Management Council of Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer

• Citation: 953 P.2d 839
• Decision Date: 11 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-307,97-307
• Parties: The MANAGEMENT COUNCIL OF the WYOMING LEGISLATURE, and the following designated members of the Management Council in their capacities as duly-elected members of the Wyoming State Senate and State House of Representatives and as taxpayers and citizens of the State of Wyoming; Robert Grieve, Bruce Hinchey, Henry "Hank" Coe, James Twiford, Guy Cameron, Mark Harris, Tom Kinnison, Peg Shreve, Eli Bebout, Louise Ryckman and Leo Garcia, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Jim GERINGER, Governor of the State of Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 839

953 P.2d 839

The MANAGEMENT COUNCIL OF the WYOMING LEGISLATURE, and the following designated members of the Management Council in their capacities as duly-elected members of the Wyoming State Senate and State House of Representatives and as taxpayers and citizens of the State of Wyoming; Robert Grieve, Bruce Hinchey, Henry "Hank" Coe, James Twiford, Guy Cameron, Mark Harris, Tom Kinnison, Peg Shreve, Eli Bebout, Louise Ryckman and Leo Garcia, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. Jim GERINGER, Governor of the State of Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant).

No. 97-307.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Feb. 11, 1998.

Dan J. Pauli and David K. Gruver (argued), Legislative Service Office, Cheyenne, for Appellants.

William U. Hill, Attorney General and Michael L. Hubbard (argued), Deputy Attorney General, for Appellee.

Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

The significant substantive question certified to this Court by the district court is whether the Governor has constitutional authority to veto portions of a bill which makes appropriations, but which does not make any appropriation in the portion of the bill that is vetoed. A threshold question is whether the plaintiffs in this declaratory judgment action have standing to pursue that remedy. In an effort to add focus to the standing question, this Court requested the parties to brief certain additional questions, and of its own motion raised the possibility of a violation of the separation of powers doctrine if the Court instead of the Legislature were to override the veto. We will recognize standing under the doctrine that acknowledges standing in matters of great public interest and importance, and we uphold the partial vetoes by the Governor as comporting with the clear language of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. The first certified question is answered "Yes," and the second certified question is answered "Yes."

The certified questions the Court agreed to answer are:

1. Did the Governor have the power under Article 4, Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution to veto portions of House Enrolled Act No. 2, enacted during the 1997 Special Session on School Finance Reform?

2. Do individual legislators or the Management Council of the Legislature have legal standing to sue the Governor regarding the exercise of his partial veto power under Article 4, Section 9 of the Wyoming Constitution?

These are stated as the issues in both the Brief of Appellants and the Brief of Appellee. No new issue is suggested in the Reply Brief of Appellants. In their Supplemental Briefs, the parties addressed the questions set forth by the Court, which were:

1. Whether W YO. S TAT. § 28-8-114 (1997) constitutes a special law regulating the practice in courts of justice, in contravention of Article 3, § 27 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming?

2. Whether Article 4, § 8 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides an adequate remedy to the legislative department, making declaratory relief inappropriate?

3. Whether the judicial department is being requested, in effect, to exercise the authority of the legislative department under Article 4, § 8 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, and, if so, whether the action of the judicial department would infringe upon the powers reserved to the legislative department, in violation of Article 2, § 1 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming?

4. Whether, in light of the allegations of Paragraph 17 of the Complaint for Declaratory Relief, the individual plaintiffs were disqualified from voting in this instance by the provisions of Article 3, § 46 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming?

During a special session of the Legislature called by the Governor in 1997, the Legislature adopted House Enrolled Act 2 (HEA 2). This legislation was the response by the Legislature to the decision of this Court in Campbell County School Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238 (1995). After it was signed by the appropriate officers of the legislature and its staff, it was presented to the Governor. In the enacting clause, HEA 2 states that it is an act "providing for appropriations," and multiple appropriations of moneys appear in the body of the act. ¹ The Legislature adjourned promptly after its action on HEA 2 was completed, and the Governor could not return it within 3 days in accordance with the constitutional process for vetoing legislation. ²

Since the Legislature, by its adjournment prevented the return of HEA 2 by the Governor in three days, he had fifteen days to return the bill to the Secretary of State with his objections. The Governor did that, and he exercised his perceived constitutional authority to veto portions of HEA 2 that did not encompass appropriations and which were substantive in nature. ³

Article 4, Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming encompasses the authority which the Governor exercised in his message to the Secretary of State. It provides:

The governor shall have power to disapprove of any item or items or part or parts of any bill making appropriations of money or property embracing distinct items, and the part or parts of the bill approved shall be the law, and the item or items and part or parts disapproved shall be void unless enacted in the following manner: If the legislature be in session he shall transmit to the house in which the bill originated a copy of the item or items or part or parts thereof disapproved, together with his objections thereto, and the items or parts objected to shall be separately reconsidered, and each item or part shall then take the same course as is prescribed for the passage of bills over the executive veto.

(Emphasis added). The essence of the debate in this case is captured within the emphasized language of Article 4, Section 9 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, with the Management Council of the Wyoming State Legislature and the associated parties (Management Council) asserting that the authority to veto is limited to appropriations only, while the Governor contends that the veto authority is much broader.

As a threshold question, we turn to the certified question relating to standing. We accept the standing of the Management Council to pursue the relief sought by way of a declaratory judgment under the doctrine of great public interest or importance. We first acknowledged the doctrine of great public interest or importance in connection with the existence of a justiciable controversy to support the invocation of the authority of the court to make a declaratory judgment. We said that the requirement of a justiciable controversy is relaxed or not followed in such instances. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (Wyo.1974). We invoked Brimmer in our first school finance case. Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo.1980). In Memorial Hosp. of Laramie County v. Department of Revenue and Taxation of State of Wyo., 770 P.2d 223, 226 (Wyo.1989), we began to extend the doctrine of great public interest or importance from a relaxation of the requirement for a justiciable controversy to a justification for standing when we said:

Declaratory relief should be liberally administered if the elements of a justiciable controversy exist to give the trial court jurisdiction. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 577 (Wyo.1974). For that controversy The transition became complete when we said:

                to exist, a genuine right or interest must be at issue between adversarial parties, and the trial court must be able to make an effective judgment which will finally determine the rights of the parties.  Id. at 578.   Even these prerequisites, however, may properly be avoided or relaxed when matters of great public interest or importance are presented to the trial court.  Id.; Kurpjuweit v. Northwestern Development Company, Inc., 708 P.2d 39, 44 (Wyo.1985).  If the hospital could establish the existence of an actual controversy with the department, there is no doubt the trial court could effectively and finally determine that dispute.  Thus, the only question remaining is whether the department has so affected an interest of the hospital so as to create an actual controversy.  "Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is sufficiently affected to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented to the court."  Washakie County School District No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo.1980)
                

We have also recognized an exception to the standing requirement when we are faced with a matter of great public interest or importance. Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574 (Wyo.1974). Without deciding whether Petitioners have standing to seek the issuance of a writ of mandamus which requires Governor Sullivan to implement the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act, we hold that the issue of whether the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act is constitutional is of great public importance and, therefore, merits a decision from this Court.

State ex rel. Wyoming Ass'n of Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sullivan, 798 P.2d 826, 828-29 (Wyo.1990) (footnotes omitted). We hold that the issue presented in the second certified question is of great public importance that merits a decision from this Court, and we, therefore, recognize the standing of the Management Council to seek a declaratory judgment on that question.

In presenting this case, the Governor relies upon a very broad philosophy of partial veto acknowledged by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin to be vested in the governor of that state. The cases that have addressed the constitutional authority in Wisconsin are Citizens Utility Bd. v. Klauser, 194 Wis.2d 484, 534 N.W.2d 608 (Wis.1995); State ex rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson, 144 Wis.2d 429, 424 N.W.2d 385 (1988); State ex rel. Kleczka v. Conta, 82 Wis.2d 679, 264 N.W.2d 539 (1978); State ex rel. Sundby v. Adamany, 71 Wis.2d 118, 237 N.W.2d 910 (1976); State ex rel. Martin v. Zimmerman, 233 Wis....