Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield

• Decision Date: 01 July 1966
• Docket Number: No. 39824,39824
• Citation: 274 Minn. 347,143 N.W.2d 813
• Parties: MANGOLD MIDWEST CO. et al., Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF RICHFIELD, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 813

143 N.W.2d 813

274 Minn. 347

MANGOLD MIDWEST CO. et al., Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF RICHFIELD, Respondent.

No. 39824.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 1, 1966.

Rehearing Denied April 4, 1966.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A municipal ordinance which does not contain terms which are irreconcilable with a state statute and which does not permit what the statute forbids or forbid what the statute permits will not be found to be invalid as conflicting with the statute if it merely fails to make certain acts which are violations of the statute also violations of the ordinance.

2. When the legislature has not so completely regulated a field or has not indicated that a field is solely a matter of state concern, and the subject matter of the regulation is not of such a nature that local regulation would have adverse effects upon the general populace of the state, then the legislature will not be considered to have preempted the field and local regulation will be permitted.

3. Purposeful discriminatory enforcement of municipal ordinances is a violation of the constitutional rights of the citizen, but under the facts of this case such purposeful discrimination was not adequately shown.

Feinberg, Mirviss, Meyers, Schumacher & Malmon, Minneapolis, for appellants.

Howard, Peterson, LeFevere, Lefler & Hamilton, Minneapolis, for respondent.

OPINION

FRANK T. GALLAGHER, C.

This is an appeal from the judgment of the district court declaring Ordinance No. 11.10 of the Village of Richfield to be a valid and enforceable ordinance.

Plaintiffs in this case, Mangold Midwest Company, United Distributors of Minnesota, Inc., and A. M. Servicing Corporation of Raytown, operate a large retail department store at 7701 Nicollet Avenue South in the village of Richfield. The store has been operating in that location since 1959. From the time of its opening until May 1962, the plaintiffs experienced no difficulty in keeping their store open on Sundays as was the practice of other retail stores in Richfield at that time.

On February 13, 1962, the village of Richfield passed Ordinance No. 11.10 entitled 'An Ordinance Relating to Business Activities on Sundays, Prohibiting Certain of Such Activities, and Providing Penalties for Violations.' The predecessor of plaintiff A. M. Servicing Corporation commenced a declaratory judgment action shortly after the enactment of the ordinance seeking to have the ordinance declared invalid. The trial court found for the defendant village and no appeal was taken from that decision, dated May 9, 1962.

Plaintiffs' store remained closed on Sundays from May 1962 until October 11, 1964, during which period other stores in Richfield remained open and sold restricted items. There was testimony from owners and managers of those stores which remained open that their employees were instructed not to sell restricted items on Sunday, but several also testified that they were aware that at one time or another restricted items were sold either by inadvertence or in case of an assurance by the buyer that an emergency existed. The Richfield police officers apparently witnessed few violations in their regular investigation of the establishments which remained open on Sundays during this period and brought charges against only two.

During September and October 1964, plaintiffs hired three persons to attempt to purchase restricted items in other stores in Richfield. It was apparent from affidavits of those persons that they were very successful in purchasing such items. In any event, plaintiffs wrote a letter to the officials of the village October 7, 1964, and informed them of the results of the purchasing project and their feeling that it revealed discriminatory enforcement of the ordinance. The letter also informed the officials that plaintiffs intended to again engage in business on Sundays, beginning October 11, 1964.

On that Sunday plaintiffs' store did open for business and plaintiffs were charged with violation of the 'Sunday closing' ordinance. Two other stores in Richfield, not owned by plaintiffs, were also served with complaints on that day charging them with violation of the same ordinance. The officer responsible for serving the complaints testified that he had been told by his supervisor to serve a couple of other stores so that it would not look as if the village were discriminating against the plaintiffs.

Sales at the plaintiffs' store amounted to about $18,000 each Sunday the store was open from October 11, 1964, to the time of trial, October 29, 1964.

Plaintiffs obtained a temporary restraining order on October 13, 1964, enjoining the village from enforcement of the ordinance and commenced this declaratory judgment action. After a decision on January 19, 1965, upholding the validity of the ordinance, the trial court restrained the village from enforcement of the ordinance until this court could determine the matter which is now before us on appeal.

The legal issues raised by plaintiffs on appeal are:

(1) Is Richfield Ordinance No. 11.10 invalid as being in conflict with Minn.St. 624.01 to 624.03? (2) Is the ordinance invalid on the basis that it attempts to regulate business in a field preempted by state law? (3) Has the village of Richfield been guilty of purposeful discriminatory enforcement or Ordinance No. 11.10 so that such further enforcement should be enjoined?

1. Turning to the first issue, there is little question as to the general law concerning the latitude allowed a municipality in passing ordinances relating to Sunday observance. It is simply that such ordinances passed by a municipality in the exercise of a police power conferred on it either expressly or by necessary implication will generally be upheld if they are not inconsistent with the state law. See, Power v. Nordstrom, 150 Minn. 228, 184 N.W. 967, 18 A.L.R. 733; Annotations, 29 A.L.R. 397, 400, and 37 A.L.R. 575. The leading annotation goes on to point out that the fact that there is a state law on the same subject as that covered by a municipal ordinance relating to Sunday observance does not render the ordinance invalid, provided the municipality has authority to legislate in that field and the ordinance is not in conflict with the state enactment. Annotation, 29 A.L.R. 397, 409.

Although there are numerous cases supporting the general rule, the law is not too clear as to when a particular ordinance conflicts with a state statute. For example, there is language in the cases which indicates that by lack of conflict is meant 'harmony,' City of Clinton v. Wilson, 257 Ill. 580, 586, 101 N.E. 192, 195; the 'same direction,' Ex parte Johnson, 20 Okl.Cr. 66, 72, 201 P. 533, 536; and that the ordinance does not authorize the doing of any act on Sunday which the general laws of the state have prohibited, City of St. Louis v. Bernard, 249 Mo. 51, 155 S.W. 394.

The case which probably goes furthest in an effort to define the type of conflict which would make an ordinance invalid is the Minnesota case of Power v. Nordstrom, supra. This court there took account of nearly all of the other less definitive attempts when it stated (150 Minn. 232, 184 N.W. 969):

'It is elementary that an ordinance must not be repugnant to, but in harmony with, the laws enacted by the Legislature for the government of the state. It cannot authorize what a statute forbids or forbid what a statute expressly permits but it may supplement a statute or cover an authorized field of local legislation unoccupied by general legislation. Every business and occupation is subject to the reasonable exercise of the police power of the municipality where it is carried on and in the exercise of the power a city or village may regulate that which the state has failed to regulate.'

Later Minnesota cases have not altered this test and for the most part have not been faced with a question of what constitutes conflict except in the area of ordinances making certain acts punishable as crimes by punishment which differs from the state standard. The law on that matter is well set out in City of Duluth v. Evans, 158 Minn. 450, 452, 197 N.W. 737, as follows:

'* * * This ordinance and the state law are very much alike, and the one is made in apparent recognition and respect for and of the other. There is not a great difference in the penalties and such difference as exists is doubtless out of necessity so that the prosecutions may be expeditiously disposed of in the municipal court. The ordinance is co-operative and not antagonistic to the general law. Ordinances may be valid when they relate to the same matter as a state law, even though the punishment prescribed in both be not the same. (Citation omitted.) Even if the penalty be less, the ordinance may be, and doubtless is, an important adjunct in preserving the standard of regulation as moulded by the general law. Being of such character it is valid.'

See, also, City of Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn. 511, 16 N.W.2d 779; State v. Weeks, 216 Minn. 279, 12 N.W.2d 493; State v. Houston, 210 Minn. 379, 298 N.W. 358; State v. Harris, 50 Minn. 128, 52 N.W. 387, 531; State v. Ludwig, 21 Minn. 202.

Taking into consideration the discussions appearing in 62 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, § 143b(3); 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3 ed.) § 23.07; and 1 Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, § 5.20, together with Minnesota cases, it appears to us that the following general principles can be established:

(a) As a general rule, conflicts which would render an ordinance invalid exist only when both the ordinance and the statute contain express or implied terms that are irreconcilable with each other.

(b) More specifically, it has been said that conflict exists where the ordinance permits what the statute forbids. Power v. Nordstrom, 150 Minn. 228, 184 N.W. 967, 18 A.L.R. 733.

(c) Conversely, a conflict exists where the ordinance forbids what the statute Expressly permits. Power v. Nordstrom, supra. A part of the...