Manigault v. State

• Decision Date: 22 February 2008
• Docket Number: No. 49A02-0707-CR-565.,49A02-0707-CR-565.
• Citation: 881 N.E.2d 679
• Parties: Ronnie MANIGAULT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

881 N.E.2d 679

Ronnie MANIGAULT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 49A02-0707-CR-565.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

February 22, 2008.

Elizabeth A. Gabig, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Zachary J. Stock, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

DARDEN, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Ronnie Manigault appeals his conviction in a bench trial of possession of cocaine, as a class B felony.¹

We affirm.

ISSUES

1. Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence.

2. Whether the trial court erred in denying Manigault's motion to dismiss.

FACTS

At approximately 11:30 p.m. on November 6, 2006, Indiana State Police Trooper Brad Smith went to the Knights Inn Motel, located in Marion County, to investigate a report that an individual with outstanding arrest warrants was living at the motel. Trooper Smith located the wanted individual's vehicle in the motel's parking lot The motel, however, did not list the individual by name as a registered guest. Trooper Smith therefore waited in the parking lot to see if the individual would return to the vehicle. Trooper Smith had a general physical description of the wanted individual but no photograph.

Later, Trooper Smith observed Manigault, who "c[a]me out and began hanging around, loitering around the vehicle that [Trooper Smith] was observing, standing behind it, leaning up against the wall behind it, standing up alongside the vehicle . . . ." (Tr. 64). Manigault matched the wanted individual's general description. Trooper Smith approached Manigault, believing Manigault to be the person he was seeking. As Trooper Smith approached in his police vehicle, Manigault "immediately turned around in a rapid . . . evasive movement, and made it into the hotel lobby. . . ." (Tr. 65).

Trooper Smith followed Manigault into the lobby, where he found Manigault "standing back in a corner that was away from any type of vending" or "where you would be talking to the hotel clerk." (Tr. 65). Trooper Smith informed Manigault of the nature of his investigation—that he was seeking an individual wanted on outstanding arrest warrants—and gave Manigault that individual's name. Manigault denied that he was that individual. Trooper Smith then asked Manigault for a form of identification to confirm Manigault's identity.

,When Manigault informed Trooper Smith that he did not have any identification, Trooper Smith requested his name and date of, birth. After Manigault had given Trooper Smith a name and date of birth, Trooper Smith asked" Manigault his age. The age given by Manigault "was not even close to the date of birth that. [Manigault] provided. . . .," (Tr. 67). Manigault then proceeded to give Trooper Smith "several" other names and dates of birth, which Trooper Smith "tried to confirm through the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles or through the Indianapolis Justice computers. . . ." (Tr. 67). None of the names, however, matched any of the records despite Manigault claiming to have had an Indiana identification card or license issued by the Indiana Bureau of Motor Vehicles.

Believing that Manigault had given him false names and information, Trooper Smith placed Manigault in handcuffs for the sole purpose of transporting him to "the Indianapolis IDENT Section where they identify people by fingerprints," which was located approximately fifteen miles from the motel. (Tr. 69). The fingerprints positively identified Manigault, who had an outstanding arrest warrant for resisting law enforcement. Manigault, however, was not the individual originally sought by Trooper Smith for an outstanding drug-related arrest warrant.

Due to Manigault's outstanding arrest warrant, Trooper Smith placed Manigault under arrest and transported Manigault to Marion County's Adult Processing Center and conducted an inventory of Manigault's personal property. During the inventory, Trooper Smith "found a baggie in [Manigault's] pocket that contained an off-white rock like substance. . . ." (Tr. 70). The substance later tested positive for "cocaine base in the net weight of 1.48 grams." (Tr. 93).

The State charged Manigault with possessing cocaine within one thousand feet of a family housing complex,² a class B felony. Manigault sought to suppress the evidence seized. During the suppression hearing, Trooper Smith testified that Manigault matched the general physical description given for the individual in the arrest warrant. The trial court denied Manigault's motion to suppress.

On May 30, 2007, Manigault filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Indiana Code section 35-48-4-6 is unconstitutional. The trial court admitted into evidence a map of Marion County, showing the approximate locations of schools, parks, family housing complexes and youth program centers located in Marion County. Manigault argued that the density of such locations renders Indiana Code section 35-48-4-6 unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

Also on May 30, 2007, the trial court held a bench trial, during which Manigault objected to admission of the evidence. The trial court found Manigault guilty as charged and sentenced him to ten years in the Department of Correction.

DECISION

1. Admission of Evidence

Manigault asserts the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that he possessed cocaine. The admission of evidence is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will reverse only upon an abuse of that discretion. Washington v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the trial court. Id. "We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling." Lundquist v. State, 834 N.E.2d 1061, 1067 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). "However, we must also consider the uncontested evidence favorable to the defendant." Id.

Manigault argues that the seizure of the cocaine resulted from a detention that violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. Namely, Manigault contends that Trooper Smith initially lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop.

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protect the privacy and possessory interests of individuals by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures. Barfield v. State, 776 N.E.2d 404, 406 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). This protection also governs "`seizures' of the person." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

Generally, a seizure does not occur until the defendant is actually detained. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624-26, 111 S.Ct. 1547, 113 L.Ed.2d 690 (1991); Wilson v. State, 670 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) (holding no violation of Fourth Amendment, until physical seizure of person accomplished). "Detention turns on an evaluation, under all the circumstances, of whether a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her business." Finger v. State, 799 N.E.2d 528, 532 (Ind.2003) (citing Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 628, 111 S.Ct. 1547). Not all police-citizen encounters implicate the Fourth Amendment. Huey v. State, 503 N.E.2d 623, 625 (Ind. Ct.App.1987). A seizure, for example, does not occur "simply because a police officer approaches a person, asks questions, or requests identification." Bentley v. State, 846 N.E.2d 300, 305 (Ind.Ct.App. 2006), trans. denied.

Here, Trooper Smith observed. Manigault loitering near a vehicle belonging to an individual with an outstanding arrest warrant. Manigault matched the wanted individual's general physical description. As Trooper Smith approached Manigault, Manigault retreated into the motel's lobby. Trooper Smith then followed Manigault into the hotel lobby, where he revealed to Manigault the nature of his investigation and asked Manigault for his identification and identifying information to confirm that Manigault was not the individual he was seeking.

Given these facts, we do not find that Trooper Smith's approach and initial contact with Manigault amounted to a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, as Trooper Smith gave no indication that Manigault was not free to leave. See Overstreet v. State, 724 N.E.2d 661, 664 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) (discussing examples of circumstances under which a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave, including "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled"), trans. denied.

Although Trooper Smith's initial encounter with Manigault did not constitute a detention, we agree that his encounter with Manigault ultimately evolved into a detention for investigatory purposes. A person may be detained on less than probable cause if the officer has a justifiable suspicion the suspect has committed a crime, providing the intrusiveness and nature of the seizure is "reasonably' related in scope to the justification for [its] initiation. The officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which reasonably warrant the intrusion upon the individual's right of privacy." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. "[T]he reasonable-suspicion inquiry is fact-sensitive and thus must be determined on a case-by-case basis." State v. Belcher, 725 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied. Officers "must have more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but need not have the level of suspicion necessary for probable cause." Id. Furthermore, under Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana...