Mangold v. DEPT. OF NATURAL RESOURCES
| Decision Date | 03 December 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. 78A01-9903-CV-88.,78A01-9903-CV-88. |
| Parties | Matthew MANGOLD, a minor, by his next friend, Michael MANGOLD, Appellant-Plaintiff, v. INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES and Switzerland County School Corporation, Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Gary K. Kemper, Kemper & Barlow, Madison, Indiana, Attorney for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, J.T. Whitehead, Deputy Attorney General of Indiana, Danford R. Due, Leslie A. Behrman, Stewart Due Doyle & Pugh, LLP, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellees.
Appellant Matthew (Matthew) Mangold appeals the denial of his complaint for damages against the Indiana Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the Switzerland County School Corporation (School). Summary Judgment was entered in favor of the DNR and the School.
We affirm.
Matthew raises four issues for our review, two of which we find dispositive and restate as:
On March 12, 1997, Conservation Officer John Groover of the DNR taught part of a hunter education course in the Switzerland County Middle School. He instructed on ammunition, rifles and shotguns. The hunter education course was an approved part of the science curriculum and Matthew attended this course as part of his science class. While he was instructing Matthew's class, Officer Groover proceeded to take apart a shotgun shell to demonstrate the four different constituent parts of a shell. Officer Groover also admonished Matthew's class to never "handle ammunition unless accompanied by an adult or an instructor." (R. 150).
Later in the day after school, Matthew took apart one of his father's shotgun shells with his brother. Matthew's brother held the shell with vice grips and Matthew took a hammer and chisel and struck the shell once. Matthew struck the shell again and the shell exploded with a fragment striking Matthew in his left eye, blinding him in that eye.
Matthew filed his complaint for damages on January 7, 1998 against both the DNR and the School. The School filed its motion for summary judgment on October 6, 1998, and the DNR filed its motion for summary judgment on September 8, 1998. The trial court granted both the DNR's and the School's motions for summary judgment on February 11, 1999.
This case comes before us on a grant of summary judgment from the trial court. A grant of immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) and the determination of a duty are both questions of law and are subject to a de novo standard of review. Delta Tau Delta v. Johnson, 712 N.E.2d 968, 971 (Ind.1999); Joseph v. LaPorte County, 651 N.E.2d 1180, 1183 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Miller v. NBD Bank, N.A., 701 N.E.2d 282, 285 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998). Once this burden has been sustained, the non-moving party must respond by setting forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine need for trial, and cannot rest upon the allegations or denials in the pleadings. Id.
In reviewing a decision upon a summary judgment motion, we are to apply the same standard as the trial court. Id. We are to review only the designated evidentiary material in the record and construe that evidence liberally in favor of the non-moving party. Id. Our role is to carefully scrutinize the trial court's determination so as not to deny the non-moving party its day in court. Id.
Matthew contends that the trial court erred when it granted the School's motion for summary judgment finding that the School owed no duty to Matthew. Specifically, Matthew argues that the trial court erred when it noted in its entry of summary judgment that the School owed no duty to Matthew because Matthew was at home when the accident occurred, Matthew was not under the supervision of the School when he was at home, and Matthew obtained no unreasonably dangerous instrumentality from the School.
Summary judgment is rarely appropriate for negligence actions, but issues of duty are questions of law for the court. Brewster v. Rankins, 600 N.E.2d 154, 156 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). To establish negligence, a plaintiff must first meet the threshold issue of a duty owed to the plaintiff. Id. at 157. Schools have a special responsibility recognized by common law to supervise their students, owing to the fact that children have characteristics that make it likely that they may do unreasonable things. Miller v. Griesel, 261 Ind 604, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706 (1974). While school authorities have a special duty to exercise reasonable care and supervision for the safety of children under their care, schools are not intended to be insurers of the safety of their students. Swanson v. Wabash College, 504 N.E.2d 327, 330 (Ind. Ct.App.1987). However, if a school provides one of its students with an unreasonably dangerous instrumentality, then there is the imposition of a duty on teachers and schools regardless of the environment in which it was used. Brewster, 600 N.E.2d at 158.
The facts most favorable to Matthew as the non-moving party reveal that the trial court did not err when it granted the School's motion for summary judgment because no duty was owed to Matthew by the School. Matthew was at home when the accident occurred and not at school, and thus, he was not under the supervision of the School or its representatives. Additionally, while it could be argued that a shotgun shell is an inherently dangerous instrumentality, the fact remains that unlike Brewster, where the instrumentality was provided by the school, in this case, the School educated Matthew about the components of a shotgun shell, but never provided Matthew with a shotgun shell to take home. Instead, Matthew got the shell at home from his father's supply.
In Miller, a fifth grade student was injured by a detonator cap that exploded during recess. 308 N.E.2d at 704. He sued the school on a negligence theory arguing that the school failed to use due care to provide reasonable supervision. Id. at 703. The Indiana Supreme Court held that schools have a special duty to supervise their students because of children's peculiar characteristics to do unreasonable things. Id. at 706. The court also held that the duty to exercise care arises as a matter of law out of a relationship existing between the parties and that the court is to determine whether such a relationship exists. Id.
In Brewster, a fourth grade student injured another child when he struck him in the head with a golf club while he was practicing his swing at his home. 600 N.E.2d at 156. The golf club was provided by the student's school and the parents of the injured child attempted to sue the school under a negligence theory, claiming that the school failed to instruct, train and supervise the student. Id. This court found that the parents failed to establish that the school owed the injured child a duty. Id. at 157. We recognized that almost all Indiana cases that dealt with the duties that a school owes to its students occur on school property. Id. Additionally, this court found that the only case that it could find that dealt with an issue of negligence off of school property, Swanson, established that a school has no duty to supervise recreational athletic practices off school premises. Id. at 158. Finally, we found that a golf club is not an unreasonably dangerous instrumentality imposing a duty on the school regardless of where it is used. Id. at 158
While Brewster and Swanson dealt with athletic type of activities that occurred off of school property, the fact remains that like those cases, Matthew's activity occurred off of school property as well. While a school does have a special duty to supervise its students owing to their peculiar characteristics, that duty cannot extend to what a child does in the privacy of his own home. Matthew was not under the supervision of the school when he was at his home. The School gave him no written instructions or supervision at his home to take apart a shotgun shell. Additionally, Matthew himself stated in an affidavit that he got the idea to hit the shotgun shell with a hammer and chisel from his own head and not from what he learned at school.
Unlike Miller, where the alleged injury occurred on school property, Matthew's injury occurred at his home and not on school property. Nonetheless, Miller established that a duty to exercise care arises out of a relationship between the parties. However, no relationship existed between Matthew and the School at the time of Matthew's injury because Matthew was injured at his home and not at school.
Furthermore, unlike Brewster, Matthew did not receive the dangerous instrumentality of the shotgun shell from the School. Rather, Matthew got a shell from his father's ammunition stored in the home. Also, Matthew did receive instructions about ammunition, rifles, and shotguns specifically pertaining to the safe handling of ammunition, the difference between rifles and shotguns, the difference between ammunition, safe handling of rifles and shotguns, safe storage of ammunition, and finally the mechanics of gun firing. However, Matthew attempts to argue that the instructions he received from Officer Groover about shotguns shells in and of themselves were an inherently dangerous instrumentality.
What makes an object inherently dangerous is that the danger is part of the constitution of the instrumentality or condition...
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