Manchester Press Club v. State Liquor Comm'n, 2977.
| Decision Date | 07 June 1938 |
| Docket Number | No. 2977.,2977. |
| Citation | 200 A. 407 |
| Parties | MANCHESTER PRESS CLUB v. STATE LIQUOR COMMISSION. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Transferred from Superior Court, Hillsborough County; Lorimer, Judge.
Suit by the Manchester Press Club against the State Liquor Commission, to enjoin the enforcement of a regulation of operation of plaintiff's club. Transferred without ruling, on the question of whether the commission had valid authority to issue the regulation.
Case discharged.
Bill, to enjoin the enforcement of a regulation of the defendant for a club licensed to sell liquor to members and guests to furnish two keys for entrance to its premises at any time. The plaintiff is a club thus licensed. Pursuant to the regulation one key was to be used by the Commission's law enforcement department and the other was to be turned over to the local chief of police for the use of his department and to be receipted for to the club by him. It was intended by the regulation that the Commission's "agents, and the police officials of the municipalities, should have at all times an opportunity of free access to the premises occupied by licensees". The question whether the Commission has valid authority to issue the regulation has been transferred without ruling by Lorimer, J.
Paul J. Doyle and John J. O'Reilly, Jr., both of Manchester (Mr. Doyle orally), for plaintiff. Thomas P. Cheney, Atty. Gen., Frank R. Kenison, Asst. Atty. Gen., and J. Blanche Newhall, of Concord (Mr. Kenison orally), for defendant.
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An act regulating traffic in intoxicating liquor (Laws 1934, Sp.Sess., c. 3) contains these pertinent provisions: The Commission thereby created to administer the act may appoint special agents to investigate, under its direction, "any and all matters" arising under the act and other liquor legislation (sec. 8); any member of the Commission or any of its special agents may at any time enter any place where liquor is sold or manufactured (sec. 8); the Commission shall cause frequent inspections to be made of such a place (sec. 28); it may suspend and revoke licenses for violations of the act (sec. 28) and shall prosecute offences against the liquor laws (sec. 8); its agents shall have a sheriff's powers with reference to the liquor laws "and the enforcement of such laws, either in cooperation with, or independently of, the officers of any county, city or town" (sec. 37); and it may make "necessary and proper rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions" of the act, to "have the effect of law" (sec. 12).
The contention that the regulation is invalid on the ground that it violates the protection of the federal and state constitutions from unreasonable search, confuses between rights and privileges. No one may sell intoxicating liquor against the state's consent, and if consent is granted, it may be on such terms and conditions as the state attaches thereto. Acceptance of the license is an acceptance of the requirements to be observed by the licensee. The requirements impose the obligation to observe them, since the obligation is one voluntarily assumed in return for the privilege. State v. Corron, 73 N.H. 434, 445, 62 A. 1044, 6 Ann.Cas. 486; State v. Sterrin, 78 N.H. 220, 98 A. 482; Rosenblum v. Griffin, N.H, 197 A. 701.
The uncompelled surrender of a right is not an invasion of the right by the recipient of the surrender, and the right to be secure against unreasonable search and seizure is one that may be yielded. No rule of public policy forbids its waiver.
Also, when a license or privilege is granted subject to such rules and regulations as may be imposed, the adoption of a regulation after the grant is not retroactive in application to the license merely because from the time of the adoption it affects subsequent conduct under the license. The acceptance of the license involves acceptance of such a regulation. Violation of a regulation while a license is in force is a violation of the terms of its grant. A license to sell liquor cedes no vested rights. State v. Holmes, 38 N.H. 225.
And the courts may not condemn the regulation as arbitrary and unreasonable, and hence as an invalid exercise of police power. Coleman v. School District, 87 N.H. 465, 471, 472, 183 A. 586; Rosenblum v. Griffin, supra.
Nor is the claim of an improper delegation of legislative power tenable. The act prescribes the general powers and duties of the Commission and defines the sphere of their action with substantial specification. The regulation is one which...
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