Maltas v. Maltas

Decision Date26 April 2002
Docket NumberNo. CIV. AMD 00-3671.,CIV. AMD 00-3671.
Citation197 F.Supp.2d 409
PartiesJohn T. MALTAS, Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard B. Maltas, Deceased, Plaintiff v. Michael L. MALTAS and Mary Ellen Maltas, Defendants
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Henry Mark Stichel, Gohn Hankey and Stichel LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Richard B. Maltas, John T. Maltas.

Douglas Clark Hollmann, Law Office, Annapolis, MD, for Michael L. Maltas, Mary Ellen Maltas.

MEMORANDUM

DAVIS, District Judge.

This diversity case requires the court's scrutiny of an unfortunate intra family dispute. The issues surround the propriety of the actions of one of seven siblings who greatly benefitted himself and his wife, to the exclusion of his brothers and sisters, from the receipt of $100,000 provided to him by his now-deceased father. The father, Richard B. Maltas (referred to herein as "Ben"), instituted the case in December 2000, while he was a domiciliary of Alaska, to recover an unspecified portion of the $100,000. After Ben's death in April 2001, the personal representative of Ben's estate, his son John T. Maltas ("plaintiff" or "Tom"), was substituted as plaintiff.

Tom contends that his brother Michael and Michael's wife, Mary Ellen (collectively "defendants" or "Michael and Mary Ellen"), who reside in Maryland, are liable for constructive fraud in respect to the money they received from Ben, or, alternatively, that Michael and Mary Ellen were unjustly enriched and should be ordered to return some portion of the funds to Ben's estate, principally via the imposition of a constructive trust upon defendants' Maryland residence.

Now pending is defendants' motion for summary judgment, on the grounds of limitations and on the merits, as to all of plaintiff's claims. Discovery has been completed. I have given careful attention to the parties' memoranda and exhibits and a hearing is not needed. Local R. 105.6. For the reasons explained below, summary judgment shall be granted in favor of defendants.

I.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material for purposes of summary judgment, if when applied to the substantive law, it affects the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Summary judgment is also appropriate when a party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in [Rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56] must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1012 (4th Cir.1991). Of course, the facts, as well as justifiable inferences to be drawn therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indust. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The court, however, has an affirmative obligation to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial. Felty v. Graves-Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir.1987).

II.

The following account of material facts is set forth in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the nonmovant. Ben was born in Connecticut on February 15, 1918, the son of a Greek immigrant father and French immigrant mother. Aff. of John T. Maltas, Attach. A (handwritten biography by Ben, dated March 28, 2000) (hereinafter Tom Aff.). When Ben was a youngster, he was hit in the head by a rock or a brick. Id. Ben's academic performance faltered as a result of that incident. Id.; see also Dep. of Michael L. Maltas at 83-85 (hereinafter Michael Dep.). Ben completed no more than the tenth grade of high school. Tom Aff., Attach. A.; Dep. of John T. Maltas at 49. When he was eighteen, Ben entered the National Guard, Tom Aff., Attach. B, and he later enlisted in the Army. He was honorably discharged from the Army in 1940. Id. Ben then joined the Marine Corps in 1945 and was honorably discharged in 1946. Tom Aff., Attach. C.

On February 18, 1942, Ben married Virginia Tallon. They resided in Connecticut and raised seven children: Richard Brian ("Brian"); Virginia; Tom (the plaintiff personal representative and an attorney); George; Michael (who is, together with his wife, a defendant); Jeanne; and Patrice. Unexpectedly, Mrs. Maltas suffered a stroke and died a few days later in May 1991. For months after his wife's death, Ben grieved and his family thought that he appeared to be out of sorts and depressed. Dep. of Marilyn Maltas at 8-9; Tom Aff. ¶ 8.

Ben was not knowledgeable about financial and business affairs. Aff. of Richard Brian Maltas ¶ 12. Rather, Mrs. Maltas had handled the financial affairs of the household before she died. Id.; Michael's Dep. at 80-81. Brian had to teach Ben how to write out checks after Mrs. Maltas died. Dep. of Richard Brian Maltas at 9; Tom Aff. ¶ 11. Brian gave the following deposition testimony regarding the role that he and Michael (who were seemingly the only two siblings who resided near Ben in Connecticut) played in Ben's life after the death of Mrs. Maltas:

Q. ... I want to focus on the 1991 time frame, after your mother's death. You have testified earlier that you and your brother Michael had had discussions about your need to take some role with respect to your father's future.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you recall anything that Michael said about what he viewed as his role as being with respect to your father?

A. I can't phrase anything exactly, except that we were both agreeing with that issue that there were not a lot of alternatives out there and it was going to be our responsibility. I wasn't like— it was just conversation back and forth saying, you know, it's going to fall on us, and we would say back and forth —

Q. Would it be correct to say that Michael agreed with you that the two of you would take some responsibilities for your father's future at that point?

A. Yes, positively.

Dep. of Richard Brian Maltas at 36-37.

About three or four weeks after his wife's death, Ben left Connecticut and went to stay in Alaska with Tom for several weeks. Tom observed during this period that his father was extremely depressed. Aff. of John T. Maltas ¶¶ 5, 8. While Ben was in Alaska, and apparently with Ben's knowledge and permission, Brian and Michael arranged for their parents' house to be sold. Aff. of Richard Brian Maltas ¶ 4. The house was sold in September 1991 for $202,500.00. Id. ¶ 5. After the mortgage on the property was satisfied and real estate commissions and legal fees were paid, the net proceeds from the sale were $171,115.00. Id. The house had been Ben's primary asset and the proceeds from the sale essentially equaled Ben's net worth. Id. During this time, Brian and Michael had a series of discussions about their father's future; it was clear that Ben did not want to live alone. Id. ¶ 6. When Ben returned from Alaska, he lived in Connecticut with Brian and his wife Marilyn for a short period. Id.

Prior to Mrs. Maltas's death, Michael and Mary Ellen had discussed with his parents the idea of buying a duplex residence that would permit the four of them (with the three children of Michael and Mary Ellen) to live together. Dep. of Mary Ellen Maltas at 7-8. Michael and Mary Ellen had never owned their own home. After Mrs. Maltas's death, Brian and Michael discussed a plan whereby Ben would provide the down payment for a house (from the proceeds of the sale of the former marital home) in which Ben would live with Michael, Mary Ellen and their children. Mary Ellen and Marilyn searched for a suitable property. Aff. of Richard Brian Maltas ¶ 8. Mary Ellen described the family situation during this period among Ben, Michael, herself, Brian, and Brian's wife Marilyn as follows: "We were very close, there were no boundaries in any of our families." Dep. of Mary Ellen Maltas at 13. Eventually, Mary Ellen and Marilyn found a house located on Sylvan Drive in Ridgefield, Connecticut ("the Connecticut residence"), not far from the residence of Brian and Marilyn. Aff. of Richard Brian Maltas ¶ 8.

The purchase price of the Connecticut residence was $212,500. Id. ¶ 9; Dep. of Mary Ellen Maltas at 20. Ben provided $100,000 from the proceeds of the sale of his former marital home to enable Michael and Mary Ellen to purchase the Connecticut residence. Dep. of Mary Ellen Maltas at 20. The down payment was approximately $78,000; the remainder of the $100,000, about $22,000, was to be used to build an addition to the Connecticut residence, thereby affording Ben access to more private space. Aff. of Richard Brian Maltas ¶ 11; Dep. of Mary Ellen Maltas at 20.

In November 1991, Ben, Michael, Mary Ellen and the three children moved into the Connecticut residence. Ben lived in the basement of the residence, an area of the house that also contained the laundry room (located in Ben's...

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