Manderfield v. Field

• Decision Date: 03 January 1893
• Citation: 7 N.M. 17,32 P. 146
• Parties: DE MANDERFIELDv.FIELD et al.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

7 N.M. 17

32 P. 146

DE MANDERFIELD

v.FIELD et al.

Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico.

Jan. 3, 1893.

Appeal from district court, Santa Fe county;

Edward P. Seeds, Judge.

Action by Josefa S. de Manderfield against Neill B. Field, administrator, etc., and another. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by LEE, J.:

On the 6th day of December, 1887, William S. Woodside died intestate in the county of Bernalillo, and the defendant Field was appointed his administrator, and took possession of his assets. On the 5th day of December, 1888, the complainant filed her bill of complaint in the district court of Santa Fe county against the defendant Field and Thomas B. Catron, in which she alleged that on the 13th day of January, 1885, Woodside, William H. Manderfield and Catron entered into a copartnership for the purpose of carrying on a trading post at Ft. Wingate, N. M.; that the said parties were equal partners in the said business; that on the 1st day of August, 1888, the said W. H. Manderfield sold, transferred, and conveyed to the complainant all his right, title, and interest in and to said firm, its assets, accounts, properties, and moneys. The bill contains many specific allegations of wrongdoing on the part of Woodside and Catron with reference to the partnership property; alleges that William H. Manderfield died on the 3d day of December. 1888; and prays that an account may be taken, and that the defendants be compelled to set forth a full, true, and just account of all moneys and property of the said firm now in their hands, and of all the profits, sales, and expenditures thereof, together with all sums drawn by them, or either of them, from the said firm, and of all the transactions, of any sort or kind, which may be pertinent to the issues and questions herein, and that the defendants may be decreed and compelled to pay to the complainant all sums found to be due to her upon such accounting. The bill also contains a prayer for general relief. Three exhibits are referred to in the bill, only two of which were filed with it. The third, being the assignment upon which the complainant bases her right of action, was not filed with the bill, nor was any reason assigned for the failure on the part of the complainant to file it, or a copy of it, as required by our statute. The defendant Field pleaded to the bill that at the time of the pretended assignment W. H. Manderfield was non compos mentis, and incapable of making the assignment, and that, therefore, no right passed to the complainant by virtue of it. He also answered, denying the material allegations in the bill. The defendant Catron filed an answer in which he denied all the material allegations of the complainant's bill, and charged that W. H. Manderfield had drawn out of the business of the partnership moneys greatly in excess of his just share and proportion. Replications having been filed, the case was on the 20th day of November, 1889, referred, by the following order: “It is hereby ordered by the court that John P. Victory be, and he is hereby, appointed special master to take the testimony in this cause, and to report the same, with his opinion thereon, to the court.” This order of reference appears to have been treated by the master and the counsel engaged in the case as broad enough to authorize the taking of testimony upon all the issues made by the pleadings, and under it evidence was offered by the complainant by which she attempted to establish her right to an accounting against the defendants, and also to show what, on such accounting, was due her, as the assignee of William H. Manderfield. The master excluded the assignment offered in evidence upon the ground that it was the foundation of the complainant's action, and was inadmissible, because not filed with the bill of complaint. Certain pages of a book claimed by the complainant to be the ledger of Woodside were offered and admitted by the master, over the objection of the defendant Field. Evidence was offered on both sides as to the mental condition of Manderfield at the time of the alleged assignment. The master also admitted, over the objection of defendant Field, three letters written by Field to Gildersleeve shortly after his appointment as administrator. Certain drafts, notes, and mortgages were also admitted, over the objection of the defendant, but in his brief Mr. Gildersleeve says that the complainant claims nothing on account of those instruments. The master reported that there was no proper evidence in the case tending to establish a privity between the complainant and the defendants, or either of them, and that the proof failed to substantiate the allegations of the bill. He declined to find on the issue of Manderfield's sanity, stating that he deemed such finding unnecessary, and reported as a conclusion of law that the complainant was not entitled to any relief. Objections were filed by the complainant, which, by consent, were to stand as exceptions to the master's report; and those exceptions, upon argument, were overruled by the court, and a decree was entered dismissing the complainant's bill. From that decree she appeals to this court.

Where, in suit by assignee of deceased partner for accounting, the evidence furnished no basis upon which an equitable adjustment of the partnership business could be made, and the claim of complainant was attempted to be made out by vague imputations of fraud on the part of the other partners, resting upon mere conjecture, without any evidence of actual fraud, the bill was properly dismissed.

C. H. Gildersleeve and J. H. Knaebel, for appellant.

Neill B. Field, for appellees.

LEE, J., (after stating the facts.)

The real questions which must determine this case arise in the peculiar and anomalous character of the proceedings. An assignee of a deceased partner files her complaint against a surviving partner, and an administrator of a deceased partner, without making the administrator of the estate of her assigner a party thereto, calling upon the surviving partner and administrator of the deceased partner to account to her for all moneys and property of said firm now in their hands, and all the profits, sales, and...