Manifold v. Ragaglia

• Decision Date: 28 December 2004
• Docket Number: (SC 17150).
• Citation: Manifold v. Ragaglia, 272 Conn. 410, 862 A.2d 292 (Conn. 2004)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: KAYLEE MANIFOLD ET AL. v. KRISTINE D. RAGAGLIA, COMMISSIONER OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ET AL.

272 Conn. 410

862 A.2d 292

KAYLEE MANIFOLD ET AL. v. KRISTINE D. RAGAGLIA, COMMISSIONER OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, ET AL.

(SC 17150).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 20, 2004.

Officially released December 28, 2004.

Sullivan, C. J., and Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Vertefeuille, Js.

Thomas C. Simones, with whom was Timothy A. Bishop, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Dana M. Horton, for the appellees (defendant Robert Creutz et al.).

Carolyn Signorelli, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Maite Barainca, assistant attorney general, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).

Opinion

NORCOTT, J.

The sole issue in this appeal is whether a physician who is not the initial reporter of suspected child abuse, but who performs a medical examination of a child at the request of the department of children and families (department) to determine whether reasonable cause exists to suspect child abuse, is entitled to the immunity from liability provided by General Statutes § 17a-101e (b).¹ The plaintiffs, the minors, Kaylee Manifold (Kaylee) and Matthew Manifold (Matthew), and their parents, Billie Jo Zaks and Michael Manifold (parents), brought this action for, inter alia, negligent infliction of emotional distress, against the following defendants: (1) Kristine D. Ragaglia, individually, and as commissioner of the department, and various department employees (department defendants);² and (2) Robert Creutz, a physician, and his employer, William Backus Hospital (William Backus), collectively referred to as the medical defendants. The plaintiffs also brought claims of medical malpractice against the medical defendants. The plaintiffs appeal³ from the trial court's grant of the medical defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing counts two, three and four of the complaint. We conclude that a physician who performs a medical examination of a child at the request of the department to determine whether reasonable cause exists to suspect child abuse is entitled to immunity from liability under § 17a-101e (b) for claims arising from that determination. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. On April 23, 2001, an anonymous caller from the office of the plaintiffs' pediatrician at the Norwich Pediatric Group contacted the department to report that Kathleen Welch, a speech therapist with the Birth to Three Program, had noticed numerous bruises on both Matthew and Kaylee, and a rash on Matthew while she was conducting a home based therapy session.⁴ In particular, Welch noticed that both children had bruises in the same location on their foreheads.⁵ Matthew and Kaylee were two and three years old, respectively, at this time.

The following day, Richard Days, a department social worker, made an unannounced visit to the plaintiffs' home. Days informed the parents of the reason for the visit, and they consented to his examining the children. He noted that both children were dirty and had bruised foreheads, while Matthew also had extensive bruising on his entire back and a rash on the front and back of his torso. Upon questioning by Days, Manifold explained that he had not taken Matthew to the pediatrician because he thought the rash was from Matthew recently having eaten $50 worth of chocolate. Manifold explained to Days that his son bruised easily, and that he had sustained the bruises while roughhousing with his sister and playing with his new toy trucks and the family dog. Later that day, Days accompanied the plaintiffs to the office of their family pediatrician at the Norwich Pediatric Group.

Upon their arrival, Days asked whether Richard Geller, the family's regular pediatrician, could examine the children to determine whether there was reasonable cause to suspect that they had been abused. Geller stated that he was unable to examine the children at that time and that they should not have been brought to his office; he advised Days to take the children to the emergency room at William Backus if an immediate examination was needed. Days then made an appointment with Geller for the following morning, but transported the plaintiffs to the William Backus emergency room for a more immediate evaluation.

At William Backus, Creutz examined both children, and ordered an X ray of Matthew. The X ray revealed no fractures, but Creutz stated in the notes of his examination that Matthew had a rash⁶ and bruises on his head and chest, as well as three large bruises on his back. The report also noted that Matthew had bruises on his legs, knees, thighs and both buttocks. The parents told Creutz that the bruises were the result of roughhousing with the dog and his sister, as well as a fall. Both parents denied causing the injuries, and told Creutz that no one ever had struck Matthew, except for "pats on the bottom."⁷ On the basis of the number and size of the bruises, Creutz concluded, however, that the bruises were typical of inflicted, rather than accidental, injuries, and he recommended further investigation of the injuries' source. He testified at his deposition that he did not order any blood tests to determine whether a blood disorder contributed to the bruising because the physical findings alone raised a sufficiently high suspicion of child abuse to require that it be ruled out, even if the blood test result was positive.

Creutz explained the results of the examination to Days, who in turn discussed them with other department personnel. Shortly thereafter, Jorge Osorio, a department supervisor, authorized a ninety-six hour hold of the children pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-101g(d). The children then were taken into department custody with the assistance of local police, and were placed in a licensed foster home. The department subsequently applied for and obtained orders of temporary custody of the children from the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, Driscoll, J., on April 25, 2001.

On April 25, 2001, Days met the children and the foster mother at the office of the Norwich Pediatric Group. At that time, Nancy Cusmano, a pediatrician, examined both children. Cusmano ordered blood tests for Matthew, stating that a normal blood test would indicate a high probability of abuse. Upon receiving the results of the test, however, Cusmano informed Days that Matthew's blood test showed some abnormalities, including a very low blood platelet count that generally causes clotting difficulties. She said that this condition could explain both the bruising and the rash. See also footnote 6 of this opinion. Cusmano referred Matthew to Joseph McNamara, a hematologist at Yale-New Haven Hospital (Yale), for further evaluation. Thereafter, McNamara diagnosed Matthew with idiopathic thrombocytopenic purpura, a blood disorder, and admitted him to Yale for treatment. The following day, April 26, 2001, McNamara advised Days that the marks and bruising were consistent with the blood disorder. Matthew subsequently was discharged from Yale. In light of this new information, the court granted the department's motion to vacate the orders of temporary custody. The department returned the children to the parents' custody later that same day, and Days relayed the Yale discharge instructions to them.

The neglect petitions that were filed with the court on April 25, 2001, however, remained active, although the department amended them to remove the initial allegations of physical abuse. The case was transferred to the department's division of protective services for further monitoring and study. A social study subsequently was filed with the court, and the neglect petitions were withdrawn in October, 2001.

In April, 2002, the plaintiffs instituted this action. In count one of the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged numerous acts of malice, negligence and recklessness by the department defendants with respect to the investigation. In count two of the complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that Creutz committed medical malpractice by failing to order a blood test, which resulted in a misdiagnosis of child abuse rather than a blood disorder. In count three, the plaintiffs made claims against William Backus derivative of Creutz' alleged malpractice. In count four, the plaintiffs alleged that the conduct of all the defendants, including the medical defendants, constituted negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Subsequently, the medical defendants moved for summary judgment as to all of the counts against them. The trial court, Gordon, J., granted their motion, concluding that Creutz was entitled to immunity from liability pursuant to § 17a-101e (b) because, as a physician, he was a "mandated reporter" within the scope of that statute. The trial court determined that, as a matter of public policy, Creutz was entitled to the statutory immunity because "we want to protect doctors and other people who we rely on to protect our children to feel free to participate in this often highly charged and potentially legal minefield-like environment . . . ." The trial court noted that, "whether or not [the physician] is a `mandated reporter' making a determination at the outset in this case or not, he is immune as somebody who is part of the evaluative process of detecting and hopefully averting the mistreatment of children." The court then concluded that William Backus was immune because the claims against it were derivative of those against Creutz, and emphasized that there was no genuine issue of material fact present that would preclude the court from granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of the medical defendants. See Practice Book § 17-49. This appeal followed.⁸

On appeal, the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly concluded that Creutz was immune from liability under § 17a-101e (b). They contend that, although Creutz is, as a general matter, a "mandated reporter" under General Statutes §...