Manhattan Bldgs., Inc. v. Hurley, 53555

Decision Date17 March 1982
Docket NumberNo. 53555,53555
Citation231 Kan. 20,643 P.2d 87
PartiesMANHATTAN BUILDINGS, INC., Petitioner, v. Patrick J. HURLEY, Secretary of Administration of The State of Kansas, Respondent.
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. A few matters of great public importance and certain depredations upon personal liberty are cognizable in the first instance by the supreme court, through original proceedings in quo warranto, mandamus, and habeas corpus. But even in such cases some special reason must exist for invoking its powers or parties will be relegated to a court of general jurisdiction for relief.

2. Mandamus is an appropriate proceeding for the purpose of compelling a public officer to perform a clearly defined duty, one imposed by law and not involving the exercise of discretion.

3. Mandamus to compel the performance of a public duty will not ordinarily lie at the instance of a private person. Where, however, the individual shows an injury or interest specific and peculiar to himself, and not one that he shares with the community in general, then the remedy of mandamus and the other extraordinary remedies are available.

4. Mandamus is a proper remedy where the essential purpose of the proceeding is to obtain an authoritative interpretation of the law for the guidance of public officials in their administration of the public business, notwithstanding the fact that there also exists an adequate remedy at law.

5. Under K.S.A. 75-3711c(c), the state finance council can not approve the expenditure of funds for anything rejected by the previous legislature and which is contrary to known legislative policy.

6. Freedom of contract is a qualified and not an absolute right, but it is protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

7. Competent parties may make contracts on their own terms, provided such contracts are neither illegal nor contrary to public policy, and in the absence of fraud, mistake or duress a party who has entered into such a contract is bound thereby.

8. The test for due process is whether the legislative means selected had a real and substantial relation to the objective sought. The rule has been restated in terms of whether the regulation is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interest of the community.

9. The yardstick for measuring equal protection arguments is the "reasonable basis" test. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective.

10. Appropriation bills may direct the amounts of money which may be spent, and for what purposes; they may express the legislature's direction as to expenditures; they may transfer funds from one account to another; they may direct that prior unexpended appropriations lapse.

11. In considering whether a usurpation of powers exists, a court should consider various factors. These include (a) the essential nature of the power being exercised; (b) the degree of control by the legislative department in the exercise of the power; (c) the nature of the objective sought to be attained by the legislature; (d) the practical result of the blending of powers as shown by actual experience over a period of time.

12. In an original action in mandamus, the record is examined and it is held : When the legislature failed to fund petitioner's ten-year lease, such action triggered the termination clause and the lease was properly terminated; further, Section 69 of 1981 Senate Bill No. 470 is examined and is held to be constitutional and valid. Relief in the nature of mandamus is denied.

Benjamin J. Neill, of Hamill, Lentz, Neill & Dwyer, Mission, argued the cause, and Thomas L. Thurston, of the same firm, was with him on the petition for mandamus.

Arthur H. Griggs, Chief Atty., Topeka, for the Dept. of Administration, argued the cause, and Adele Ross Vine, Staff Atty., for the Dept. of Administration, was with him on the brief, for respondent.

William D. Biles, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued the cause for the intervenor attorney general, and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., and Bruce E. Miller, Deputy Atty. Gen., were with him on the motion to intervene.

Robert A. Coldsnow, Topeka, legislative counsel, argued the cause for intervenor Legislative Coordinating Council, and was on the motion to intervene.

MILLER, Justice:

This is an original action in mandamus, brought by the petitioner, Manhattan Buildings, Inc., the owner of the Woman's Club building in downtown Topeka, against the respondent, Patrick J. Hurley, Secretary of Administration of the State of Kansas. Manhattan leased the building to the Secretary; before taking possession under the lease, the Secretary gave Manhattan a notice of termination. By this action, Manhattan asks this court to declare that the termination clause of the lease was not properly invoked, and that Section 69 of 1981 Senate Bill No. 470 (later 1981 Session Laws of Kansas, Chapter 32, Section 69, and now K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 75-3921) is unconstitutional and void. Manhattan also seeks an order in the nature of mandamus, compelling the Secretary to perform all of his obligations under the lease. The attorney general and the Legislative Coordinating Council were granted leave to intervene.

The essential facts, which are not in substantial dispute, are as follows: Throughout the year 1980, various employees of the department of administration and the insurance department carried on negotiations with representatives from Manhattan Buildings with regard to leasing the Woman's Club building for the insurance department, which was to move from its quarters in the State Office Building to the Woman's Club building. These negotiations culminated in a written lease dated January 8, 1981, executed by Manhattan Buildings as lessor and the Secretary of Administration as lessee, and approved by the sublessee, Fletcher Bell, Commissioner of Insurance. The lease required the lessor to renovate the building according to stated and appended specifications, and to complete this work before the State took possession. The lease covered a period of ten years, commencing May 1, 1981. It provided for payment of rent in the total sum of $1,899,687.50, payable $17,969.78 on May 1, 1981, $94,984.38 to be paid semiannually on each July 1 and January 1 thereafter through July 1, 1990, and a final payment of $77,014.50 to be paid January 1, 1991. Clause No. 9 of the lease gives rise to this litigation. It reads as follows:

"Termination for Fiscal Necessity : Notwithstanding any other provision of this lease, if funds anticipated for the continued fulfillment of this lease agreement are at any time not forthcoming, either through the failure of the legislature to appropriate funds or the discontinuance or material alteration of the program under which funds were provided, then second party (the Secretary) shall have the right to terminate this lease by giving first party a reasonable notice specifying the reasons for such necessary termination."

It is undisputed that neither the insurance department nor the department of administration had available funds appropriated for the purpose of funding this specific lease during the fiscal year ending on the 30th day of June, 1981. Funding for the lease was to come from appropriations to be made by the 1981 legislature.

The insurance department, at the time the lease was entered into, was occupying space in the State Office Building. A request for funds to cover the rental for that space was included within the department's original budget request for the fiscal year beginning on July 1, 1981. That request was not sufficient to cover the increased cost of leasing the Woman's Club building, and accordingly, early in 1981, that request was increased. The Governor, in his recommendations to the legislature, included the increased amount. Appropriations for the insurance department, incorporating that increase, were then included within 1981 Senate Bill No. 158. The bill was referred to the Senate Ways and Means Committee, where a subcommittee recommended that the increase be stricken from the insurance department's appropriation. The subcommittee's report explains its recommendation as follows:

"The Subcommittee concurs with the Governor's recommendations except for two items. The recommended $385,598 for rents exceeds the requested amount by $156,805 and reflects the anticipated relocation of the agency from the State Office Building to a privately-owned facility at 9th Street and Topeka Blvd. The Subcommittee questions whether it is in the best interests of the state to be contracting with a private landlord when the same funding could be dedicated toward amortizing the cost of a state-owned building. Furthermore, the Subcommittee is of the opinion that the Legislature should not appropriate additional funds for new leases prior to review of the comprehensive space management plan proposed by the Department of Administration."

The full Senate Ways and Means Committee, in considering the subcommittee report, discussed the possibility of planning a second state office building instead of leasing more space in privately owned buildings. It adopted the subcommittee report, and recommended the bill for passage. The Senate then passed the bill, with the additional funds deleted.

Next in the legislative process, a subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee recommended that the additional funds be restored to the insurance department's appropriation. The full committee, however, did not adopt the subcommittee report, and recommended the bill for passage without the additional funds requested by the insurance department. 1981 Senate Bill No. 158 was then passed by the House, approved by the Governor, and published, without an appropriation of funds for the insurance department to cover the Woman's Club lease.

That, however, is not the end of the...

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