Manhattan Fire Ins. Co. v. Weill
Decision Date | 19 April 1877 |
Citation | 69 Va. 389 |
Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
Parties | MANHATTAN FIRE INS. CO. v. WEILL & ULLMAN. |
I. One condition of a policy of insurance on a building is, " if the building insured stands upon leased ground it must be so represented to the company, and so expressed in the written part of the policy; otherwise the policy shall be void" --HELD: The plaintiff may prove that the description of the property was inserted in the policy by the general agent of the company who issued this policy, and that he knew at the time that the building stood upon leased ground.
II. The knowledge of the general agent issuing the policy, is the knowledge of the company, and they receiving the premiums on the policy with that knowledge, are bound by the policy.
III. Another condition of a policy of insurance on buildings is " if the interest of the assured in the property be any other than the entire unconditional and sole ownership of the property for the use and benefit of the assured, it must be so represented to the company, and so expressed in the written part of this policy, otherwise the policy shall be void. The assured had given a deed of trust upon the building to secure a debt--HELD:
1. This condition does not refer to the legal title, but to the interest of the assured in the property: that he warranted to be no other than the entire unconditional ownership of the property.
2. This was no warranty against liens and incumbrances. The assured's interest was the sole ownership. The fact that he had given a deed of trust to secure a debt upon the property does not make the cestui que trust a joint owner.
3. There being no pretence of fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation, by the assured, of the deed of trust upon the building, the policy is obligatory upon the insurance company.
This was an action on the case in the corporation court of the city of Norfolk, brought by Wiell & Ullman, against the Manhattan Fire Insurance Company, to recover the amount of the insurance on a house in said city which had been consumed by fire. On the trial several exceptions were taken by the defendants to rulings of the court, and there having been a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $1,385, with interest from the 1st of November 1873, the defendants applied to a judge of this court for a writ of error and supersedeas; which was allowed. The questions involved in the case and the facts, are stated by Judge Christian in his opinion.
Scarburgh & Duffield, for the appellants.
White & Garnett, for the appellees.
The plaintiff in error (the Manhattan Fire Insurance Company) seeks to avoid the obligation of its policy issued to the defendant in error upon two grounds:
First, that the building insured stood upon leased ground, but was not so represented to the company, and not so expressed in the policy.
Second, that at the time of the insurance, the house was encumbered by a deed of trust, which fact was not represented to the company, and not expressed in the policy.
The condition of the policy upon which this defence is based is as follows:
Evidence was offered to prove that the general agent of the company, who issued this policy to defendants in error, knew that the building insured stood on leased ground at the time he issued the policy. There was a motion to exclude this evidence from the jury, which was overruled by the court, and was the subject of a bill of exceptions, which set forth the evidence offered and admitted by the court as follows:
Be it remembered, that after the jury were sworn to try the issue joined in this cause, the plaintiffs to maintain the said issue on their part, after having offered in evidence to the jury (1) the policy, (2) the authenticated copy of the deed of lease, (3) the admissions of the parties, and (4) the proof of loss, as these several matters are set forth in the defendant's bill of exceptions No. 1, introduced (5) R. F. Vaughan as a witness in their behalf, who testified as follows:
And then the plaintiffs introduced (6) A. M. Vaughan as a witness in their behalf, who testified as follows:
And then the plaintiffs introduced (7) J. C. Deming as a witness in their behalf, who testified as follows:
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