Malpeli v. State

• Decision Date: 18 September 2012
• Docket Number: No. DA 11–0593.,DA 11–0593.
• Citation: 366 Mont. 69,2012 MT 181,285 P.3d 509
• Parties: Faith MALPELI, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of Montana, Defendant, Appellee, and Cross–Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

366 Mont. 69

285 P.3d 509

2012 MT 181

Faith MALPELI, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.STATE of Montana, Defendant, Appellee, and Cross–Appellant.

No. DA 11–0593.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs June 6, 2012.

Decided Aug. 21, 2012.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 18, 2012.

For Appellant: Wade J. Dahood, Bernard J. Everett; Knight, Dahood, Everett & Sievers; Anaconda, Montana.

For Appellee: David Lee Ohler, Jolyn E. Eggart; Special Assistant Attorneys General, Montana Department of Transportation; Helena, Montana.

Justice BETH BAKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 Faith Malpeli brought an inverse condemnation action against the Montana Department of Transportation (MDT), seeking compensation for the alleged taking of her property as a result of the reconstruction of Montana Highway 191 near Big Sky, Montana during a highway safety improvement project. A jury found that MDT had not taken a property right belonging to Malpeli, and therefore did not reach the question of compensation. Malpeli appeals, arguing that the District Court erred by (a) denying Malpeli's motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial; (b) excluding Malpeli's appraiser from testifying; and (c) allowing MDT to disclose to the jury an offer of compromise it had made to Malpeli before this action was filed. MDT cross-appeals, arguing that the District Court erred by denying its motion for partial summary judgment before trial. After careful consideration, we determine that the motion for summary judgment should have been granted, and therefore affirm the judgment in favor of MDT.

¶ 2 The issue that we address on appeal is the following:

¶ 3 Did the District Court err in denying MDT's motion for summary judgment regarding Malpeli's claim that MDT took from her the right of reasonable access to her property?

¶ 4 Because we conclude that the District Court erred in denying summary judgment on this issue, we do not address Malpeli's claims of trial error.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 5 Malpeli owns residential property adjacent to Montana Highway 191. MDT is the state agency responsible for operating and maintaining public highway facilities, including rights-of-way, embankments, drainage structures, bridges, guardrails, and other protective structures, to ensure the safe, efficient use of the highways. See§§ 2–15–2501 to –2511, MCA; §§ 60–1–101 to –103, MCA; §§ 60–2–201 to –243, MCA.

¶ 6 In the summer and fall of 2008 and 2009, MDT reconstructed the portion of Highway 191 adjacent to Malpeli's residence as part of a highway safety improvement project. The MDT reconstruction of Highway 191 involved widening the highway to include a left-turn lane and adding eight-foot-wide paved shoulders. All of these improvements were completed within the existing highway right-of-way. None of Malpeli's property was required in order to widen the highway and add the paved shoulder.

¶ 7 Malpeli's property includes a driveway from Highway 191 to her garage. Part of Malpeli's garage is located just one foot from the highway right-of-way. After the project was completed, the highway fog line and the edge of the pavement were as much as eight feet (the fog line) to nearly eighteen feet (the edge of the pavement) closer to part of Malpeli's garage than they had been before the project. In addition, Malpeli's approach from the highway to her property had been paved, the grade had been reduced, and a guardrail had been added on the south side of the approach.

¶ 8 On January 29, 2010, Malpeli filed this lawsuit, alleging that MDT, in carrying out the reconstruction project, had, among other claims, (a) “taken from plaintiff MALPELI reasonable and safe access to her residential property to and from Highway 191;” and (b) “violated its own MDT ‘approach standards' in the reconstruction of the highway.” ¹ The crux of Malpeli's complaint about access to her property was described in later pleadings: “Before the widening of Highway 191, FAITH MALPELI could maneuver her vehicles to turn them around and face the approach to Highway 191. Since the widening, she cannot. She, her guests and delivery vehicles now must back out onto the highway or back out onto the paved shoulder....”

¶ 9 Following discovery, MDT filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Malpeli did not have a property interest in use of the public right-of-way for maneuvering vehicles, and that using the public right-of-way in such a manner was unrelated to any right of access that a landowner might possess. Malpeli opposed the motion.

¶ 10 The District Court denied MDT's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Malpeli has a property interest in “reasonable ingress and egress” to and from her property, and that the question whether the reconstruction of Highway 191 constitutes a taking of this property interest is a question of fact.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 We review de novo a district court's decision on a motion for summary judgment, using the same criteria applied by the district court under M.R. Civ. P. 56. Boehm v. Cokedale, LLC, 2011 MT 224, ¶ 12, 362 Mont. 65, 261 P.3d 994.Rule 56(c)(3) provides: “The judgment sought should be rendered if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A material fact is one that involves the elements of the cause of action or defense at issue to such an extent that it requires resolution of the issue by a trier of fact. Williams v. Plum Creek Timber Co., 2011 MT 271, ¶ 14, 362 Mont. 368, 264 P.3d 1090.

¶ 12 In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment properly made and supported, the opposing party must set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial by affidavits or as otherwise provided by Rule 56. M.R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party; all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. Williams, ¶ 15.

DISCUSSION

¶ 13 Did the District Court err in denying MDT's motion for summary judgment regarding Malpeli's claim that MDT took from her the right of reasonable access to her property?

¶ 14 Malpeli's inverse condemnation claim is based on Article II, Section 29 of the Montana Constitution, which states that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation to the full extent of the loss having been first made to or paid into court for the owner.” A claim under this provision requiresa court to first determine “whether a plaintiff possesses a cognizable property interest in the subject of the alleged taking. The question of whether plaintiffs owned a compensable property interest presents a question of law based on factual underpinnings.” Kafka v. Mont. Dep't of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 2008 MT 460, ¶ 32, 348 Mont. 80, 201 P.3d 8 (quoting Mohlen v. United States, 74 Fed.Cl. 656, 660 (Fed.Cl.2006)). Under Montana law, the threshold question whether one has a protected property interest must be answered in the affirmative before the question whether one was deprived of that interest may be submitted to the trier of fact. Kafka, ¶ 32 (quoting Seven Up Pete Venture v. State, 2005 MT 146, ¶ 26, 327 Mont. 306, 114 P.3d 1009).

¶ 15 Property interests are defined by rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. Kafka, ¶ 33 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001, 104 S.Ct. 2862, 2872, 81 L.Ed.2d 815 (1984)). The determination whether a citizen has a protected property interest focuses on the citizen's relationship to the alleged property, such as whether the citizen had the rights to exclude, use, transfer, or dispose of the property. Kafka, ¶ 33 (quoting Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Assn. Inc. v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed.Cir.2005)).

¶ 16 The undisputed facts of this case show that Malpeli could still enter and exit her property after the Highway 191 project was completed, but that it was more difficult for her to turn a vehicle around, because MDT had used much of the highway right-of-way where she previously had turned around to widen the highway and add shoulders. At Malpeli's deposition, which was among the discovery materials filed in connection with the summary judgment motion, she explained that her “right of access” claim involved only the “danger” of “pulling in and out” of her driveway, specifically her concern that she could only back onto the highway or paved shoulder. The real question presented by the motion for summary judgment, therefore, was whether Malpeli had a compensable property interest in the use of the public's right-of-way to turn her vehicles around.

¶ 17 In denying MDT's motion for summary judgment, the District Court relied on this Court's holding in State by State Highway Comm'n v. Keneally, 142 Mont. 256, 384 P.2d 770 (1963). The parties in Keneally recognized that an abutting landowner has a right to “ reasonable ingress and egress from the abutting highway.” Keneally, 142 Mont. at 265, 384 P.2d at 775 (emphasis in original); see Wynia v. City of Great Falls, 183 Mont. 458, 472, 600 P.2d 802, 810 (1979) (quoting Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal.2d 343, 144 P.2d 818, 834 (1943) (Traynor, J., dissenting)) (“the right of ingress and egress is limited to adequate and reasonable access to the property from the street”).

¶ 18 The Keneally Court stated: “ ‘No hard and fast rule can be stated as to whether an abutting property owner has been denied access that is reasonable.... In most instances the question is one of fact, not of law, and its determination depends largely upon the evidence in the particular case.’ ” Keneally, 142 Mont. at 265, 384 P.2d at 775 (emphasis added) (quoting Iowa State Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82 N.W.2d 755, 760 (Iowa 1957)). This statement...