Maltas v. Maltas.

• Decision Date: 07 September 2010
• Docket Number: No. 18538.,18538.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: John T. MALTAS v. R. Brian MALTAS.

298 Conn. 354

2 A.3d 902

John T. MALTAS

v.R. Brian MALTAS.

No. 18538.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 25, 2010.

Decided Sept. 7, 2010.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.

Stephen C. Gallagher, Danbury, for the appellant (defendant).

V. Michael Simko, Jr., Shelton, for the appellee (plaintiff).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js. ^*

ROGERS, C.J.

This case raises questions regarding the proper procedure and burden of proof in actions to enforce foreign default judgments. The defendant, R. Brian Maltas, appeals from the trial court's summary judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, John T. Maltas. ¹ The plaintiff brought the present action to domesticate in Connecticut a default judgment rendered in Alaska, and the defendant sought to attack collaterally the validity of that judgment, claiming that the Alaska court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The defendant claims that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) a collateral challenge to the validity of a foreign default judgment must be raised in a motion to dismiss and not as a special defense; and (2) the plaintiff had satisfied his burden of establishing that there were no genuine issues of material fact and the Alaska judgment was valid as a matter of law. We agree with both of the defendant's claims and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to the present appeal. The parties are brothers. In 2005, the plaintiff, an Alaska resident, brought an action in Alaska against the defendant, a Connecticut resident, on a claim of promissory estoppel. ² The plaintiff's Alaska complaint alleged that when the parties' father, an Alaska resident, died in 2001, the right to prosecute a pending action he had filed in Maryland against a third brother, Michael Maltas, passed to his estate. The plaintiff further alleged that, when he became the personal representative of his father for probate purposes, he “consulted with the [d]efendant on whether or not the estate should continue to prosecute the Maryland case.” The plaintiff allegedly informed the defendant that neither he nor the estate had sufficient funds to continue to prosecute the action. In response, the plaintiff alleged, the defendant had assured the plaintiff that he controlled the deceased's funds and would make them available to the plaintiff to prosecute the Maryland action. The plaintiff alleged, however, that after he had prosecuted the Maryland case to its conclusion, in reliance on the defendant's assurances, the defendant reimbursed the plaintiff for only a portion of the legal costs.

The plaintiff's Alaska complaint provided no details regarding the number, duration, location or mode of communication of the alleged promissory discussion or discussions between the parties, nor did it specify whether any of either party's alleged obligations were to be carried out in Alaska. Further, there is no indication in the record that the plaintiff had provided any affidavits or other evidence to the Alaska court in support of his allegations. The record does indicate that the defendant was served personally in Connecticut with process for the Alaska action.

In 2006, the Alaska court rendered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, in the amount of $40,000 plus interest, costs and attorney's fees. The judgment stated that the defendant had “failed to plead in or otherwise defend this action....” It did not indicate, however, that the Alaska court had made an explicit finding that it had personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff.

On July 31, 2007, the plaintiff filed this action in Connecticut, seeking to enforce the Alaska default judgment against the defendant pursuant to General Statutes § 52-607. ³ The Connecticut complaint alleged the existence of the Alaska default judgment, and that the defendant owed the plaintiff the sum of $53,752 on that judgment. The complaint made no reference to the jurisdictional basis for the Alaska action, however, or to the particulars of the discussions which allegedly precipitated it.

The defendant responded to the plaintiff's complaint on September 26, 2007, by filing an answer and a special defense. The defendant admitted only to being a resident of Connecticut. As to the remaining allegations, he averred that he lacked sufficient information to form a belief, and he left the plaintiff to his proof. In his special defense, the defendant claimed that the Alaska judgment was not enforceable against him because he never had appeared in the Alaska action and the Alaska court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. The plaintiff denied the defendant's special defense.

The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Practice Book § 17-44 et seq., alleging that the Alaska judgment was a valid, final judgment, entitling him to judgment as a matter of law in the Connecticut enforcement action. Along with the motion, the plaintiff submitted affidavits from his Alaska and Connecticut counsel, each reiterating the allegations from the Connecticut complaint, namely, that an Alaska default judgment had been rendered against the defendant and remained wholly unsatisfied. Again, the affidavits made no reference to the jurisdictional basis for the Alaska action, or to any factual detail on which a court could make a jurisdictional finding. ⁴

Relying on Connecticut rules of procedure, the plaintiff also contended that the defendant had waived his right to contest the Alaska court's personal jurisdiction over him. He argued that Practice Book §§ 10-30 through 10-32 require that any challenge to personal jurisdiction be brought through a motion to dismiss, rather than as a special defense, and that such a motion must be brought within thirty days of filing an initial appearance. Finally, the plaintiff contended that, even if the issue of personal jurisdiction had not been waived, there was no genuine issue of material fact, and the judgment was valid under Alaska law.

In opposing the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the defendant contended that the plaintiff's waiver arguments were legally incorrect. With regard to the presumed validity of a foreign default judgment, the defendant noted that the complaint in the Alaska action contained “no allegations as to the basis for an Alaskan [c]ourt to have personal jurisdiction over the [d]efendant and no finding was made by the Alaskan [c]ourt as to the basis for it having personal jurisdiction over the [d]efendant.” According to the defendant, whether the Alaska court properly had exercised personal jurisdiction over him was a disputed question of fact to be resolved by the trial court. The defendant submitted an affidavit with his opposition memorandum, ⁵ in which he averred that he had not entered an appearance or consented to the entry of judgment against him in the Alaska action, and that he had only been to Alaska once in his life, for approximately three days in the mid-1980s.

On October 15, 2008, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Although the precise basis for the trial court's decision is not entirely clear, the court appears to have determined, alternatively, that: (1) the defendant had waived his right to contest the validity of the Alaska judgment by failing to file a motion to dismiss; or (2) the Alaska judgment was presumptively valid as a matter of law, placing the burden on the defendant to submit evidence drawing into question the Alaska court's lack of personal jurisdiction, which the defendant had failed to do. This appeal followed.

I

The defendant claims first that the trial court improperly concluded that he had waived his claim that the Alaska court lacked personal jurisdiction over him by raising it as a special defense rather than in a motion to dismiss. The plaintiff argues in response that Practice Book §§ 10-30 through 10-32 require that any challenge to personal jurisdiction be brought through a motion to dismiss. We agree with the defendant.

The interpretation of a rule of practice, including whether it applies to a particular situation, is a question of law. Wiseman v. Armstrong, 295 Conn. 94, 99, 989 A.2d 1027 (2010). Accordingly, the trial court's determination that the defendant waived his right to challenge personal jurisdiction by failing to comply with the requirements of the rules of practice is subject to plenary review. Id.

Practice Book § 10-30 provides in relevant part that “[a]ny defendant, wishing to contest the court's jurisdiction, may do so even after having entered a general appearance, but must do so by filing a motion to dismiss within thirty days of the filing of an appearance.” Practice Book § 10-31(a) provides further that “[t]he motion to dismiss shall be used to assert ... (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person....” Finally, Practice Book § 10-32 provides that “[a]ny claim of lack of jurisdiction over the person ... is waived if not raised by a motion to dismiss filed in the sequence provided in Sections 10-6 and 10-7 and within the time provided by Section 10-30.” ⁶

These rules clearly contemplate that it is a challenge to the jurisdiction of the Connecticut court that must be raised in a motion to dismiss, or else be waived. The rules of practice overall govern practice and procedure in the courts of this state only. See Practice Book § 1-1. The rules in chapter 10 of the Practice Book address in detail the form and timing of pleadings to be filed in Connecticut actions. The requirements in Practice Book § 10-30 for “contest[ing] the court's jurisdiction” plainly apply to challenges to a particular court's jurisdiction. (Emphasis added.) Read in context, that court necessarily is the Connecticut court in which the action is pending. Similarly, the procedures delineated in Practice Book §§ 10-31 and 10-32 for...