Manguso v. Oceanside Unified School Dist.

• Decision Date: 24 January 1979
• Citation: 88 Cal.App.3d 725,152 Cal.Rptr. 27
• Parties: Margaret Earley MANGUSO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. OCEANSIDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT and Ben Fugate, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 16711.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 27

152 Cal.Rptr. 27

88 Cal.App.3d 725

Margaret Earley MANGUSO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. OCEANSIDE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT and Ben Fugate, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 16711.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Jan. 24, 1979.

Jones, Hatfield, Penfield & Garrett and Barton M. Myerson, Escondido, for plaintiff and appellant.

Higgs, Fletcher & Mack and Harry L. Carter and Gregg C. Sindici, San Diego, for defendants and respondents.

HARELSON, ^* Associate Justice.

Margaret Earley Manguso's action is one for libel against a former school principal, Ben Fugate, under whom she worked as a teacher, and against Oceanside Unified School District, the school district employing them, for alleged defamatory statements Fugate made in a letter he is alleged to have caused to be placed in her permanent personnel file with the school district.

Manguso filed her complaint on December 3, 1976, and the demurrer of Fugate and the District was sustained without leave to amend on May 26, 1977, on the ground her action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations found in Code of Civil Procedure, section 340.

The statement of "facts" set forth in Manguso's opening brief and upon which this appeal is made are allegations from her complaint. No evidence has been adduced to support such allegations. Those alleged "facts" are:

Manguso is trained and qualified as an elementary school teacher and certified to practice in the State of California. In August of 1960, while she was employed by the District, and while Fugate was acting within the scope of his employment, the District and Fugate authored a letter containing certain libelous statements concerning her. The District and Fugate caused this letter to be placed in her confidential personnel file in the District's personnel office in August 1960, where it remained until May 25, 1976. During this entire period the letter was read by or to Manguso's prospective employers and agents, with the result Manguso was unable to obtain employment as an elementary school teacher in San Diego County from 1963 to the present. The file in which the letter was placed was confidential and Manguso did not discover its existence until May 25, 1976.

The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court properly sustained the demurrer on the ground Manguso's action was barred by Code of Civil Procedure, section 340, subdivision (3), which "specifies a one-year statute of limitations for an action for libel, slander, . . ." Manguso acknowledges this is the applicable statute of limitations, the statute begins to run when the cause of action accrues, and as a general rule a cause of action for libel accrues when the defamatory matter is published. Manguso has made no allegations the letter was published, or republished, within one year prior to the filing of her complaint. Therefore, if the general rule regarding accrual is applied here, her cause of action is barred.

Manguso contends, however, under the facts of her case as set forth in the complaint, the date upon which her cause of action is held to have accrued should be determined in accordance with the "rule of discovery"; i. e., her cause of action should be held not to have accrued until she knew, or should have known, all material facts essential to show the elements of her cause of action.

In Cain v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 62 Cal.App.3d 310, 132 Cal.Rptr. 860, plaintiffs brought an action against an insurance company for damages for violation of their right to privacy which appeared to have occurred in 1969. Plaintiffs alleged they first became aware of the invasion of privacy on March 6, 1971, and filed their action on May 14, 1974. The court held that Code of Civil Procedure, section 340, subdivision (3) providing a one-year statute of limitations for the commencement of certain actions was the applicable statute of limitations. Following the trend toward the discovery rule and away from the strict rule in respect to the time for the accrual of the cause of action, the court held the rule of discovery attends Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (3) in its application to actions for damages for violation of the right of privacy. The court thus held the plaintiffs' cause of action did not accrue until they discovered or should have discovered their cause of action.

In the case of Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries, 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 146 Cal.Rptr. 271, the court held personal injury cases based upon negligent breach of contract are governed by the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (3). Plaintiff sought to bring himself within the operation of the "discovery rule" a recognized exception to the strict operation of the statute of limitations. The court noted in a growing variety of cases, courts have held the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovered or had notice of all facts which are essential to the cause of action. The court stated:

"In order to invoke this special defense to the statute of limitations, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts which show (1) the time and manner of discovery, and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence. (Citations) Mere conclusionary assertions that delay in discovery was reasonable are insufficient and will not enable the complaint to withstand general demurrer. (Citation)." (Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 297, 146 Cal.Rptr. 271, 274.)

The court concluded, however, in the Saliter case under the facts alleged, plaintiff had discovered or had notice of all facts essential to the asserted cause of action seventeen months before he filed his first complaint.

In Seelenfreund v. Terminix, 84 Cal.App.3d 133, 148 Cal.Rptr. 307, a purchaser of real property brought an action against a licensed termite inspector for negligent breach of an oral contract to make a termite inspection and report thereon. After obtaining the report plaintiff purchased the property. A subsequent inspection of the property two years later disclosed problems which had not been reported in the earlier inspection but which had allegedly existed at that time. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground the cause of action was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Although both sides agreed two years was the applicable time period, they disagreed as to when the two years began to run. The demurrer was sustained without leave to amend, and a judgment of dismissal was entered thereon. The defendant argued, and the trial court held, the "rule of discovery" exception to the running of the statute of limitations applies only when a fiduciary relationship existed between the contending parties. The appellate court did not agree, holding the two-year statute began to run when plaintiff knew or should have known the contract had been negligently breached.

In the instant case the District first cites Moore v. United...