Mandujano v. Geithner
| Decision Date | 17 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. C 10-01226 LB,C 10-01226 LB |
| Parties | SALVADOR MANDUJANO, Plaintiff, v. TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Plaintiff Salvador Mandujano, a former United States Mint Police Officer, sued his former employer after he was fired in 2008 for failure to maintain a driver's license and sustaining a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 1, ¶ 1, and 4, ¶ 12.1Mandujano alleges that his removal was discriminatory and violated the Veterans Employment Opportunity Act ("VEOA"), 5 U.S.C. § 3330a, et seq. and the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA"), 5 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq. Id. at 1, ¶ 2. These claims were reviewed initially by the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), which upheld Mandujano's removal. Id. at 3, ¶ 6. Both Mandujano and Defendant Timothy Geithner now move for summary judgment on the non-discrimination claims. Plaintiff's Motion, ECF No. 41; Defendant's Motion, ECF No. 39. The court grantsGeithner's motion for partial summary judgment because there are no issues of material fact that would call into question whether (A) the MSPB's decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law, (B) obtained without procedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed, or (C) unsupported by substantial evidence.
Mandujano began his employment as a United States Mint police officer in 1990. MSPB Hearing Testimony, AR 1066.2 Mandujano's job description specified that his primary duty as a police officer was to "maintain law and order." U.S. Mint Police Officer Position Description, AR 21. The "line" (or main) operations of the job (as opposed to miscellaneous support duties) included "patrol work, vehicle operation control, and pedestrian traffic control." Id. Driving was listed among the physical demands of the position. AR 26. While Mandujano served as a police officer, he regularly certified that he had read the Mint Directives for police officers. AR 28-34. Included in those directives was Mint Directive 10D-20, which specified that "it [was] a condition of employment with the U.S. Mint Police that each officer possess a valid motor vehicle operator's license." Mint Directive 10D-20, AR 521.
On July 31, 2008, Mandujano was arrested on a misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI) charge after he rear-ended another vehicle stopped at a stoplight. Incident Report, AR 180.3 He informed his supervisor the next day. MSPB Hearing Testimony, AR 959. On August 22, 2008, Mandujano pleaded guilty at the preliminary hearing and provided the police report to Lieutenant Mayhew. Misdemeanor Complaint, AR 188; Letter from Chief McCampbell, AR 208. The next day, he was relieved of all law enforcement duties and reassigned. Letter from Sergeant Reisland, AR 178. On September 11, 2008, his license was suspended. Letter from Mandujano, AR 176; see AR 188 (DUI resulted in license suspension for at least a year). On October 22, 2008, Mandujano received the notice of proposed removal for failure to maintain his driver's license and driving underthe influence. Notice of Proposed Removal, AR 168. On December 31, 2008, the deciding official, Inspector Massola, issued a decision on the proposed removal, upholding the charges and dismissing Mandujano. Decision on Proposed Removal, AR 142-48.
On January 20, 2009, Mandujano appealed his removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), alleging harmful procedural error, prohibited discrimination, an action taken not in accordance with the law, an action constituting prohibited personnel practices, and a violation of his veterans' preference. MSPB Appeal Form, AR 250-66. At a hearing on August 11, 2009, the MSPB considered the claims and heard testimony from Mandujano, Chief McCampbell, Inspector Massola, Sergeant Mucker, and Officer Mayhew. Testimony, AR 908.
On September 18, 2009, the MSPB issued an initial decision that sustained the removal. MSPB Initial Decision, AR 277. The MSPB found that it was "undisputed that [Mandujano] pled guilty and was convicted on August 22, 2008 of a misdemeanor for driving under the influence of alcohol on July 31, 2008, and that his California state driver's license was suspended for one year." AR 280. It thus sustained the charge of driving under the influence. Id. The MSPB also held that to prove the charge of failure to maintain a driver's license, the agency must show only that Mandujano lost his driver's license and that possession of a license was a condition of employment. Id. The MSPB found that position description established that possession of a driver's license was a condition of employment. AR 281. Based on the record evidence, the MSBP sustained this charge too. Id.
The MSPB then found that the agency had established a nexus between the charged conduct and Mandujano's ability to accomplish his duties. Id. Undisputed testimony established that Mint police officers were expected to drive for one hour of their shift. Id. Also, the MSPB found that breaking the law was antithetical to the agency's mission of enforcing the law based on Inspector Massola's testimony. AR 280-82.
The MSPB then found that Mandujano failed to prove his affirmative defenses by preponderant evidence. AR 282-84. The MSPB found that Mandujano failed to prove his veterans' preferenceclaims because he failed to identify with any specificity the veterans' preference that was violated. AR 282-83. The MSPB also rejected Mandujano's two claims of violations of Article 31 of the collective bargaining agreement. First, Mandujano claimed that the removal action was not given to him within a reasonable time after the offense. The MSPB rejected this claim, finding that the evidence showed that Mandujano was in regular contact with his supervisors about the incident and potential discipline starting the day after the incident and that the proposed removal one month after the conviction was not an unreasonable time. AR 283. Second, Mandujano claimed that management did not follow a course of progressive discipline, but the MSPB rejected the claim, finding that the misconduct was sufficiently serious to warrant removal. AR 284, 290.4
Finally, the MSPB reviewed the penalty imposed, determined that the agency considered all relevant factors (including the offense, the disciplinary and work record, effect of the offense on the ability to work, the clarity of notice of the rules violation or prior warnings, mitigating circumstances, and the effectiveness of alternative sanctions to deter future misconduct), and found that the penalty was reasonable. AR 289-91 (, among other things, the agency's conclusions that Mandujano could not perform his job without a license and that Mandujano's supervisors lost confidence in him because of his "illegal, dangerous and reckless conduct" in the form of the DUI.)
Mandujano then filed this action, seeking judicial review of the MSPB's decision. Complaint, ECF No. 1. Both Mandujano and Geithner now move for summary judgment on the nondiscrimination claims. Plaintiff's Motion, ECF No. 41; Defendant's Motion, ECF No. 39.5
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosures on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. See id. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party. See id. at 248-49.
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery and disclosures on file, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need point out only "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325. If the moving party meets this initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings and-by its own affidavits or discovery-set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986). If the non-moving party does not produce evidence to show a genuine issue of material fact, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA"), 5 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., provides the remedy for a federal employee appealing a termination. Ordinarily, a federal employee appeals first to the MSPB and then to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513(d), 7701(a), 7703. But if a case is a "mixed case, " meaning one involving both a personnel action normally appealable to the MSPB and a claim of discrimination, then judicial review is in the district court. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1993). In mixed cases, the district court has jurisdiction to review both the lawfulness of the personnel action and the discrimination claim. Romain v. Shear, 799 F.2d 1416, 1420 n.1 (9th Cir.1986).
The district court reviews the discrimination claims de novo and the non-discrimination claimsunder a deferential...
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