Malone v. K-Mart Corp.
| Decision Date | 30 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ.A. 98-D-467-S.,Civ.A. 98-D-467-S. |
| Citation | 51 F.Supp.2d 1287 |
| Parties | Linda MALONE, Plaintiff, v. K-MART CORP., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Ann C. Robertson, Maury Steven Weiner, Birmingham, AL, for plaintiff.
Stephen E. Brown, Mitchell G. Allen, Carole A. Golinski, Birmingham, AL, for defendant.
DE MENT, District Judge.
Before the court is Defendant K-Mart Corporation's ("K-Mart") Motion For Summary Judgment As To All Of Plaintiff's Claims, along with its Brief In Support Of Motion For Summary Judgment ("Def.'s Br.") and Evidentiary Submission, filed on February 1, 1999. Plaintiff filed a Brief In Opposition To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, which the court construes as a Response ("Pl.'s Resp."), along with her Evidentiary Submission In Opposition To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, on February 17, 1999. Defendant filed a Reply Brief on February 24, 1999, and Plaintiff filed a Response To Defendant's Reply Brief, which the court construes as a Surreply, on March 5, 1999. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343(a)(4), 2201, and 2202, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq., 1981, and § 1981a. The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.
On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no `genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)).
The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The mechanics of satisfying the initial burden vary, however, depending upon which party, the movant or the nonmovant, bears the burden of proof at trial. See Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir.1993) ().
Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or] her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). In meeting this burden, the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An action is void of a material issue for trial "[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348.
Plaintiff Linda Malone, an African-American female, began working for Defendant K-Mart at store No. 3082 in 1973 and continues to work for K-Mart. (Pl.'s Resp. at 1.) In 1982, Plaintiff became a pharmacy technician. (Id.) In 1982, Tommy Henig ("Henig"), a white male, began working at store No. 3082 as a pharmacist and as Plaintiff's supervisor. (Id. at 2.) After Henig had worked at the store for approximately three months, he began to make racially and sexually derogatory comments to Plaintiff on a daily basis, which continued throughout the fifteen years that he worked with Plaintiff.1 (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that she complained "on many occasions to management employees regarding the harassment she was suffering at the hands of Henig." (Id. at 5.) Her complaints generally were ignored and nothing was done. For instance, Plaintiff complained to the pharmacy district manager, Owens Scott, "about the sexually and racially inappropriate manner in which Henig treated her" on "hundreds of occasions," but Henig's harassment continued "with the same force." (Id.) Further, Plaintiff was actively discouraged from complaining, such as when Carol Barbaree McKenny ("Barbaree") told Plaintiff that she did not like Plaintiff's complaining to the store manager. (Id.)
Plaintiff also complained directly to Henig about his mistreatment of her. (Id. at 6.) She "told Henig to stop it and that he was hurting her feelings and degrading her." (Id.) She also wrote a letter to Henig, "requesting that he stop harassing her." (Id.) In response, Henig laughed and continued his behavior. (Id.)
Prior to January 11, 1996, all of Plaintiff's complaints were made verbally. On January 11, 1996, Plaintiff for the first time complained in writing via a letter to John Swanner, the store manager, summarizing her complaints of Henig's continued harassment. (Id.) Swanner called Plaintiff within fifteen minutes of receiving the letter and told her that she was right, "that Henig's harassment had been going on for a long time and that they needed to do something to stop it." (Id. at 8.)
On January 15, 1996, Plaintiff met with Swanner and Jean Herman, the human resources manager. Swanner told Plaintiff that the pharmacy district manager, Tudor Jones, wanted a list of dates and time and things that were said. (Malone Dep., Ex. 11 at 2.) Plaintiff prepared a list and gave it to Swanner on January 19, 1996. (Pl.'s Resp. at 8; see n. 1, supra.) Swanner mailed the list to Jones on January 23, 1996. (Id.)
Jones investigated Plaintiff's complaint by interviewing Plaintiff and other K-Mart employees. Interviews with Swanner, Herman, and Barbaree revealed that they were aware of a long-term problem with Henig. (Pl.'s Resp. at 8-10; Kramer Dep. Ex. 7; Jones Dep. Ex. 1 at 19.) Throughout this investigation, no effort was made to ensure that Plaintiff and Henig did not work together. (Pl.'s Resp. at 9.) In fact, they continued to work together, and Henig continued to harass Plaintiff. (Id.)
Subsequent to the investigation, Henig was terminated on February 9, 1996. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff claims that she was subjected to a racially hostile work environment subsequent to Henig's termination, "primarily at the hands of Carol Barbaree and the new store manager, Geary Dismukes, a white male." (Id. at 13.) Plaintiff references several instances of discrimination. First, Plaintiff claims that Barbaree heard a pharmacy employee use the word "nigger" twice while in Plaintiff's presence, but took no remedial action. (Id.) On one of these occasions, Plaintiff "said, Carol [Barbaree], and Carol just kind of like shook it off her shoulders like this, you know, didn't say anything." (Id.)
Second, Plaintiff claims that, in November 1996, a pharmacy employee and Dismukes made fun of names that black people give their children. (Id. at 13-14.) When Plaintiff spoke to Dismukes about this incident, (Malone Dep., Ex. 11.)
Third, Dismukes told Plaintiff that "it is her fault that the store has had trouble hiring pharmacists." (Pl.'s Resp. at 14.) Fourth, an African American assistant manager informed Plaintiff that Dismukes "asked her why she put up a Big Bird display in the infants department `for those little black kids to tear down.'" (Id. at 15.)
The fifth incident concerns Plaintiff's performance evaluation. On December 12, 1996, Plaintiff was dissatisfied with her annual review. (Id.) Plaintiff met...
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