Manhein v. New York Life Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 31 October 1941 |
Docket Number | 6333. |
Citation | 5 So.2d 918 |
Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
Parties | MANHEIN v. NEW YORK LIFE INS. CO. |
Rehearing Denied Nov. 28, 1941.
Writ of Certiorari and Review Denied Feb. 2, 1942.
Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo Rob't. J. O'Neal, Judge.
Montgomery, Montgomery & Fenner, of New Orleans, and James G. Cowles, of Shreveport, for appellant.
Booth & Lockard, of Shreveport, for appellee.
Defendant issued to plaintiff a life insurance policy wherein it agreed to pay him $25 per month during his lifetime should he become "wholly and presumably permanently disabled before the age of sixty, subject to all the terms and conditions contained in Section One" of the policy. Section One, so far as germane to the issues herein, reads as follows, to-wit:
In June, 1931, plaintiff became wholly incapacitated to perform any sort of work and in compliance with the policy provisions, defendant then began paying him monthly disability benefits. These continued with little interruption until May, 1939, at which time payments were discontinued without reason therefor being assigned. After amicable demand for resumption of said payments and refusal, this suit followed.
Plaintiff alleges that he is now totally, wholly and permanently disabled and has been in this condition without interruption since 1931, and thereby he is prevented from earning a livelihood or pursuing any gainful occupation. He sues to recover monthly payments of disability benefits, also the penalty and attorneys' fee provided for by Act 310 of 1910, on the theory that defendant's action in discontinuing payments was unjust, unreasonable and arbitrary.
Defendant resists the suit on the ground that plaintiff is not now nor has he been since May, 1939, totally and wholly disabled within the provisions of the policy contract.
There was judgment for plaintiff in keeping with his demand. His attorneys' fee for services in the lower court was fixed at $150. Defendant prosecutes appeal. Answering the appeal, plaintiff prays for increase in the quantum of attorneys' fee to $250, the full amount sued for.
In June, 1931, an unusually severe type of arthritis developed in plaintiff's knees, ankles and left hip. He was confined to bed therefrom for eleven months, a goodly part of which time was spent in hospitals. The hip joint became immobile from ankylosis and a successful operation was performed to relieve its impairment. This occurred in the year 1934, and confined plaintiff to bed for three and one-half months. The left leg, as a result of the operation, is one and one-half (1 1/2) inches shorter than the right.
After plaintiff's recovery from the operation and his ailments had been alleviated as much as medical science and surgery could do, these conditions remained and are present today, to-wit:
Right knee and both ankles are so stiff from ankylosis as to materially impair flexion; also, ability to move the feet in any direction is materially impaired. Callouses have developed in both feet. The left leg is atrophied from above the knee to the toes.
Since June, 1931, plaintiff has been under the observation of Dr. T.J. Smith, a reputable physician in Shreveport, who has regularly treated his ailments. He knows and is in a position to know plaintiff's condition better than any one else, and gave the following testimony which, considered in connection with the above described pathological conditions, is enlightening, to-wit:
The correctness of the conclusions and opinion of Dr. Smith is not contradicted by any witness in the case. Dr. Kerlin, who testified for defendant, does not dissent therefrom, but, on the contrary, substantially agrees with Dr. Smith.
Plaintiff's father has operated a small florist shop in the City of Shreveport for many years. After completing a high school course, plaintiff began working in his father's shop and in 1931, when he first became disabled, was performing the duties of designer. That was his occupation at the time. He acquired the knowledge, skill and ability needful to fill that position from practical experience and observation in his father's business and by attending elsewhere short courses in designing.
The duties of a designer in a small florist shop are somewhat numerous besides that of designing, and making up wreaths, sprays and other forms of floral decorations. It includes the handling of heavy objects. Perforce such duties are performed almost entirely while standing up. Much bending of the body forward over a wide table is required in assembling material preparatory to and in the confection of large wreaths, etc., for funerals, marriages, and other public affairs. It is not unusual that such a designer has to be on the job for long hours and sometimes all night in order to fill heavy rush orders.
Plaintiff is now thirty-six years of age. He is married and has one child. He did nothing in the way of work to engage his mental and physical faculties from June, 1931, until he reentered his father's business some time during the year 1935. He did this on his father's advice. The father, after stating that plaintiff stayed at his home and was doing nothing but twiddling his thumbs, testified:
Plaintiff does no designing and is unable to do so. His father has a designer regularly employed. Plaintiff answers phone calls assists in sending out monthly statements and when there is a rush of business or help is short, he waits on customers who desire to make small purchases. He is paid no salary, but has access to the cash drawer of his father's business. If he stands on his feet for as much as forty-five minutes, his legs and ankles swell badly. He is forced, in order to have relief, to bathe them in hot water and to massage them. Following such experiences he invariably lies down on a cot, there provided for his special use, until the swelling subsides. He is unable to walk for more than a block or two without his legs, ankles...
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