Mancini v. City of Tacoma

Decision Date13 May 2019
Docket NumberNo. 77531-6-I,77531-6-I
PartiesKATHLEEN MANCINI, a single woman, Respondent, v. CITY OF TACOMA, a municipal entity and political subdivision of the State of Washington; TACOMA POLICE DEPARTMENT; and RON RAMDSDELL, individually and in his official capacity as chief of Tacoma Police, Appellant.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

DWYER, J. — Following an incident wherein Tacoma police officers raided Kathleen Mancini's home under the mistaken belief that it was home to a suspected drug dealer, Mancini filed a lawsuit against the City of Tacoma asserting several tort claims, including negligence. At trial, the jury found in favor of Mancini on only her negligence claim. On appeal, the City contends that Mancini's negligence claim should not have been submitted to the jury because, as tried, it was a claim for negligent investigation, which is not cognizable in Washington. Because the evidence of negligence adduced at trial (and the theory of negligence urged on the trial court in response to the City's motion to dismiss) concerned negligence committed during the evidence gathering aspects of the police investigation, we conclude that Mancini's negligence claim, as tried, was a claim of negligent investigation, was not cognizable, and should not have been submitted to the jury. Therefore, we reverse the judgment and remand for dismissal of Mancini's negligence claim.

I

In early December 2010, Officer Kenneth Smith of the Tacoma Police Department was in contact with a confidential informant who told him that an individual named "Matt," a white male approximately 30 years of age, was selling dealer size quantities of methamphetamine. In early January 2011, the confidential informant further claimed to have been inside Matt's apartment at 28625 16th Avenue SW, Apartment B1 in Federal Way, and to have observed Matt selling quantities of methamphetamine.

Officer Smith and his partner drove the confidential informant to the aforementioned location to have the confidential informant identify Matt's apartment in person. The apartment unit was located in an apartment complex with multiple buildings. Upon arriving at the complex, the confidential informant identified both the B1 apartment unit and a vehicle parked in the parking lot of the complex, a black four-door Dodge Charger, as where the informant had observed Matt with dealer size quantities of methamphetamines. The confidential informant further described Matt's apartment to Officer Smith as dirty and gross and explained that Matt had rented the apartment in his mother's name so that no one could figure out where he was.

In addition to having the confidential informant verify the location of Matt's apartment in person, Officer Smith also attempted to verify the confidential informant's information by checking it on several online databases. As a result ofthese searches, Officer Smith learned that the apartment identified by the confidential informant was rented by Kathleen Mancini. Officer Smith believed that Mancini was Matt's mother,1 and decided to obtain a search warrant for the apartment identified by the confidential informant. He did not perform any surveillance on the apartment or the vehicle before seeking a warrant, nor did he attempt to set up a controlled buy, even though he utilized these procedures before seeking a warrant in roughly 95 percent of his cases. In his warrant application, Officer Smith identified Mancini's apartment as the place he sought permission to search in order to discover evidence of Matt's illicit drug activity. A Pierce County superior court judge then signed the warrant authorizing a search of Mancini's apartment.

On January 5, 2011, Officer Smith led a team of armed officers to execute the search warrant at Mancini's apartment at 28625 16th Avenue SW, Apartment B-1. The officers used a battering ram to breach the door to Mancini's apartment, entered the apartment, handcuffed Mancini, and moved her out of the apartment. However, immediately after he entered the apartment, Officer Smith knew that his team was in the wrong apartment because the apartment was "the exact opposite" of how the confidential informant had described Matt's apartment. Matt actually resided in apartment A1, not apartment B1. The confidential informant had misidentified the apartment.

Mancini subsequently filed a lawsuit against the City of Tacoma, the Tacoma Police Department and the chief of the Tacoma Police Department (theCity). Her complaint pled the following causes of action: negligence, breach of duty to train and supervise, assault and battery, false imprisonment, defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, outrage, violation of RCW 49.60.030,2 and violations of numerous provisions of the Washington State Constitution. Mancini v. City of Tacoma, No. 71044-3-I, slip op. at 6 (Wash. Ct. App. June 8, 2015) (unpublished), http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/710443.pdf (hereinafter Mancini I). She sought an award of damages resulting from the police raid of her apartment.

The City moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, and the trial court dismissed Mancini's negligent training and supervision claim and her constitutional claims. Mancini I, No. 71044-3-I, slip op. at 6. Subsequently, the City moved for summary judgment on all of Mancini's remaining claims. Mancini I, No. 71044-3-I, slip op. at 9. The trial court granted the motion and Mancini appealed. Mancini I, No. 71044-3-I, slip op. at 10-11.

On appeal, we concluded that dismissal on summary judgment was proper as to her claims of defamation and outrage, but unwarranted as to her remaining claims of negligence, battery, assault, false imprisonment, and invasion of privacy. Mancini I, No. 71044-3-I, slip op. at 11. Pertinently, we concluded that Mancini's negligence claim was not barred by the public duty doctrine, that the City had not established that she alleged a claim for negligence that encompassed only a noncognizable claim of negligent investigation, and that there was sufficient evidence of a genuine dispute of material fact regarding hernegligence claim to preclude summary judgment. Mancini I, No. 71044-3-I, slip op. at 18-19 n.12. We remanded the negligence and the four intentional tort claims to the trial court.

At trial, as pertaining to the negligence claim, Mancini presented testimony from Officer Smith and from expert witness former Seattle Police Chief Norm Stamper.

During Officer Smith's testimony, he explained that he conducted surveillance on targeted addresses in 95 percent of his drug investigations, but did not do so here. Similarly, he testified that he did not perform a controlled buy3 before seeking a warrant to search Mancini's apartment, even though he normally did so in 95 percent of his drug investigations. Officer Smith also testified that he ran database searches on both Matt and the address identified by the confidential informant. The searches revealed that the apartment identified by the informant was rented by Mancini. Officer Smith explained that, at the time, he believed that this information supported, rather than contradicted, the confidential informant's identification because the confidential informant had explained that Matt's apartment was rented in his mother's name and Mancini was approximately the right age and race to have potentially been Matt's mother.

During Chief Stamper's testimony, he testified that it was his expert opinion that Officer Smith should have performed both surveillance and a controlled buy before obtaining a warrant. According to Chief Stamper, OfficerSmith's mistake was in trusting the information provided by the confidential informant and not verifying that information through proper investigatory steps before relying on it to obtain a warrant.

Following the close of Mancini's case in chief, the City moved for judgment as a matter of law on the negligence claim, asserting that all of the evidence presented on the negligence claim pertained to investigative acts and that negligent investigation was not a cognizable claim in Washington. In response to the motion, Mancini defended her claim by stating:

There was virtually no police work done here. They put a drug informant in a car, drove her by four identical buildings and said, "Point out which one is where you saw the drugs." That was the extent of the investigation.
. . . .
What is negligence on the part of the officer? The officer admitted that he does surveillance in 95 percent of his cases, and he did none here. They did not attempt a controlled buy. They didn't do anything, and they haven't shown us that they've done anything.
And it certainly is a question that gets to the jury, and the plaintiff has sustained her burden of proof with Chief Stamper's testimony that this should never happen, and that there are many, many ways to have seen to it that it didn't. And he went through where else you could have surveilled. And, sure, Your Honor has seen the picture I have of the parking lot and the entry to the stairs and the parking lot that go down to Ms. Mancini's apartment. If there had been drug activity and they had surveilled that parking lot at all, they would have at least gotten the right building, and they didn't.

The trial court denied the City's motion.4 After the close of all the evidence, the City renewed its motion on the same ground. The motion was again denied.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mancini on her negligence claim, awarding her damages of $250,000, but found against her on each of her intentional tort claims. The City appeals.5

II

The City contends that the trial court should have granted its motion for judgment as a matter of law because Mancini failed to establish facts at trial upon which relief could be granted on her negligence claim.6 This is so, the City asserts, because the evidence adduced at trial established that Mancini's negligence claim, as tried, was a claim for negligent investigation....

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