Malott v. Hood

Decision Date18 February 1903
Citation66 N.E. 247,201 Ill. 202
PartiesMALOTT v. HOOD.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Error to appellate court, Third district.

Action by J. B. Hood against V. T. Malott, receiver of the Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad Company. From a judgment of the appellate court (99 Ill. App. 360) affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed.Neal & Wiley and T. J. Golden, for plaintiff in error.

James W. & Edward C. Craig, for defendant in error.

BOGGS, J.

The plaintiff in error on the 27th day of December, 1897, was operating the Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad Company in his capacity as receiver, by appointment of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Indiana and the circuit court of the United States for the Southern district of Illinois. On that day the defendant in error, who was in the employ of said receiver as rear brakeman on a freight train which said receiver was moving over said road from East St. Louis, in the state of Illinois, to Indianapolis, in the state of Indiana, while attempting, at the side track at Greenup, Ill., to couple one of the cars which had been placed in the train at East St. Louis to a car standing on the switch at Greenup, had his right hand caught between the deadwood of the bumpers of the cars, and so badly crushed and mangled that his hand had to be amputated. He brought this action in case against the receiver to recover damages for the injuries thus received, and recovered a judgment in the sum of $3,500, which has been affirmed by the appellate court for the Third district on appeal. This writ of error has been sued out by the receiver.

Two grounds of recovery were relied on. The first was that the car which had been placed in the train at East St. Louis, Ill., to be transported or hauled to Indianapolis, Ind., which the defendant in error was attempting to couple to another car, was being used in interstate commerce by the receiver, and was not provided with grab irons or hand holds in the ends and sides thereof, as is required by section 4 of the act of congress approved March 2, 1893 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, 3174], which section is as follows: ‘That from and after the first day of July, 1895, until otherwise ordered by the interstate commerce commission, it shall be unlawful for any railroad company to use any car in inter-state commerce that is not provided with secure grab-irons or hand-holds in the ends and sides of each car for greater security to men in coupling and uncoupling cars,’-and that the injury to the defendant in error resulted from the failure to so have grab irons or hand holds on the ends of the car. As to this ground of recovery, the argument of counsel for the plaintiff in error is that the evidence did not bring the case within the terms of the federal statute, and did not, by a preponderance thereof, show the car was not provided with the grab irons or hand holds, and that the court erred in not giving the jury an instruction defining ‘interstate commerce.’

In support of the first of these contentions, it is urged there is no evidence to show that the car in question contained any commodities to be transported from one state to another. The trial court was not asked to hold, as matter of law, the evidence was insufficient to warrant recovery, and to direct a peremptory verdict in favor of the plaintiff in error receiver. The question, therefore, does not arise upon the record whether, as matter of law, the court erred in submitting the case to the jury, and the action of the circuit court and the appellate court is conclusive as to the sufficiency of the proof to support the verdict. Whether the conflict in the testimony on the question whether the car was supplied with grab irons or hand holds was properly decided by the jury was also a question of fact, and is not open to review in this court.

It appeared in the proof the receiver was operating a line of railway from East St. Louis, in the state of Illinois, to Indianapolis, in the state of Indiana, and that the car in question was placed in the train at East St. Louis, and was to be transported or hauled to Indianapolis. The evidence tended to show that the train was loaded with stock and merchandise, and it is insisted the inference fairly...

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6 cases
  • Craesafulli v. Winston Bros. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • April 29, 1910
    ...... man would anticipate injury as so probable that he would not. enter upon or remain in the employment. (Malott v. Hood, 201 Ill. 202, 66 N.E. 247; Clark v. Wolverine. Portland Cement Co., 138 Mich. 673, 101 N.W. 845;. Revolinski v. Adams Coal Co., 118 Wis. ......
  • Lamoon v. Smith Cement Brick Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • June 19, 1913
    ......51; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. House, 172. Ill. 601, 50 N.E. 151; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kelly, 63 F. 407, 11 C. C. A. 260; Malott v. Hood, 201 Ill. 202, 66 N.E. 247. . . In the. case in hand the respondent's position is further. ......
  • Jobe v. Spokane Gas & Fuel Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • April 12, 1913
    ......R. R. v. House, 172 Ill. 601, 50 N.E. 151; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. [73 Wash. 9] Kelly, 63 F. 407,. 11 C. C. A. 260; Malott v. Hood, 201 Ill. 202, 66. N.E. 247. . . The. danger here encountered by the plaintiff was not a certain,. ......
  • Schmidt v. Schmidt
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • February 18, 1903
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