Malta v. Wood Group PSN, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | BRB 16-0552 |
| Parties | LUIGI A. MALTA Claimant-Respondent v. WOOD GROUP PSN, INCORPORATED and SIGNAL MUTUAL INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION, LIMITED Employer/Carrier-Petitioners DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Respondent |
| Court | Longshore Complaints Court of Appeals |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appeal of the Decision and Order Based on the Parties' Joint Stipulation of Larry W. Price, Administrative Law Judge United States Department of Labor.
Al J Robert, Jr. (Law Office of Al J. Robert, Jr., LLC), New Orleans, Louisiana, and Frank M. Buck, Jr. (The Buck Law Firm), Gretna, Louisiana, for claimant.
Scott A. Soule and Randy J. Hoth (Blue Williams, L.L.P.) Mandeville, Louisiana, for employer/carrier.
Matthew W. Boyle (Nicholas C. Geale, Acting Solicitor of Labor; Maia Fisher, Associate Solicitor; Mark A. Reinhalter, Counsel for Longshore),
Washington, D.C., for the Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor.
Before: HALL, Chief Administrative Appeals Judge, BUZZARD and ROLFE, Administrative Appeals Judges.
DECISION AND ORDER
Employer appeals the Decision and Order (2013-LHC-01511) of Administrative Law Judge Larry W. Price rendered on a claim filed pursuant to the provisions of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C §901 et seq. (the Act). We must affirm the administrative law judge's findings of fact and conclusions of law if they are rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance with law. 33 U.S.C. §921(b)(3); O'Keeffe v. Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Inc., 380 U.S. 359 (1965).
This case is before the Board for the second time. Claimant was employed as an offshore warehouseman at employer's Black Bay Central Facility, a fixed platform in Louisiana state waters. 1st Hr'g Tr. (Jan. 14, 2014) at 7, 10. As an offshore warehouseman, claimant's duties included shipping, receiving, warehousing, dispatching tools and supplies to different operators for use on various satellite platforms, and loading and unloading vessels at various times throughout the day. Id. at 10-11, 13. Claimant's warehousing duties also consisted of maintaining the warehouse, maintaining the stock in the warehouse, and ordering supplies. Id. at 22.
The Central Facility provided support for various satellite oil and gas production platforms located in the Helis Black Bay field. Most of the equipment and supplies needed for operations in the Helis Black Bay field were shipped by vessel from Venice, Louisiana to the warehouse at the Central Facility. 1st Hr'g Tr. at 18, 22-23. These materials included pipes, valves, compressors, nitrogen cylinders, tool bags, and repair parts. Id. at 12, 30-31.
On April 14, 2012, claimant received a call requesting help to unload a vessel. 1st Hr'g Tr. at 18. Claimant was unloading a CO2 bottle that had been mislabeled as “empty” from the cargo basket when it forcefully discharged. In diving out of the way, claimant fell and sustained injuries to his back, left arm, shoulder, and foot. When the accident occurred, claimant was on the platform in front of the warehouse. He did not go onto the vessel. Id. at 25.
Employer asserted that claimant's injury was not covered under the Act, but it paid claimant temporary total disability benefits under the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Act. 1st Decision and Order at 1. The administrative law judge denied claimant's claim for benefits because he concluded that claimant's injury did not occur on a “situs” covered by the Act. 1st Decision and Order at 7. Claimant appealed the administrative law judge's Decision and Order to the Board, challenging the administrative law judge's finding that the Black Bay Central Facility is not a covered situs. The Board reversed the administrative law judge's decision, holding that the Central Facility is a covered situs pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §903(a). Malta v. Wood Group Prod. Services, 49 BRBS 31 (2015). The Board remanded the case for consideration of any remaining issues. Id. at 35.
On remand, the administrative law judge conducted a second hearing on the issue of whether claimant was engaged in “maritime employment” pursuant to Section 2(3) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §902(3).[1] Claimant testified as to his duties and estimated that he spent up to 10 hours per week or 25 to 35 percent of his shift loading and unloading vessels. 2nd Hr'g Tr. (April 13, 2016) at 37. Claimant clarified that the supply vessels came out to the Central Facility every day and there were always supplies to be loaded onto the vessels for shipment to the prospective satellite fields. Id. at 40-41. Claimant stated that he would load and unload the supplies while standing on the platform outside the warehouse doors. Id.
After the second hearing, the parties submitted a joint stipulation to the administrative law judge. See Joint Stipulation submitted May 26, 2016 The Joint Stipulation provided as follows:
As per the Decision of the Benefits Review Board issued on May 29, 2015, which the Employer and Authorized Group Self-Insurer dispute, there is jurisdiction under the LHWCA; … (d) employer and Authorized Group Self-Insurer shall pay LWEC benefits from April 18, 2015 and on-going, at a rate of $289.48 per week, while reserving their right to properly controvert payment of benefits due to a change of status, discovery of new evidence, DOL or OALJ approval of a joint 8(i) Petition for Compromise Settlement of remaining claims or the emergence of any other grounds for controversion; … (h) The Employer and Carrier specifically reserve their right to all appellate remedies, including but not limited to, those before the Benefits Review Board and the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal.
Joint Stipulation at 2-3. In a June 10, 2016 Decision and Order, the administrative law judge incorporated the Joint Stipulation in its entirety and ordered employer to pay claimant benefits from April 18, 2015 at a rate of $289.15 per week for his loss in wage-earning capacity. See Decision and Order Based on the Parties' Joint Stipulation at 2.
On appeal, employer challenges the administrative law judge's “finding” that the claimant is a “maritime employee” under Section 2(3) of the Act. Employer contends the award must be reversed because claimant was not engaged in maritime employment. Claimant responds, urging affirmance of the administrative law judge's decision as to claimant's status. The Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs (the Director), also responds, filing a motion to remand on the grounds that the administrative law judge's decision did not address the issue of claimant's “status” under the Act and that there are no substantive findings for the Board to review. Employer replies to claimant's response, asserting that the issue of status remained a contested issue and that the administrative law judge's award must be reversed.
It is well-settled that both the “situs” and “status” requirements must be met for coverage under the Act. 33 U.S.C. §§902(3), 903(a); see Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 6 BRBS 150 (1977). The Board held that claimant's injury occurred on a covered situs pursuant to Section 3(a) of the Act. Malta, 49 BRBS at 35. Accordingly, the administrative law judge accurately stated at the second hearing that whether claimant has status as a maritime employee is the only issue remaining as to whether the initial prerequisites for coverage have been met. 2nd Hr'g Tr. at 4. The parties' Joint Stipulation, adopted by the administrative law judge's Decision and Order, stated “as per the Decision of the Benefits Review Board issued on May 29, 2015, which the Employer and Authorized Group Self-Insurer dispute, there is jurisdiction under the LHWCA….”[2] See Joint Stipulations at 2; Decision and Order Based on the Parties' Joint Stipulations at 2.
We agree with the Director that this case must be remanded. The Joint Stipulations submitted by the parties and accepted in their entirety by the administrative law judge improperly interpreted the Board's prior decision. Moreover, employer's reservation of a right to challenge the stipulated facts reflects its intent to not be bound by the stipulations.
A stipulation is “[a]n express waiver... conceding for the purposes of trial the truth of some alleged fact....” Mitri v. Global Linguist Solutions 48 BRBS 41, 44, n.9 (2014) (quoting Vander Linden v. Hodges, 193 F.2d 268, 279 (4th Cir. 1999). As a general rule, stipulations are binding upon those who enter into them. Brown v. Maryland Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 18 BRBS 104, 107 (1986). However, stipulations offered in lieu of factual evidence are not binding on any party if they evince an incorrect application of law. Aitmbarek v. L-3 Communications, 44 BRBS 115 (2010); Puccetti v. Ceres Gulf, 24 BRBS 25 (1990). To the extent the parties' stipulation and the administrative law judge's acceptance thereof reflect an understanding that the Board's decision held that claimant satisfied the Act's status requirement, the stipulation is mistaken. The Board's decision did not address the issue of status nor was it before the Board in the first appeal because the administrative law judge's initial decision did not address the status requirement. The Board reversed only the administrative law judge's finding that claimant's injury did not occur on a covered “situs, ” vacated the denial of benefits, and remanded for consideration of the remaining issues, to include status, if this was a contested issue. SeeMalta, 49...
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