Mandi Swan On Behalf Her Son I.O. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi.

• Decision Date: 09 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 13 C 3623.,13 C 3623.
• Citation: 956 F.Supp.2d 913
• Parties: Mandi SWAN on behalf of herself and her son I.O., Denise Burns on behalf of herself and her daughter, V.B., Felicia Bradley on behalf of herself and her son, C.B., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, Barbara Byrd–Bennett, Chief Executive Officer, and City of Chicago, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

956 F.Supp.2d 913

Mandi SWAN on behalf of herself and her son I.O., Denise Burns on behalf of herself and her daughter, V.B., Felicia Bradley on behalf of herself and her son, C.B., on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF CHICAGO, Barbara Byrd–Bennett, Chief Executive Officer, and City of Chicago, Defendants.

No. 13 C 3623.

United States District Court,

N.D. Illinois,

Eastern Division.

July 9, 2013.

Robin B. Potter, Patrick James Cowlin, Shankar Ramamurthy, Robin Potter & Associates P.C., Thomas Howard Geoghegan, Michael Paul Persoon, Sean Morales Doyle, Despres Schwartz & Geoghegan, Randall D. Schmidt, Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Sally J. Scott, Abizer Zanzi, James C. Franczek, Jennifer Ann Smith, Lisa Anne McGarrity, Michael A. Warner, Jr., Franczek Radelet P.C., Lawrence Charles Dinardo, Brent Daniel Knight, Elizabeth Bethea McRee, Julie Morrissy Baker, Jones Day, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN Z. LEE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Mandi Swan, Denise Burns, and Felicia Bradley (collectively “Plaintiffs”) are parents of children who are enrolled in special education programs and attend the Chicago public schools slated for closure before the commencement of the 2013–2014 school year. They have sued the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (“Board”), Barbara Byrd–Bennett, the Chief Executive Officer of the Chicago Public Schools (“CPS”), and the City of Chicago (the “City”) (collectively “Defendants”), alleging two violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. First, Plaintiffs allege that closing the schools as scheduled will disproportionately harm children in special education programs because the closures will not allow sufficient time for students with disabilities to adequately socialize and acclimate to their new schools. Nor will there be enough time, according to Plaintiffs, for CPS administrators to ensure that the Individualized Educational Programs (“IEPs”) for the individual students are satisfied at the new schools. Second, Plaintiffs allege that the scheduled closings fail to reasonably accommodate students with disabilities. Plaintiffs seek an injunction delaying the school closings for at least one year.

The City moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that, as a matter of law, the Board, not the City, is responsible for school closings and has the statutory power to delay the closings. For the reasons stated herein, the City's motion is granted, and Plaintiffs' claims against the City are dismissed.

Background

The following facts are taken from Plaintiffs' Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of resolving this motion to dismiss. See Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat'l City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir.2010).

On March 23, 2013, CPS's CEO Byrd–Bennett proposed to close fifty-three CPS elementary schools, including the elementary schools that Plaintiffs' children attend. (Compl. ¶¶ 28, 32, 34, 36.) On May 22, 2013, the Board met to approve the closings. ( Id. ¶ 30.) The City, through the Mayor, appoints the Board members and makes decisions with respect to the revenue available for the education of CPS students. ( Id. ¶¶ 120–21.)

In their requests for relief, Plaintiffs ask the Court to issue injunctive relief “enjoin[ing] the defendants [including the City] from carrying out the closings for at least a year and until such time as the defendants can assure an orderly process of transition that will minimize the emotional and learning setbacks to the plaintiff class.” ( Id. at pp., 14, 16.) On May 29, 2013, the City moved to dismiss the lawsuit pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

Discussion

Although the City brings its motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court's “first task, as it is in every case, is to determine whether we have subject matter jurisdiction” over Plaintiffs' claims against the City. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co. v. Haight, 697 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir.2012). The Court must engage in this jurisdictional inquiry, even if it is not directly raised by the parties. Hay v. Ind. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 312 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir.2002) (“[N]ot only may the federal courts police subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, they must.”) (internal citations omitted). In this case, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs have standing to seek the requested injunction against the City. For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that they do not. Additionally, even if Plaintiffs possess standing to seek alternative forms of relief against the City, see Bontkowski v. Smith, 305 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir.2002), they have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and fall short of the pleading standard announced by the Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court will address each of these issues in turn.

I. Standing for Injunctive Relief

Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution “limits the ‘judicial power’ to the resolution of ‘cases' and ‘controversies.’ ” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). A necessary element of Article Ill's case-or-controversy requirement is “that a litigant have ‘standing’to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.” Id. Whether a litigant has standing is a “threshold question” which the Court must address even if the parties do not raise it, because if the litigants do not have standing, the Court is without authority to consider the merits of the action. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986). Moreover, “standing is not dispensed in gross.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008) (internal quotations omitted). “[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.” Id. (internal quotations omitted); see Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000).

“[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Norton, 422 F.3d 490, 495 (7th Cir.2005) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). A party must have personally suffered an injury-in-fact, which is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged conduct, and which is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing each of these elements. Id. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.

The third element, commonly referred to as “redressability,” “examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judicial relief requested....” Norton, 422 F.3d at 501 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 753 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). “Redressability thus depends upon the relief requested.” Id. at 502. And there must be a “ ‘substantial likelihood’ that the relief requested will redress the injury claimed....” Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 75 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 2620, 57 L.Ed.2d 595 (1978).

Furthermore, even where a plaintiff may have suffered a legally cognizable injury, this does not mean that the redressability requirement is satisfied. Perry v. Sheahan, 222 F.3d 309, 314 (7th Cir.2000) (“Standing does not automatically attach once an ongoing injury is identified.”). “Relief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court; that is the very essence of the redressability requirement.” Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998)).

It follows from these fundamental principles that where, as here, a plaintiff seeks an injunction against a defendant, he or she must demonstrate that the defendant to be enjoined has the authority to effectuate the injunction. See Turner v. McGee, 681 F.3d 1215, 1218–19 (10th Cir.2012) ( “As is often the case, redressibility turns on the scope of authority of the defendants. We ask: Could these Defendants, enjoined as [plaintiff] has requested, remedy [plaintiff's injury]?”); Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1111 (10th Cir.2007) (“The redressability prong is not met when a plaintiff seeks relief against a defendant with no power to enforce a challenged statute”).

Indeed, if a defendant does not have the authority to carry out the injunction, a plaintiff's claim for injunctive relief must be dismissed because the Court cannot enjoin a defendant “to act in any way that is beyond [the defendant's] authority in the first place.” Okpalobi v. Foster, 244 F.3d 405, 426–27 (5th Cir.2001) (dismissing claims for lack of jurisdiction because “these defendants have no powers to redress the injuries alleged”); see also Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 606 F.3d 1058, 1074–75 (9th Cir.2010) (plaintiffs lacked standing as to defendant Park Service because it was not the lead agency responsible for the project in dispute); Scott v. DiGuglielmo, 615 F.Supp.2d 368, 373 (E.D.Pa.2009) (“If the defendants have no power to redress the alleged injuries even if the court were to grant the requested relief, the plaintiff has no case or controversy against those particular defendants”); Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07–1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *12 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 3, 2008) (“In proceeding instead only against individuals who do not have authority to afford her the...