Malone v. Williams

• Decision Date: 30 September 2022
• Docket Number: 2:18-cv-01146-RFB-NJK
• Parties: DOMONIC RONALDO MALONE, Petitioner, v. BRIAN WILLIAMS, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

DOMONIC RONALDO MALONE, Petitioner, v. BRIAN WILLIAMS, et al., Respondents.

No. 2:18-cv-01146-RFB-NJK

United States District Court, D. Nevada

September 30, 2022

ORDER

RICHARD F. BOULWARE, II UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Nevada prisoner Domonic Ronaldo Malone (“Petitioner” or “Malone”) now brings the instant Habeas Corpus action by his appointed counsel. The respondents have filed an answer, responding to the remaining claims in Malone's amended habeas petition, Malone has filed a reply, and the case is before the Court for resolution on the merits of Malone's claims. The Court will grant Malone habeas corpus relief on his claim that his federal constitutional right to represent himself at trial was violated. The Court will deny Malone relief, and deny him a certificate of appealability, with respect to his other claims.

II. BACKGROUND

Malone was convicted of kidnapping and murdering Victoria Magee and Charlotte Combado. Malone was sentenced to four consecutive sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for the murders, and additional prison terms for the other crimes. See Judgment of Conviction, Exh. 365 (ECF No. 29-54).

Malone appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction on December 18, 2013. See Order of Affirmance, Exh. 385 (ECF No. 30-15).

Malone filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court on August 13, 2014. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Exh. 390 (ECF Nos. 30-20, 30-21, 30-22, 30-23, 30-24); Amended Supplemental Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Exh. 415 (ECF Nos. 30-49, 30-50); Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Exh. 429 (ECF No. 30-64). The state district court denied Malone's petition. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Exh. 437 (ECF No. 30-72). Malone appealed, and the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Malone's petition on February 15, 2018. See Order of Affirmance, Exh. 474 (ECF No. 31-35).

This Court received a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus from Malone, initiating this action, on June 25, 2018. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1-1). The Court granted Malone's motion for appointment of counsel, and appointed counsel to represent him. See Order entered July 16, 2018 (ECF No. 4); Order entered August 31, 2018, (ECF No. 7). With counsel, Malone filed an amended petition on January 29, 2019. (ECF No. 11).

In his amended petition-his operative petition-Malone asserts the following grounds for relief:

1. Malone's federal constitutional rights were violated “when he was forced to accept the Special Public Defender's Office as his lawyers.”

2. Malone's federal constitutional rights were violated as a result of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, because of trial counsel's “failure to challenge prospective juror #484.”

3. Malone's federal constitutional rights were violated as a result of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, because of trial counsel's failure “to investigate the incomplete cellphone records or hire an expert to reconstruct them.”

4A. Malone's federal constitutional rights were violated because the prosecutor, in closing argument, committed prosecutorial misconduct by referring “to a dumped out purse as evidence of a ‘struggle' during the alleged kidnapping.”

4B. Malone's federal constitutional rights were violated as a result of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, because of trial counsel's failure to object to the State's improper commentary during closing arguments.

5. Malone's federal constitutional rights were violated as a result of improper jury instructions.

6. Malone's federal constitutional rights were violated because his first-degree kidnapping conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence.

7. Malone's federal constitutional rights were violated because the trial court allowed the testimony of an accomplice and improperly instructed the jury about how to weigh the accomplice testimony.

8A. Malone's federal constitutional rights were violated as a result of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, because of the cumulative effect of trial counsel's errors.

8B. Malone's federal constitutional rights were violated as a result of ineffective assistance of his appellate counsel.

Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 11).

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on September 9, 2019 (ECF No. 22), arguing that various of Malone's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, are partly or wholly unexhausted in state court; and/or are partly or wholly procedurally defaulted. On July 13, 2020, the Court granted that motion in part and denied it in part; the Court dismissed the claim in Ground 2. See Order entered July 13, 2020 (ECF No. 40). The Court deferred ruling on the question of the possible procedural default of Grounds 4A, 5 (in part), 6 and 7 until consideration of the merits of Malone's remaining claims. See id.

Respondents filed an answer (ECF No. 51), responding to Malone's remaining claims on May 28, 2021. Malone filed a reply on September 23, 2021 (ECF No. 54).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court may not grant a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on any claim that was adjudicated on its merits in state court unless the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by United States Supreme Court precedent, or was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state-court ruling is “contrary to” clearly established federal law if it either applies a rule that contradicts governing Supreme Court law or reaches a result that differs from the result the Supreme Court reached on “materially indistinguishable” facts. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam). A state-court ruling is “an unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law if it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but unreasonably applies the rule to the facts of the case. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-08 (2000). To obtain federal habeas relief for such an “unreasonable application,” however, a petitioner must show that the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent was “objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 409-10; see also Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21 (2003). Or, in other words, habeas relief is warranted, under the “unreasonable application” clause of section 2254(d)(1), only if the state court's ruling was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011).

B. Procedural Default

In Coleman v. Thompson, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner who fails to comply with the state's procedural requirements in presenting his claims is barred by the adequate and independent state ground doctrine from obtaining a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-32 (1991) (“Just as in those cases in which a state prisoner fails to exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner who has failed to meet the State's procedural requirements for presenting his federal claims has deprived the state courts of an opportunity to address those claims in the first instance.”). Where such a procedural default constitutes an adequate and independent state ground for denial of habeas corpus, the default may be excused only if “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,” or if the prisoner demonstrates cause for the default and prejudice resulting from it. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).

To demonstrate cause for a procedural default, the petitioner must “show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded” his efforts to comply with the state procedural rule. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. For cause to exist, the external impediment must have prevented the petitioner from raising the claim. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (1991). With respect to prejudice, the petitioner bears “the burden of showing not merely that the errors [complained of] constituted a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire [proceeding] with errors of constitutional dimension.” White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 1989), citing United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).

C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court propounded a two-prong test for analysis of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, requiring the petitioner to demonstrate (1) that the attorney's “representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) that the attorney's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must apply a “strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. The petitioner's burden is to show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. To establish prejudice under Strickland, it is not enough for the habeas petitioner “to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on...