Manigault v. Bryan

• Decision Date: 15 January 1930
• Docket Number: 12806.
• Citation: 151 S.E. 199,154 S.C. 78
• Parties: MANIGAULT v. BRYAN et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

151 S.E. 199

154 S.C. 78

MANIGAULT v. BRYAN et al.

No. 12806.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 15, 1930

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Charleston County; Wm. H Grimball, Judge.

Action by Mary E. Manigault against Charlotte P. Bryan and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

The decree of Wm. H. Grimball, circuit judge, directed to be reported, was as follows:

"This case comes before me on facts which are admitted and agreed to by the parties, and involves solely the question as to whether the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the lot of land described in the complaint, or whether she has only an estate therein for life, or during widowhood.

"The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

"Charles Manigault, late of the city of Charleston, died on January 14, 1908, seized

and possessed in fee simple of a lot of land in the city of Charleston, described in the complaint, and known as No. 9 Gibbes street, and leaving of force a will which was duly admitted to probate in the probate court of Charleston county on January 29, 1908. The will was as follows:

"' I give, devise and bequeath all my property of every kind and description unto my wife, Mary E. Manigault, for and during the term of her natural life or widowhood, and from and after the death of my said wife or her widowhood, whichever event may first happen, I give, devise and bequeath all of my said property unto my children living at the death or marriage of my said wife, share and share alike, absolutely and forever; but if there be only one child living at the death or marriage of my said wife, then I give, devise and bequeath unto that one child all my said property, absolutely and forever.'

"The executor named in the will duly qualified, and the estate has been fully administered.

"At the time of his death, the testator left surviving his widow, Mary E. Manigault, the plaintiff herein, and two children, Charles Manigault and Aimee Manigault. The daughter, Aimee Manigault, died intestate and unmarried on or about April 2, 1926, and the son, Charles Manigault, died intestate and unmarried July 18, 1927. The widow survives and is still unmarried.

"Prior to the commencement of this action, plaintiff, claiming to be the owner in fee simple of the lands referred to, entered into a written contract with the defendant Charlotte P. Bryan for the sale of this property for the sum of $7,000, payable in cash. The defendant declined to accept the title tendered, claiming that under the will of the testator the plaintiff has only a life estate therein, and that upon her death or remarriage the title to the premises will vest in the persons answering the description of heirs at law of the testator at the date of death or remarriage of plaintiff.

"This action was thereupon brought by plaintiff against the defendant Charlotte P. Bryan for specific performance, and the defendants Josephine Jenkins, the sister of the testator, Hawkins K. Jenkins, her husband, and Emma M. Jenkins, who has intermarried with Rev. Mr. Gribbin and is now known as Emma M. Gribbin, Joseph E. Jenkins, Hawkins K. Jenkins, Jr., and Gabriel Manigault Jenkins, her children, all of whom are of full age, have been made parties defendant, as constituting all of the persons now in esse who could have any claim in or interest to the premises under the contention of the defendant Charlotte P. Bryan. Besides his wife and children, the testator left surviving him no brothers or parents, and only the one sister, Mrs. Josephine Jenkins, who with her husband and children are defendants as stated.

"The defendants Josephine Jenkins et al. claim by their answer that plaintiff has only a life estate in the premises described in the complaint, and that they being all of the persons in esse answering the description of those who would answer the description of heirs at law of testator, as of the time of the death of the life tenant, constitute the persons entitled as remaindermen to the fee of the property. In addition to demanding a decree to this effect, they ask that the contract of sale be carried out by a deed being executed by the master, and that the proceeds of sale, after payment of the costs and expenses of these proceedings, be paid over to a trustee to be appointed by the court in trust to invest the same and pay over the annual income to plaintiff for life, and after her death to pay such funds over to such one or more of these defendants as may at that time answer the description of heirs at law of the testator, freed from all further trust.

"The plaintiff claims that under the facts as stated and found his children took a contingent remainder under the will of testator, they having predeceased testator's wife, without her having remarried prior to the death of the children, the testator died intestate as to the fee; and that the fee vested at the death of the testator in his wife and two children, and that, by reason of the death of the two children intestate and unmarried, she is the absolute owner of the property in fee simple.

" The defendants claim that the construction contended for by plaintiff defeats the plain intention of the will of testator, and that, in order to give effect to the will, the court must hold that the plaintiff has only the estate given her by the will, and that at her death or remarriage the property will go to such person or persons as may then answer to the description of the heirs at law of testator, and that under this construction Mrs. Jenkins or such of her family as may be living at the death of Mrs. Manigault will be the persons entitled to the remainder.

"The effect of the contention of plaintiff is to defeat the intention of testator, so far as it is expressed in the will, as it vests the whole estate in her absolutely in fee, even though she should marry. The contention of the defendants preserves the intention of testator, so far as is expressed in the will, and gives the property, upon her death or remarriage, to his blood kin.

"There is no doubt that the ordinary rule is that, where a person leaves a will whereby he devises his property for life, but fails to dispose of the remainder, such remainder will vest in testator's heirs, as of the time of his death. McFadden v. McFadden, 107 S.C. 101, 91 S.E. 986; Lawrence v. Burnett, 109 S.C. 416, 96 S.E. 144; Busby v. Busby, 142 S.C. 395, 140 S.E. 801; Boyce v. Mosely, 102 S.C. 361, 86 S.E. 771.

"The question presented here, however, is not so simple; for, if the foregoing rule is applied, the declared intention of the testator is defeated, and the disposition he undertook to make of his property becomes utterly nugatory. Is the court bound by the ordinary rule governing intestacy in a case such as this?

"The fundamental rule in all cases of construing wills is that the intention of the testator as disclosed by the will must be carried out if not in conflict with the law of the land.

"'The object of all construction is to ascertain the intention of the testator; and, when that is ascertained, it must be carried into effect, provided this can be done consistently with the settled rules of law.' Roundtree v. Roundtree, 26 S.C. 450, 2 S.E. 474, 478; First National Bank v. Hutson, 142 S.C. 239, 140 S.E. 596.

"'When the testator's intention can be discovered it must necessarily be carried out, unless it is inconsistent with the law of the land. In looking for this intention we must be guided by the words which the testator has used, reading them in the light of established principles of law.' Faber v. Police, 10 S.C. 376, 386.

"'The paramount importance of the intention of the testator, which must necessarily override every other rule and be the governing principle, otherwise the Court instead of the testator would make the will.' Id.

"In the present case the testator has by plain implication indicated that his intention was that his wife should only take an estate in his property during her life or in her widowhood. If it were a settled rule of law that a testator could not postpone the determination of who his heirs at law might be until the death of a life tenant, the court would of course be bound to observe this rule. Such, however, is not the law. On the contrary, it has been invariably held, where testator disclosed that only those of his heirs should take as answered to this description at the termination of an intervening life estate, that such disposition was valid. Evans v. Godbold, 6 Rich. Eq. 26; Blount v. Walker, 31 S.C. 13, 9 S.E. 804; Gourdin v. Shrewsbury, 11 S.C. 1; Barber v. Crawford, 85 S.C. 54, 67 S.E. 7.

"The case has been very fully argued by counsel, and the court has reached the opinion that the limitation of the remainder in this case is by plain indication the date of the death of the life tenant; otherwise the whole purpose and theory of testator's will is destroyed. No rule of law has been shown which is inconsistent with this conclusion, and the court therefore so holds.

" This conclusion disposes of the application of plaintiff for specific performance of the contract of the defendant Charlotte P. Bryan which must be denied. Plaintiff, however, has brought into court all parties who could take under the objection to the title made by the proposed purchaser, and these parties are asking that the property be sold under the terms of the contract. The defendant Charlotte P. Bryan is prepared to pay the purchase money and comply with the terms of sale if she can obtain a proper deed to the property.

"Inasmuch as all parties concerned are before the court and have been served and are of age, and as the sale of the lands at the price named in the contract set out in the complaint is acceptable...