Maness v. Scientific

• Decision Date: 04 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. 3:10–CV–178.,3:10–CV–178.
• Citation: 751 F.Supp.2d 962
• Parties: Sallie MANESS, Plaintiff,v.BOSTON SCIENTIFIC, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

751 F.Supp.2d 962

Sallie MANESS, Plaintiff,

v.BOSTON SCIENTIFIC, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:10–CV–178.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee.

Nov. 4, 2010.

Danny M. Hryhorchuk, The Law Officer of Danny Hryhorchuk, Morristown, TN, for Plaintiff.Samuel L. Felker, Shayne R. Clinton, Jody Elizabeth O'Brien, Bass, Berry & Sims, PLC, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THOMAS W. PHILLIPS, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 8]. On June 4, 2010, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims—all based in products liability—do not satisfy the federal pleading requirements, as modified in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, –––U.S. ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).

On October 19, 2010, Plaintiff responded in opposition, arguing that: (1) federal pleading requirements do not apply to state law claims removed to federal court; and (2) in any event, Plaintiff satisfied the federal pleading requirements, as modified by Twombly. [Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 13]. On October 28, 2010, Defendants filed a Reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. 15].

Based upon the following, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 8] is GRANTED, whereby Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED. While Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed, Plaintiff has 30 days from entry of this Memorandum and Order to file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint within this time period, or if the amended complaint fails to satisfy the federal pleading requirements, judgment shall be entered in favor of the Defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

As an initial matter, the Court notes that it has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. The following facts are taken mostly from Plaintiff's complaint, and will be assumed as true for purposes of the 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir.2007) (in ruling upon motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff”).

On March 16, 2010, Plaintiff filed a product liability action against defendants Boston Scientific Corporation ¹, Advanced Bionics ², Scott Stewart, and John Does 1–5. [Plaintiff's Complaint, Doc. 1–1]. The complaint was filed in the Circuit Court for Knox County. [ Id.]. On April 23, 2010, Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441. [Defendants' Notice of Removal, Doc. 1].

In her complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she suffered injuries ³ after having a medical device implanted. [Plaintiff's Complaint, Doc. 1–1, ¶ IX, at 6]. In June 2007, at Fort Sanders Regional Medical Center in Knoxville, Tennessee, Plaintiff had a spinal cord simulation system device implanted. [ Id.]. This device, the “Implantable Pulse Generator Advanced Bionics Precision SCS, Model number IPG SC–1110” (hereafter, the “Device”), is used to treat back pain. [ Id.]. On October 6, 2007, a recall was issued for the model that Plaintiff had implanted. [Notice of Recall, Doc. 1–1 at 12–15]. According to Boston Scientific, only 8 patients out of 12,700 reported problems with the Device. [Field Safety Notice, Doc. 1–1 at 17]. On March 20, 2009, after “much pain and intense suffering and massive infection,” Plaintiff had the Device removed.⁴ [Plaintiff's Complaint, Doc. 1–1, ¶ IX, at 7].

Plaintiff has filed product liability claims against Boston Scientific and Advanced Bionics, the corporations which allegedly “designed, manufactured, assembled, distributed and sold” the Device. [ Id. ¶ V, at 4]. In addition, Plaintiff has sued Scott Stewart, a field sales representative for Boston Scientific, who allegedly “maintained, sold, serviced, controlled, installed and removed” the Device. [ Id. ¶ VI, at 5]. Plaintiff has also sued “John Does 1–5,” several unidentified defendants [ Id.].

Plaintiff has sued Defendants under several theories, including negligence, reckless misconduct, malice, fraud and oppression, and strict liability “in manufacturing, designing, assembling distributing maintaining, repairing, servicing, selling and installation of the Device,” and in “failing to include warnings as to its dangerous propensities and handling characteristics.” [ Id. ¶ X.1, at 7]. While Plaintiff has not clearly identified her causes of action, it appears that she has sued Defendants under theories of defective design, defective manufacturing, and “failure to warn,” among others.

On June 4, 2010, Defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the federal pleading requirements, as modified in Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, and Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937. On October 19, 2010, Plaintiff responded in opposition. [Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 13]. On October 28, 2010, Defendants filed a Reply in support of their Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 16]. The matter is now ripe for adjudication.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In 2007, the Supreme Court modified the pleading standard in the context of antitrust cases. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Notably, the Supreme Court held that in order to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—which attacks the sufficiency of a complaint—the plaintiff must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (emphasis added). In 2009, the Supreme Court extended the Twombly (or plausibility) standard to all federal civil cases. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1953.

Under the new standard, a claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). While this is not akin to a “probability requirement,” the plaintiff must show “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). This “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citations and quotation marks omitted). In other words, a plaintiff must “plead factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. A plaintiff falls short if he pleads facts “merely consistent with a defendant's liability” or if the alleged facts do not “permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct ...” Id.

In ruling upon motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Directv, 487 F.3d at 476. However, the court “need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” Id. (quoting Gregory v. Shelby Cnty., 220 F.3d 433, 446 (6th Cir.2000)). See also Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Ultimately, this determination—whether a plaintiff's claim is “plausible”—is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950 (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSISA. Twombly Applies to All Civil Cases in Federal Court, Including State Law Claims Removed to Federal Court

As an initial matter, Plaintiff argues that the Court should look to Tennessee law for pleading requirements. [Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 13 at 4]. In other words, Plaintiff wants the Court to apply Tennessee law—instead of Twombly—in ruling upon the 12(b)(6) motion. [ Id.]. According to Plaintiff, the Court “should follow state law pleading requirements since this is a claim based upon state law ...” [ Id.].

Plaintiff's argument is without merit. It does not matter whether Plaintiff's claims are based upon state law or federal law: all claims, once removed to federal court, are subject to federal pleading requirements. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that Twombly's plausibility standard applies to all civil cases in federal court. 129 S.Ct. at 1953. In Iqbal, the respondents argued that the plausibility standard should be limited to antitrust cases, as in Twombly. Id. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that the plausibility standard applies to all civil cases in federal court:

Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.

Id. (emphasis added) (citations and quotations omitted). See also Minger v. Green, 239 F.3d 793, 799–801 (6th Cir.2001) (applying federal pleading rules in a case based upon diversity jurisdiction); Wilkey v. Hull, 366 Fed.Appx. 634, 637 (6th Cir.2010) (applying Twombly pleading standard in a diversity case to determine whether the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support state law claims); Foust v....