Mangrich v. Colvin

Decision Date12 February 2016
Docket NumberNo. C15-2002-LTS,C15-2002-LTS
PartiesBECKY S. MANGRICH, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Becky S. Mangrich seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denying her application for Social Security disability insurance benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (Act). Mangrich contends that the administrative record (AR) does not contain substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision that she was not disabled during the relevant period. For the reasons that follow, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.

I. BACKGROUND

Mangrich was born in 1964, completed twelve years of schooling and did not attend special education classes. AR 219, 368. She has previously worked as a cashier self-service. AR 32. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) determined that she was capable of performing this past work, as well as other work that exists to a significant extent in the national economy such as final assembler, addresser and charge clerk. AR 32-33.

Mangrich filed her application for DIB on August 18, 2011, alleging a disability onset date of April 26, 2011. AR 20, 176. She contends that she is disabled due to degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, status post cervical spine fusion, migraines and depression. AR 22. Mangrich's claims were denied initially and on reconsideration. AR 20. She then requested a hearing before an ALJ. ALJ Julie Bruntz conducted a video hearing on May 9, 2013, AR 13, and issued a decision denying Mangrich's claim on July 22, 2013. AR 17.

Mangrich sought review by the Appeals Council, which denied review on November 19, 2014, AR 1, leaving the ALJ's decision as the final decision of the Commissioner. On January 21, 2015, Mangrich filed a complaint (Doc. No. 3) in this court seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. On February 24, 2015, with the consent of the parties (Doc. 6), the Honorable Linda R. Reade transferred this case to me for final disposition and entry of judgment. The parties have now briefed the issues and the matter is fully submitted.

II. DISABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF

A disability is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); accord 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is "not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists . . . in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A).

To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; see Kirby v. Astrue, 500 F.3d 705, 707 (8thCir. 2007). First, the Commissioner will consider a claimant's work activity. If the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).

Second, if the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the Commissioner looks to see "whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities." Dixon v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 602, 605 (8th Cir. 2003). "An impairment is not severe if it amounts only to a slight abnormality that would not significantly limit the claimant's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." Kirby, 500 F.3d at 707; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a).

The ability to do basic work activities is defined as "the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs." Id. § 404.1521(b). These abilities and aptitudes include (1) physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling; (2) capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) use of judgment; (5) responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers, and usual work situations; and (6) dealing with changes in a routine work setting. Id. § 404.1521(b)(1)-(6); see Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141 (1987). "The sequential evaluation process may be terminated at step two only when the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments would have no more than a minimal impact on her ability to work." Page v. Astrue, 484 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Third, if the claimant has a severe impairment, then the Commissioner will consider the medical severity of the impairment. If the impairment meets or equals one of the presumptively disabling impairments listed in the regulations, then the claimant is considered disabled, regardless of age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), 404.1520(d); see Kelley v. Callahan, 133 F.3d 583, 588 (8th Cir. 1998).

Fourth, if the claimant's impairment is severe, but it does not meet or equal one of the presumptively disabling impairments, then the Commissioner will assess the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) to determine the claimant's "ability to meet the physical, mental, sensory, and other requirements" of the claimant's past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), 404.1545(a)(4). "RFC is a medical question defined wholly in terms of the claimant's physical ability to perform exertional tasks or, in other words, what the claimant can still do despite his or her physical or mental limitations." Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1). The claimant is responsible for providing evidence the Commissioner will use to make a finding as to the claimant's RFC, but the Commissioner is responsible for developing the claimant's "complete medical history, including arranging for a consultative examination(s) if necessary, and making every reasonable effort to help [the claimant] get medical reports from [the claimant's] own medical sources." Id. § 404.1545(a)(3). The Commissioner also will consider certain non-medical evidence and other evidence listed in the regulations. Id. If a claimant retains the RFC to perform past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv).

Fifth, if the claimant's RFC as determined in Step Four will not allow the claimant to perform past relevant work, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that there is other work that the claimant can do, given the claimant's RFC as determined at Step Four, and his or her age, education, and work experience. See Bladow v. Apfel, 205 F.3d 356, 358-59 n.5 (8th Cir. 2000). The Commissioner must show not only that the claimant's RFC will allow the claimant to make an adjustment to other work, but also that the other work exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 591 (8th Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant can make an adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, then the Commissioner will find the claimant is not disabled. If the claimant cannot make an adjustment to other work, then the Commissioner will find thatthe claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v). At Step Five, even though the burden of production shifts to the Commissioner, the burden of persuasion to prove disability remains on the claimant. Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004).

III. THE ALJ'S FINDINGS

The ALJ made the following findings:

1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2016.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 26, 2011, the alleged onset date.
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, status post cervical spine fusion, migraines and depression.
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) except the claimant could occasionally climb ramps and stairs but should never climb ladders, ropes and scaffolds. The claimant could occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. The claimant would need to avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and hazards (such as unprotected heights and dangerous machinery). The claimant is limited to simple, routine and repetitive tasks. The claimant would need to alternate between standing and sitting every 30 minutes while remaining on task.
6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a cashier self-service (DOT 211.462-014). This work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565).
7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from April 26, 2011 through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f)).

AR 23-34.

IV. THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD

The Commissioner's decision must be affirmed "if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) ("The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as...

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