Malone v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

• Decision Date: 25 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09-2060.,09-2060.
• Citation: 610 F.3d 16
• Parties: Azell MALONE, Plaintiff, Appellant,v.LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION; Carl Supancic, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

610 F.3d 16

Azell MALONE, Plaintiff, Appellant,v.LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION; Carl Supancic, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 09-2060.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Feb. 3, 2010.

Decided June 25, 2010.

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Michael F. Drywa, Jr. with whom Sims & Sims LLP was on brief, for appellant.

Tamika R. Nordstrom with whom Mark T. Reynolds, Miller & Martin PLLC, and Reynolds, DeMarco & Boland LTD were on brief, for appellees.

Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, SOUTER,^* Associate Justice, and STAHL, Circuit Judge.

STAHL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-appellant Azell Malone appeals the district court's grant of a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).¹ Before the motion was granted, a jury had entered a verdict and award in favor of Malone and against defendants-appellees Lockheed Martin Corporation and Carl Supancic. The jury found the defendants guilty of employment discrimination based on race, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (RIFEPA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-1 et seq. , and the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990 (RICRA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1 et seq.; as well as retaliation based on Malone's alleged whistle-blowing activities, in violation of the Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act (RIWPA), R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-50-1 et seq. The jury entered an award of $2 million in compensatory and punitive damages.²

In a thorough and extensive opinion, the district court subsequently granted defendants' renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 50(b). As to the racial discrimination claims brought under Title VII, RIFEPA, and RICRA, the district court made three separate determinations. First, it concluded that only two alleged discriminatory acts fell within the actionable time periods of the federal and state statutes (respectively, 300 days and one year), and that Malone failed to present any evidence whatsoever that those two acts were the result of racial discrimination.

Second, the district court noted that acts that occurred outside the actionable time period “ ‘may constitute relevant background evidence.’ ” Malone v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 2009 WL 2151706, at *19 (D.R.I. July 16, 2009) (quoting National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 112, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002)); see also Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 76 (1st Cir.2004) (“A discriminatory act or practice that is not the basis for a timely charge of discrimination nonetheless may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the same type of discriminatory act or practice has been timely challenged.”). However, upon reviewing this background evidence the court determined that it revealed no sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury finding of racial animus.

Third, the district court concluded that the wrongful acts alleged by Malone which fell outside the relevant limitations periods did not make out a hostile work environment claim (under a so-called “continuing violation” theory) because his supervisors' repeated disciplinary actions were taken in response to Malone's “undisputed and well documented” habit of “taking unscheduled vacation days over a period of several years,” and there was otherwise no objective evidence of a racial motivation for the discipline. Malone, 2009 WL 2151706, at *10. Essentially, the district court determined that it had erred in allowing this evidence before the jury on a continuing violations theory.

As to the retaliation claim brought under the RIWPA, the district court concluded that Malone's report to his superiors that two employees under his supervision were suspected of accepting improper gifts from a federal employee was not the kind of act protected by the RIWPA. In the alternative, the court also concluded that Malone failed to put forth any evidence that his subsequent reprimands and demotion were caused by his report of the improper gifts rather than by his recurring absenteeism; the court concluded that the jury's determination of causation “amount[ed] to nothing more than speculation.” Malone, 2009 WL 2151706, at *15.

Having reviewed the record carefully, we affirm the district court's entry of judgment as a matter of law against Malone as to all claims.³ We conclude, as the district court did and for substantially the same reasons, that the record reveals no sufficient evidentiary basis for the verdict. Because our reasoning does not differ substantially from that of the district court, we outline the relevant facts and law only to the extent necessary to explain our conclusions; a fuller treatment of the case background is available in the district court's opinion.

A. Standard of Review

We generally review a district court's grant of a Rule 50 motion de novo. Visible Syst. Corp. v. Unisys Corp., 551 F.3d 65, 71 (1st Cir.2008).⁴ In so doing we use the same standard as the district court in evaluating the motion, meaning that “[a]ll of the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence are ... considered in the light most favorable to” the non-moving party, here Malone. See Espada v. Lugo, 312 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.2002). Further, “[i]n reviewing the record, we will evaluate neither the credibility of the witnesses nor the weight of the evidence.” Vazquez-Valentin v. Santiago-Diaz, 385 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir.2004) rev'd on other grounds, 546 U.S. 1163, 126 S.Ct. 1329, 164 L.Ed.2d 43 (2006). However, and crucially in this case, “ ‘the plaintiff is not entitled to inferences based on speculation and conjecture.’ ” Id. at 30 (quoting Ferrer v. Zayas, 914 F.2d 309, 311 (1st Cir.1990)).

The standard for granting a Rule 50 motion is stringent. “Courts may only grant a judgment contravening a jury's determination when ‘the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of the moving party that no reasonable jury could have returned a verdict adverse to that party.’ ” Rivera Castillo v. Autokirey, Inc., 379 F.3d 4, 9 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Keisling v. SER-Jobs for Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 759-60 (1st Cir.1994)).

B. Background Facts

As noted above, we leave the myriad details of this case to the district court's comprehensive opinion. Essentially, Malone, an African-American male engineer, received a series of escalating reprimands, deteriorating performance reviews, and eventually a demotion while employed at Lockheed Martin's facility in Newport, Rhode Island. The reprimands, at least six between 2002 and 2005, were issued by two consecutive supervisors, Carl Supancic and James Higson, ⁵ in response to Malone's continued practice of requesting vacation days without prior notice, on the morning of the day he wished to take off, or failing to report for work without seeking permission at all.⁶ Despite being told repeatedly and in writing that such actions were disruptive, disfavored, and could lead to job termination, Malone continued the practice. He also continued the practice despite imposition of a performance improvement plan, which was designed by Lockheed's human resources managers and legal department. Perhaps the most egregious example of this behavior occurred on two consecutive days in October 2004, when Malone failed to receive advance permission for time off or report to work despite the delivery of letters via courier to his home each day demanding his attendance at work.

As for evidence that the reprimands, performance reviews, and eventual demotion may have been caused by race-based animus, we agree with district court that such evidence was lacking from the trial record. Malone's theory was that his first supervisor, Carl Supancic, who directed a majority but not all of the reprimands and discipline of Malone, was racially biased against him. Malone admitted, however, that he only reached this conclusion “after ruling everything [else] out.” There was no other evidence submitted that suggested Supancic's actions were motivated by racial animus.⁷ The only racially tinged incident put forth by Malone was that coworkers, not including Supancic, once joked that Malone was “driving Miss Daisy” because he had to drive a white colleague to and from a work site.⁸

C. Racial Discrimination Claims

The district court correctly determined that only two discrete acts of alleged discrimination occurred within the statute of limitations for purposes of claims made under Title VII ⁹ and the state statutes. These two events were: (1) an “Updated Final Warning” regarding Malone's attendance issues that was issued by Malone's subsequent supervisor, Higson; and (2) a performance review that rated Malone as a “Basic Contributor” that was likewise issued by Higson. There was no claim that Higson himself took these actions based on racial animus, only an assertion that Higson fell under Supancic's influence. In addition, Malone submitted little evidence ¹⁰ other than his own conjecture,¹¹ that Higson's issuance of either of these reports was influenced by Supancic. Thus, as a matter of law, these two events could not have formed an adequate basis for the jury's finding of liability. Vazquez-Valentin, 385 F.3d at 30 (rejecting inferences based on speculation and conjecture alone); Ferrer, 914 F.2d at 311 (same).

As correctly noted by both parties in supplemental briefing, evidence of events that fall outside the statute of limitations may still be admitted as relevant background evidence to show that discriminatory animus motivated the acts that occurred within the statute of limitations. See Rathbun, 361 F.3d at 76. However, this rule does nothing to help Malone's cause because he offered no evidence that the acts that fell outside the limitations periods (including Supancic's reprimands, performance reviews, and eventual demotion of Malone) were motivated at least in part by racial animus. As discussed above, Malone submitted no evidence...