Manikhi v. MASS TRANSIT

Citation733 A.2d 372,127 Md. App. 497
Decision Date19 July 1999
Docket NumberNo. 1482,1482
PartiesJacqueline MANIKHI v. MASS TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION, et al.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

Elizabeth Colette, Baltimore, for appellant.

Kathleen J. Masterton, Asst. Atty. Gen. and J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore, for appellees, MTA, Moragne-el and Parsons.

H. Victoria Hedian, Paul D. Starr and Abato, Rubenstein and Abato, P.A., on the brief, Baltimore, for appellees, Pettus, Fonder and Zollicoffer.

Callista M. Freedman and Paul F. Newhouse, Towson, on the brief for appellee, Ovid.

Argued before WENNER, EYLER and THEODORE G. BLOOM (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. EYLER, Judge.

On March 14, 1997, Jacqueline Manikhi, appellant, filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against multiple defendants, alleging violations of her civil rights, various State torts, and other claims. One of the defendants filed a motion to strike the complaint pursuant to Rule 2-303, and all defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 2-322(b). The motions to dismiss set forth in detail why the complaint failed to state a cause of action. At the hearing on the motions, held on September 17, 1997, the hearing judge granted the motion to strike, observing that she "was up around page 40—something, and [her] question was `So what are the causes of action?'" 1 Appellant was given leave to file an amended complaint, and on October 6, 1997, appellant filed an amended complaint with an attached 50-page affidavit. The defendants, appellees herein, the Mass Transit Administration (MTA), Roy Ovid, Vernon Parsons, Wade Moragne-el, Charles Pettus, Ennis Fonder, and Nelson Zollicoffer, in official and individual capacities, filed motions to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. Some of the appellees moved to strike the affidavit.

The circuit court granted the appellees' motions to strike the affidavit and motions to dismiss, with the exception of a battery claim against appellee Ovid in his individual capacity. The rulings were announced in open court, and appellant did not request further leave to amend.2 The trial of the battery claim began on April 27, 1998, and resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee Ovid on April 30, 1998. Appellant noted an appeal to this Court and challenges portions of the judgment granting the motions to dismiss.

Allegations of the Amended Complaint

In essence, appellant alleged the following in the amended complaint. Appellant is a female African American and was employed by the MTA beginning in 1989. In 1991, she began working in MTA's Kirk Avenue shop as an "A-Cleaner" and was responsible for cleaning vehicles. Appellant worked the night shift. Ovid, "a male of African descent from Columbia, South America," also worked as an A-Cleaner on the night shift during the relevant time period. Appellant was physically and verbally abused by Ovid from 1991 to 1995. The amended complaint detailed numerous acts by Ovid, including allegations that he touched appellant in a sexually and physically abusive manner, that he exposed himself to her, and that he verbally teased her and threatened to perform various acts of violence against her.

Parsons, a male Caucasian, was employed by the MTA at the Kirk Avenue location during the relevant time period and was appellant's superior. Moragne-el, a male African-American, was chief superintendent at the Kirk Avenue location beginning in 1995. The amended complaint alleged that both Parsons and Moragne-el had knowledge of the harassment but did nothing to stop it and instead condoned and encouraged Ovid's conduct. Appellant further alleged that the "last straw" occurred on October 11, 1995, when appellee Ovid elbowed her and called her a "bitch." On October 13, 1995, appellant filed a sexual harassment complaint with the MTA, which was resolved in her favor on December 8, 1995. In 1996, appellant transferred to another location in order to get away from the unlawful conduct and took a lower position as a "B-Cleaner," which allowed her to work alone. In approximately August, 1996, appellee Ovid was criminally convicted based on his harassment of appellant, and the conviction was reduced to probation before judgment after Ovid attended counseling.

Pettus, a male African-American, was president of the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1300, of which appellant was a member. Fonder, a male African-American, was recording secretary of Local 1300, and Zollicoffer, a male African-American, was a Local 1300 official during the relevant time period. The amended complaint alleged that Pettus, Fonder, and Zollicoffer condoned and encouraged the abuse; that MTA knew or should have known of the conduct but did nothing to stop it; and that the co-defendants protected Ovid.

Appellant alleged the following in specific counts:

Count I—battery against Ovid;

Count II—false imprisonment against Ovid;

Count III—aiding and abetting against all defendants;

Count IV—civil conspiracy against all defendants;

Count V—discriminatory harassment/hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e against the MTA;

Count VI—retaliation in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e against the MTA;

Count VII—deprivation of rights secured by the federal constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the individual defendants;

Count VIII—a conspiracy to deprive appellant of her civil rights because of racial and class-based animus in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) against the individual defendants;

Count X3—a conspiracy to interfere with justice in state courts in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) against Ovid, Parsons, and Moragne-el;

Count XI—criminal acts of violence against appellant motivated by gender in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 13981 against Ovid, Parsons, and Moragne-el;

Count XII—violations of due process, equal protection, and free speech under Articles 24 and 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against the individual defendants;

An unnumbered count—intentional infliction of emotional distress against all defendants;

Count XIII—slander against Ovid and Moragne-el.

Questions Presented

Appellant presents the following questions, which we have rephrased in part:

1. Did the circuit court err in dismissing appellant's Title VII discrimination claims against her employer, MTA?

2. Did the circuit court err in dismissing appellant's discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and equal protection claims under Article XXIV of the Maryland Declaration of Rights against individuals Ovid, Parsons, Moragne-el, Pettus, Fonder, and Zollicoffer?

3. Did the circuit court err in dismissing appellant's false imprisonment claim against Ovid?

4. Did the circuit court err in dismissing appellant's 42 U.S.C. § 13981 Gender Motivated Violence Act claim against Ovid, Parsons, and Moragne-el?

5. Did the circuit court err in dismissing appellant's intentional infliction of emotional distress, aiding and abetting, and civil conspiracy claims against the MTA, Ovid, Parsons, Moragne-el, Pettus, Fonder, and Zollicoffer?

On appeal, appellant presents no argument with respect to the battery claim in Count I, the 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims in Counts VIII and X, the Article 40 and remaining Article XXIV violations alleged in Count XII, or the slander claim in Count XIII. Consequently, those claims are not properly before us.

Finally, appellant challenges—in footnote 4 of her brief—the circuit court's decision to strike the affidavit that was attached to and incorporated in the amended complaint. The lower court stated that it would strike the affidavit because it was a "regurgitation" of material in the original complaint that the court had labeled "outrageous" and "totally unnecessary" and that had prompted the court to strike the original complaint. Before this Court, appellant's argument in support of the affidavit does not address the valid central legal concern with the material: that it does not comply with Rule 2-303(b), prohibiting "argument ... or any immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter" in a pleading. We therefore deem the point waived and affirm this aspect of the lower court's order. Consequently, we do not consider the contents of the affidavit in answering the questions presented.

Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the pleadings. Bobo v. State, 346 Md. 706, 709, 697 A.2d 1371 (1997); Popham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 333 Md. 136, 140 n. 2, 634 A.2d 28 (1993). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, we must assume "the truth of all well-pleaded facts, as well as the reasonable and logical inferences which may be drawn therefrom." Popham, 333 Md. at 140 n. 2, 634 A.2d 28. See also Board of Educ. v. Browning, 333 Md. 281, 286, 635 A.2d 373 (1994)

; Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 443, 620 A.2d 327 (1993). The pleader must allege facts with specificity, and this Court need not consider wholly conclusory charges in a complaint. See Bobo, 346 Md. at 708-09,

697 A.2d 1371; Berman v. Karvounis, 308 Md. 259, 265, 518 A.2d 726 (1987). Further, "any ambiguity or uncertainty in the allegations bearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action must be construed against the pleader." Ronald M. Sharrow, Chartered v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 Md. 754, 768, 511 A.2d 492 (1986). See also Bobo, 346 Md. at 709,

697 A.2d 1371; Popham, 333 Md. at 140 n. 2,

634 A.2d 28; Browning, 333 Md. at 286,

635 A.2d 373. Dismissal is only proper if, after the allegations of the complaint are construed in this light, the facts and allegations in the complaint would fail to afford the plaintiff relief if proven. See Bobo, 346 Md. at 709,

697 A.2d 1371; Browning, 333 Md. at 286,

635 A.2d 373.

Discussion

Appellant, in the amended complaint, apparently attempted to remove much of the material that was held to have been improperly...

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2 cases
  • Manikhi v. Mass Transit
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • August 24, 2000
    ...within the one-year period of limitations for that tort. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Manikhi v. Mass Transit Admin., 127 Md.App. 497, 733 A.2d 372 (1999). We granted Manikhi's petition for certiorari. 356 Md. 495, 740 A.2d 613 (1999). This certiorari review concerns......
  • Campbell v. Cushwa
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • August 31, 2000
    ...must assume the truth of all well pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them. Manikhi v. Mass Transit Admin., 127 Md.App. 497, 510, 733 A.2d 372,cert. denied, 356 Md. 495, 740 A.2d 613 (1999); Rossaki v. NUS Corp., 116 Md.App. 11, 18, 695 A.2d 203 (1997). The pl......

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