MANHATTAN LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. Evanek
| Decision Date | 29 June 1984 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 83-2598. |
| Citation | MANHATTAN LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK v. Evanek, 587 F.Supp. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1984) |
| Parties | The MANHATTAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. Charlotte EVANEK and Marian Evanek, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Craig Jones, Reed Smith Shaw & McClay, Pittsburgh, Pa., for plaintiff.
James Daub, Pittsburgh, Pa., for Marian Evanek.
Michael Boyle, Jonathan Bonime, Meyer, Unkovic & Scott, Pittsburgh, Pa., for Charlotte Evanek.
This is an interpleader action filed by the Manhattan Life Insurance Company of New York to determine the rights to insurance proceeds under a policy of insurance in the amount of $50,000 issued by the PlaintiffInsurance Company to Raymond T. Evanek.
There are two rival claimants for the proceeds of the policy herein involved.The first claimant is DefendantCharlotte Evanek, the designated beneficiary on the March 24, 1974 enrollment card, who was then the wife of Raymond Thomas Evanek, the insured, who is now deceased.However, the insured and Charlotte Evanek were divorced by decree of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County on October 31, 1977.The second claimant is DefendantMarian Evanek, the Administratrix C.T.A. of the Estate of Raymond T. Evanek, who married the insured Raymond T. Evanek on or about July 8, 1982.The insured died on June 8, 1983, still married to Marian Evanek.No change of beneficiary card was filed by the insured prior to his death.
Both Defendants have moved for Summary Judgment on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and each claims to be entitled to the proceeds of the policy of insurance as a matter of law.
DefendantCharlotte Evanek contends that a divorced spouse may claim the proceeds of an insurance policy where that spouse is the designated beneficiary, even though the beneficiary is also designated as the "wife" but is not married to the insured at the time of the insured's death.Charlotte Evanek further contends that the property settlement agreement made in connection with the divorce does not cover these insurance proceeds.
Marian Evanek, the surviving widow, contends that under the terms of the Separation and Property Settlement Agreement dated August 12, 1977, Charlotte Evanek released and acquitted the insured and his estate of all claims and rights under the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, including the insurance proceeds involved here.Marian Evanek also contends that the designation of a beneficiary is a conveyance of property rights which conveyance is ineffective after the divorce under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1.
Exhibit B to the Complaint designates the beneficiary as follows:
Beneficiary Age Relationship
Charlotte M. Evanek 49 Wife
The form further states:
The terms of the Group Policy (Exhibit A to the Complaint) provide:
If the Individual dies while insured under the Group Policy the amount of insurance in force on account of the Individual at the date of his death shall be paid to the Beneficiary.
Section VI, Beneficiary, of the Policy (Exhibit A to the Complaint) provides:
The Agreement of Raymond T. Evanek and Charlotte M. Evanek made August 12, 1977 in connection with the divorce proceeding reads as follows:
EIGHTH: In consideration of these premises, the Wife hereby releases and acquits the Husband and his estate of and from any and all other claims, liabilities, obligations, dower and other rights to which she may be entitled under the Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, ...
A "conveyance" is defined in 20 Pa.C. S.A.§ 6101(Cum.Pam.1983-84) as follows:
The effect of divorce on a conveyance is set forth in 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1 (Cum. Pam.1983-84) as follows:
With respect to policies of insurance, 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(a) provides:
The designation of beneficiaries of life insurance ... shall not be considered testamentary and shall not be subject to any law governing the transfer of property by will....
DefendantMarian Evanek, the surviving spouse of Raymond T. Evanek, argues that the right to collect the insurance proceeds is a property right which was released by Charlotte Evanek in the property settlement agreement.DefendantMarian Evanek further argues that the insurance policy must be an inter vivos transfer and not a testamentary conveyance.Since it must be an inter vivos conveyance, Marian Evanek argues that under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1, the designation of the insured's former wife as primary beneficiary was rendered ineffective by reason of the divorce, and that the proceeds of the policy should therefore be paid to the estate of the insured.
DefendantCharlotte Evanek argues that the designation of a beneficiary under a policy of insurance is not a conveyance within the terms of 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1; that it cannot be a testamentary conveyance by virtue of 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(a); nor can it be an inter vivos conveyance since the mere naming of a beneficiary vests nothing in the person named.Charlotte Evanek also argues that the word "wife" is a descriptive word and is to no effect since "Charlotte Evanek" is specifically named as the beneficiary.
There is no dispute that Pennsylvania law governs the resolution of this controversy.The issue involved herein has been considered by several Pennsylvania lower courts and Federal District Courts, but has never been considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
In Simpkins v. Dodolak, 16 D & C3d 556(C.P. ClearfieldCo.1980), a fact situation identical to the case herein was presented.The Simpkinscourt dealt with the issue of whether the word "conveyance" as used in 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1 included the naming of a beneficiary in a life insurance policy, and stated, 16 D & C3dat 558:
In the act, immediately preceeding 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1, and which was repealed thereby, life insurance contracts were specifically excluded from the scope of the "conveyance of assets."In regards to a wife's marital rights upon election to take against the will of a deceased husband, there is no such exclusion in the present act with which we are concerned, and therefore, it can logically be inferred that the legislature intended no such exclusion in the present statute.
Unfortunately, Simpkins does not present an in-depth analysis of the problem.
Also holding that under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 6111.1 divorce renders ineffective the...
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Procter & Gamble U.S. Bus. Servs. Co. v. Estate of Rolison, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-762
...(E.D. Pa. 1997); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCall, 509 F. Supp. 439, 441 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of New York, N.Y. v. Evanek, 587 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1985). In coming to this conclusion, two of these courts found persuasive......
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Pucci v. United States, 80 Civ. 361 (PNL).
... ... 361 (PNL) ... United States District Court, S.D. New York ... June 29, 1984.587 F. Supp. 477 ... ...
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Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of New York, N.Y. v. Evanek, 84-3474
...between Charlotte and Marian, and in due course the court granted summary judgment in favor of Charlotte, the first wife. 587 F.Supp. 479 (D.C.Pa.1984). This appeal by Marian requires us to decide, under Pennsylvania law: (1) whether a separation and property settlement agreement incorporat......
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Procter & Gamble U.S. Bus. Servs. Co. v. Estate of Rolison
...(E.D. Pa. 1997); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCall, 509 F. Supp. 439, 441 (W.D. Pa. 1981); Manhattan Life Ins. Co. of New York, N.Y. v. Evanek, 587 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 762 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1985). In coming to this conclusion, two of these courts founds persuasiv......