Maniscalco v. Superior Court
| Decision Date | 30 September 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. G014164,G014164 |
| Citation | 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 322,19 Cal.App.4th 60 |
| Parties | Thomas Frank MANISCALCO, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Orange County, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
One of the recurrent problems revolving around capital punishment is whether certain benefits or liabilities extend to defendants who are charged with "capital" crimes but who nevertheless do not actually face the death penalty. 1 For example, the right to bail may depend on a defendant's not having been charged with a "capital crime," while the right to extra attorneys or investigators at taxpayers' expense may turn on whether he or she has been so charged. 2
The federal courts have solved the problem by examining the underlying substance of the benefit or liability. Essentially, they ascertain the reason for the benefit or liability, and ask whether the reason applies in the case at hand.
The present case requires us to confront the same problem. The defendant has been charged with special circumstance murder--a charge which carries the possibility of a death penalty--but the prosecution has announced it will no longer seek the death penalty. The defendant sought bail, but the trial court denied the request because of the "capital" nature of the charge. In denying the request, the court relied on In re Freeman (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 838, 162 Cal.Rptr. 423, which held, under functionally identical circumstances, that bail was precluded as long as the defendant was charged with a capital offense, even if he or she was not actually in jeopardy of the death penalty.
However, the court denied the request reluctantly, stating that it did not agree with Freeman and found the case "illogical" in the wake of our Supreme Court's decision in Sand v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 567, 194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787. Sand had held that a defendant was not entitled to certain ancillary defense services which are otherwise available to those charged in "capital cases" because he was, like the defendant here, no longer actually facing the death penalty.
We believe the federal approach reflects the true state of California law as well. The core reason for denying bail to defendants charged with capital crimes relates directly to the gravity of the crime, and has no necessary relationship to the complexity of the defendant's "case." (See People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628, 657, fn. 45, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880.) On the other hand, the reason for extra investigators and experts does bear directly on a defendant's "case." (See Sand v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d 567, 194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787.) Because the present case involves a request for bail, the defendant's petition must be denied. 3
This court set out most of the basic facts in the last installment of Thomas Maniscalco's saga. (See Maniscalco v. Superior Court (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 846, 848-849, 285 Cal.Rptr. 795.) Briefly, Maniscalco was arrested over nine years ago and charged with three murders occurring in 1980. He has remained in custody without bail ever since. 4 Maniscalco's first trial, culminating in November 1990, resulted in a hung jury. In August 1992, after the penalty phase of the trial of Maniscalco's erstwhile codefendant ended with a hung jury, the prosecution stated on the record that it would no longer seek the death penalty against Maniscalco.
Maniscalco immediately felt certain consequences of the district attorney's decision not to seek the death penalty. The superior court promptly removed his cocounsel from the case, presumably reasoning that, under Sand v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d 567, 575, 194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787, Maniscalco was not entitled to "ancillary defense services" under Penal Code section 987.9 because his was no longer a "capital case." 5 Shortly thereafter, in February 1993, Maniscalco once again applied for bail, asserting three arguments: (1) under Sand his case was no longer "capital"; (2) proof of the alleged crime was no longer evident (or the presumption great) because of the hung jury in his first trial; and (3) being held for nine years without bail violated his due process rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The prosecution principally relied on In re Freeman, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d 838, 162 Cal.Rptr. 423, which held that bail was precluded so long as a defendant was charged with a capital offense.
At a lengthy hearing, the superior court denied Maniscalco's motion to set bail. The court reluctantly concluded this was still a capital case for purposes of bail, stating: "[A]s much as I don't like it, as much as I don't agree with it, and I find it to be illogical based on subsequent decisions, I don't know how I get around following Freeman." Once the court made that ruling, Maniscalco's attorney stated she was not seeking a redetermination of whether the proof of the alleged crime was evident or the presumption was great. 6 Finally the court stated, "I don't think that nine years, the nine years that Mr. Maniscalco has spent in jail based upon my knowledge of this case is a circumstance that I would find rises to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation." 7
Only three published California appellate decisions have thus far actively considered the right to bail in the context of a special circumstance murder charge with no actual exposure to the death penalty: People v. Obie (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 744, 750, 116 Cal.Rptr. 283, disapproved on another point in People v. Rollo (1977) 20 Cal.3d 109, 120, footnote 4, 141 Cal.Rptr. 177, 569 P.2d 771; In re Freeman, supra, 102 Cal.App.3d 838, 162 Cal.Rptr. 423; and In re Bright (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1664, 1667-1672, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 105. Each case held that the nature of the charge meant that the defendant was not entitled to bail under section 12 [formerly section 6] of Article I of the California Constitution () even though there was no actual risk of a death penalty. However, after Obie and Freeman the Supreme Court handed down Sand v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d 567, 194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787, which, while it did not deal with bail, is superficially difficult to reconcile with Obie, Freeman and Bright. We first examine these four cases.
Obie merely touched on the subject in two sentences, which can be quoted in full: (Obie, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 750, 116 Cal.Rptr. 283.)
Freeman reasoned, without much more explanation, that murder with special circumstances "embrace[d] a capital offense" because "the absolute right to bail is conditioned on the gravity of the charge." (102 Cal.App.3d at p. 840, 162 Cal.Rptr. 423.) Like Obie, Freeman's authority was the text of footnote 45 in the case of People v. Anderson, supra, 6 Cal.3d 628, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880. Anderson had invalidated the death penalty in California as it then stood. At the very end of the opinion, in footnote 45, the court addressed the problem of the "right to bail in cases in which the law has heretofore provided for the death penalty." The court "deem[ed] it appropriate to note" that the "underlying gravity" of the offenses providing for the death penalty survived the invalidation of the death penalty. In particular, the underlying gravity of those offenses "for the purpose of bail" continued "unaffected." (Anderson, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 657, fn. 45, 100 Cal.Rptr. 152, 493 P.2d 880.) For the Freeman court, the remarks in Anderson's footnote 45 were dispositive. 8
In considering whether a defendant was involved in a "capital case" for purposes of a statute (Pen.Code, § 987.9) entitling a defendant to ancillary defense services, Sand made it quite clear that it was not addressing the problem of the exception for bail when the defendant is charged with a capital offense. (34 Cal.3d at pp. 574-575, 194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787.) The "bail situation," the court declared, "is distinguishable." (Id. at p. 574, 194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787.)
As far as the problem of ancillary services was concerned, Sand focused on the complexity of death penalty trials which are always bifurcated between a guilt phase and a penalty phase. Where the prosecution does not actually seek the death penalty, there is no need for the second phase. Because the provision for special funding of "capital cases" reflects the Legislature's perception of both the gravity of the penalty and the "difficulty of preparing for a murder trial," the absence of actual exposure to the death penalty undercuts one of the major purposes for the special funding statute. (See 34 Cal.3d at p. 575, 194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787, and see generally pp. 573-575, 194 Cal.Rptr. 480, 668 P.2d 787.)
The latest case is Bright, which, perhaps because it was decided after Sand, went into considerably more detail than Obie or Freeman. Bright reasoned that the purpose of bail was to assure attendance at trial, and that the risk of flight is "similarly high whether the accused faces death or the alternative punishment of life in prison without the possibility of parole." (In re Bright, supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1671-1672, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 105.) Bright noted, as we have...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Rodriguez
...But bail is not at issue here. A defendant facing a charge of special circumstance murder is not entitled to bail. (Maniscalco v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 60, 63.) In any event, the hypothetical Rodriguez poses does not present any danger of an equal protection violation. His hy......
-
People v. Superior Court (Kim)
...with a capital offense. If he is not, he has a constitutional right to bail. As we stated in Maniscalco v. Superior Court (People) (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 60, 61-62, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 322, the right to bail depends on a defendant's not having been charged with a "capital crime." 3 Kim is unquest......