Manila School Dist. No. 15 v. White, 99-30
Decision Date | 17 June 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 99-30,99-30 |
Citation | 338 Ark. 195,992 S.W.2d 125 |
Parties | MANILA SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER FIFTEEN, Appellant, v. Robert R. WHITE, Appellee. |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
William C. Brazil and Amy Brazil, Conway, for appellants.
Barrett & Deacon, by: D. P. Marshall Jr., James F. Gramling, Jr., Jonesboro, for appellee.
Richard W. Roachell, Little Rock, for Amicus Curiae.
By petition for writ of mandamus filed in the Circuit Court of Mississippi County, Arkansas, Mr. Robert R. White sought to compel the Manila School District No. 15 and the members of the District's Board of Education to renew his contract for the 1998-99 school year under the same terms and conditions as his 1997-98 contract. Specifically, Mr. White asserted that the contract offered by the District for the 1998-99 school year constituted a nonrenewal of his earlier contract and that the District's failure to comply with the provisions of the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act of 1983 resulted in an automatic renewal of his contract. Ark.Code Ann. § 6-17-1501 et seq. (1993 Repl.). The trial court granted Mr. White's petition for writ of mandamus and motion for summary judgment. In support of its argument on appeal that the trial court erroneously applied the Teacher Fair Dismissal Act, the District contends that its actions constituted a reassignment of duties under Ark.Code Ann. § 6-17-303 (Repl.1993) rather than a nonrenewal under Ark.Code Ann. § 6-17-1501 et seq. We disagree and affirm the trial court.
The purpose of the writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right or to enforce the performance of a duty. Chandler v. Perry-Casa Public Schools, 286 Ark. 170, 690 S.W.2d 349 (1985). By summary judgment, the trial court ruled that Mr. White had an established legal right to renewal of his employment contract for the 1998-99 year on the same terms as the 1997-98 contract. The law is well settled that summary judgment is to be granted by a trial court only when it is clear that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be litigated, and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Stockton v. Sentry Ins., 337 Ark. 507, 989 S.W.2d 914 (1999); Pugh v. Griggs, 327 Ark. 577, 940 S.W.2d 445 (1997). Once the moving party has established a prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, the opposing party must meet proof with proof and demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact. Id. On review, this court determines if summary judgment was appropriate based on whether the evidentiary items presented by the moving party in support of the motion leave a material fact unanswered. Id. This court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion was filed, resolving all doubts and inferences against the moving party. Id. Our review focuses not only on the pleadings, but also on the affidavits and other documents filed by the parties. Wallace v. Broyles, 331 Ark. 58, 961 S.W.2d 712 (1998); Angle v. Alexander, 328 Ark. 714, 945 S.W.2d 933 (1997).
The material facts are not in dispute. Mr. White was employed by the Manila School District as a teacher and coach for thirteen years. His duties always included coaching and teaching classes in physical education. He never taught core curriculum subjects, such as English, science, math, geography, or social studies, although he occasionally instructed courses in driver's education or supervised study hall. Mr. White had a successful record as a coach. Under his supervision, the Manila senior high basketball team won several district and conference championships. Likewise, Mr. White led Manila's golf team to championships at the district and state level. He was also named coach of the year several times. During his thirteen years with the Manila School District, Mr. White never received anything but satisfactory formal evaluations of his work.
Mr. White's contract with the District for the school year 1997-98 provided that he would perform "the duties that are generally performed by a teacher including but not limited to, the following specific duties: as assigned by the Superintendent." 1 The time period for the contract was August 14, 1997 to May 22, 1998, and the compensation to be paid was a base salary of $37, 567 ( revised in May 1998 to $38, 986). According to the last paragraph of the contract entitled "OTHER CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT," $4,000 of the base salary was "for a coaching supplement." Although not reflected in the contract, Mr. White also had the opportunity to earn extra income by driving the basketball team bus to and from games and by running basketball camps for the District during the summer.
On April 8, 1998, the District's Superintendent, Mr. Roland Wells, contacted an attorney, Mr. W. Paul Blume, about the feasibility of not renewing Mr. White's coaching duties. On that same day, Mr. Blume advised Superintendent Wells in writing that, given Mr. White's particular circumstances, it was extremely unlikely that a nonrenewal would be affirmed by a court. As an alternative, Mr. Blume recommended a lateral reassignment without a reduction in salary, specifically mentioning reassignment to the position of Director of the Alternative School. Prior to the meeting with Mr. Blume, Superintendent Wells had written Mr. White on March 5, 1998 and expressed the District's concerns about Mr. White's performance as a coach. The March 5, 1998 memorandum listed seven concerns and expected improvements, all involving Mr. White's approach to coaching, and three other changes to be implemented as of March 16, 1998. On April 13, 1998, Mr. White responded to the memorandum, setting forth his disagreement with most of the District's concerns.
Also on April 13, 1998, the Manila School Board voted to renew Mr. White's contract for the 1998-99 school year and simultaneously voted to accept the Superintendent's recommendation that Mr. White be reassigned to the position of Alternative School Director/Teacher. Based upon Mr. White's education and experience, including his ability to impose strict discipline, the District believed that he would perform well as the Director/Teacher of the Alternative School.
The 1998-99 contract offered to Mr. White provided that he would "serve as a teacher and other duties as assigned by the Superintendent," followed by a specific designation of "Alternative School Director/Teacher." The time period for the contract was August 17, 1998 to May 21, 1999, and the compensation to be paid would be the same base salary as the year before. However, the last paragraph of the 1998-99 contract entitled "OTHER CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT," provided that $4,000 of the base salary was for "Alternative School Director."
By letter dated April 16, 1998, Superintendent Wells sent the proposed contract for 1998-99 to Mr. White. On May 5, 1998, Mr. White informed Superintendent Wells that he accepted employment for 1998-99 on the same terms as the 1997-98 contract. By memorandum dated May 7, 1998, Superintendent Wells advised Mr. White that the Board of Education had reassigned him to the position of Alternative School Director/Teacher at the same salary for the 1998-99 school year.
The District asserts as its first point on appeal that the trial court erred when it concluded that the District could not reassign Mr. White to the position of Alternative School Director/Teacher for the 1998-99 school year, and relies upon Ark.Code Ann. § 6-17-303, which provides that:
District school boards shall have the authority to assign and reassign or transfer all teachers in schools within their jurisdiction upon the...
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