Mandel v. Sturr
Decision Date | 29 April 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 59 & 60,Dockets 24993,24994.,59 & 60 |
Citation | 266 F.2d 321 |
Parties | Abraham MANDEL, Executor of the Will of Max Mandel, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Walter R. STURR, Collector of Internal Revenue for the 14th District of New York, et al., Defendants-Appellees. Pauline HOFFMAN, Lillian Starr, Joseph J. Mandel and Abraham Mandel, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David COPANS, Executor of Harry M. Hickey, deceased, former Collector of Internal Revenue for the 14th District of New York, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
James R. Rowen, New York City (Abraham Mandel, New York City, on the brief), for plaintiffs-appellants.
Arthur V. Savage, Asst. U. S. Atty., Southern District of New York, New York City (Arthur H. Christy, U. S. Atty., Southern District of New York, New York City, on the brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, MOORE, Circuit Judge, and GIBSON, District Judge.
Abraham Mandel, executor under the will of Max Mandel, and the beneficiaries, Pauline Hoffman, Lillian Starr, Joseph J. Mandel, Abraham Mandel, hereinafter referred to as the beneficiaries, brought their actions to recover amounts paid by them under protest as a result of additionally assessed estate and income taxes. The executor and the beneficiaries, respectively appeal from the determinations of the Trial Court sustaining in part the deficiency assessed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the estate tax reported by the executor and the income taxes of the recipient-beneficiaries. The appeals in the two cases have been consolidated.
The essential facts of this case are fairly clear. At the date of Max Mandel's death on June 9, 1945, he and David Wolfson were sole partners in a military uniform business. It is apparent from the facts that the partnership owned and required substantial capital to function. Under the terms of an agreement entered into between the surviving partner and the executor, on December 31, 1945, the book value of Max Mandel's share in the tangible assets of the partnership was fixed at $153,162.56. There is no reason to doubt that this was a fair valuation. In fact, that figure is not questioned either in the court below or before this court. That amount was included in the decedent's gross estate and the estate tax properly paid. The sole issues here are (1) whether the gross estate of the decedent includes an amount ($12,595.57) received pursuant to a partnership agreement representing interest on the capital account (valued at $153,162.56), and (2) whether it includes an amount ($10,000) received by the estate in settlement of a claim to participate in the profits of the business as carried on by the surviving partner (Wolfson) subsequent to the death of Max Mandel. Are these amounts "income in respect of a decedent" to the beneficiaries within the meaning of Section 126, Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C.A. § 126?
The partnership agreement in effect at Max Mandel's death provided in part as follows:
There are other provisions in the agreement whereby a retiring partner could similarly receive installment payments of his partnership share upon retirement. There is little or no doubt that the value of an estate's right to receive income earned by a partnership subsequent to the death of a deceased partner is includible in the gross estate. As this court stated in Riegelman's Estate v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 1958, 253 F.2d 315, 316, an extended discussion is not required as to that particular point, it having been adequately reviewed and analyzed elsewhere. However, this case is distinguishable from Riegelman on the facts.
The amount of $22,595.57, the subject of this appeal, derives from two sources. Firstly, under the quoted portions of the partnership agreement, the deceased partner's share in the partnership assets was payable to the estate in 40 equal monthly payments with interest at 6% per annum. There was, however, a lapse of some six months from the date of Max Mandel's death without any such payments being made. It is apparent that after negotiation between the executor and the surviving partner, David Wolfson, a Memorandum Agreement was entered into which provided that the deceased partner's share of the partnership assets, valued at $153,162.56, would be paid to the estate in full. Wolfson then paid that amount as agreed. They further agreed that the amount of $12,595.57 was to be paid to the estate in full settlement of all interest due or to become due on the capital account under the Mandel-Wolfson partnership agreement and that an additional $10,000 would be paid by Wolfson in settlement of any claim the estate and beneficiaries might have to post-mortem profits in the partnership. There is no evidence that these were other than arm's-length negotiations, or that the interest provisions of the partnership agreement were calculated as a method of substituting interest payments for capital to escape possible estate taxation.
The sum of $22,595.57, representing the total of $12,595.57 in interest and $10,000 in settlement of the claim to future profits was paid by Wolfson and distributed to the beneficiaries. The executor and recipient-beneficiaries brought their actions to recover taxes paid on these amounts under protest.
Although Section 126 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 is high on the list of vaguely drafted legislation in a field notoriously complex, we see no reason to extend its broad language so far as the Government urges in this case. The $12,595.57 was paid by Wolfson in settlement of interest due on an asset of the estate. It was a fair amount to pay for the full usage had by Wolfson of the capital of the estate invested in his business over the period of time until the full share of the decedent's interest in the partnership assets was paid in full to the estate. As such, the $12,595.57 is in the nature of a legal rate of interest or return on a capital investment significantly represented by the principal amount of $153,162.57, already included in the gross estate and the estate tax once paid. To perpetually tax the right to interest or earning capacity of the capital already included in the gross estate, as the appellee suggests, extends the meaning of the Code beyond reason. The Government places much reliance on the Riegelman case, supra, wherein this court reviewed much of the legislative and case history of Section 126, Internal Revenue Code of 1939. That case has, however, no factual similarity to the case before us. In the case before us, capital is a...
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