Manivannan v. U.S. Dep't of Energy
| Decision Date | 08 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 18-297 |
| Parties | AYYAKKANNU MANIVANNAN, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Presently before the Court is a renewed Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Defendants United States Department of Energy (the “DOE”) and the United States of America (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF Nos. 63, 88. Defendants assert that Plaintiff Ayyakkannu Manivannan's (“Manivannan”) claims for conversion and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) are barred by the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2680(h). For the reasons that follow, judgment will be entered in Defendants' favor as to Manivannan's claim for conversion, and the Motion to Dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part as to his IIED claim.[1]
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff resigned his job with the DOE following allegations of disturbing actions taken against an intern. The allegations led to an internal investigation and state criminal prosecution. Manivannan has since filed several lawsuits related to those events.
As relevant here, on March 8, 2018, Manivannan commenced Civil Action No. 18-297 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania alleging a single claim for the violation of the Privacy Act of 1974. Complaint Manivannan v. U.S. Department of Energy, No. 18-297 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2018), ECF No. 1. On July 11, 2019 Manivannan filed a second civil action with this Court at Civil Action No. 19-828, alleging claims for: “Improperly Withholding, Damaging, and Destroying Plaintiff's Personal Property” (Count I); Negligence (Oversight, Management, and Supervision) (Count II); and Negligence (Improper Communication with Centre County District Attorney's Office) (Count III). Complaint, Manivannan v. United States, No. 19-828 (W.D. Pa. Jul. 11, 2019), ECF No. 1. By Order dated January 2, 2020, the two actions were consolidated for pretrial purposes at Civil Action No. 18-297. Manivannan then filed his Consolidated Second Amended Complaint alleging claims under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and the FTC A. See, Consolidated Second Amended Complaint, Manivannan v. U.S. Department of Energy, No. 18-297 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2018), ECF No. 59.
Upon resolution of an initial Motion to Dismiss and Manivannan's appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, this action was remanded for this Court to consider whether Manivannan's remaining claims for conversion, IIED “resting on [DOE counsel's] cooperation with state prosecutors,” and violation of the Privacy Act may withstand grounds for dismissal previously raised by Defendants. Manivannan v. United States Dep't of Energy, 42 F.4th 163, 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2022). Defendants have renewed their Motion to Dismiss Manivannan's claims for conversion (Count III) and IIED (Count VII). ECF No. 92, and see, ECF No. 64 at 2225.
Manivannan has filed a Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 93. The renewed Motion to Dismiss is ripe for consideration.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility is “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Instead, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (June 6, 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Id. (citations omitted). If the facts alleged in the complaint “show” that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, the court should deny the motion to dismiss. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
With relevance to the renewed Motion to Dismiss, “[a]s a general matter, a district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985)). “[A]n exception to the general rule is that a ‘document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint' may be considered ‘without converting the motion [to dismiss] into one for summary judgment.'” Id. (citation omitted).
Manivannan attached to his Consolidated Second Amended Complaint various forms and appendices he submitted to the DOE to initiate his FTCA claims, as well as responses received upon initial agency review and reconsideration. ECF No. 59-2 - 59-14. These documents have been reproduced in the DOE's Supplemental Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Second Amended Complaint and thus may be considered by the Court. Defendants' motion also relies in part upon exhibits that are not attached to the operative complaint or an integral part of Manivannan's claims. See ECF No. 63-2; ECF No. 92-3.
After remand, this Court notified all parties that as related to Defendants' assertion that the applicable FTCA statute of limitations bars Manivannan's conversion claim, Defendants' exhibits will be considered pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d). Thus, the motion to dismiss will be treated as a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 88 (). The parties were advised that the Court would evaluate the motion under the standards in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, and that Manivannan could supplement the record. He has not filed any additional exhibits in opposition to the pending motion.
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue of material fact is in genuine dispute if the evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (). Thus, summary judgment is warranted where, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... a party ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Matreale v. N.J. Dep't of Mil. & Veterans Affs, 487 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2007); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss with prejudice Manivannan's conversion claim at Count III because he filed this action beyond the time allowed under FCTA's statute of limitations. ECF No. 63. Upon review, the Court agrees that Manivannan's delay bars his claim and therefore judgment is properly entered in Defendants' favor as to the conversion claim.
“As a sovereign, the United States is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued.' Sconiers v. United States, 896 F.3d 595, 597 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting White-Squire v. U.S. Postal Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010)). In the case of certain tort claims, “the FTCA is ‘a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United States.'”[2] Id. (quoting Miller v. Philadelphia Geriatric Ctr., 463 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 2006)). The FTCA provides that it “shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.” 28 U.S.C. § 2674. The United States Supreme Court “has described the Act as marking the culmination of a long effort to mitigate unjust consequences of sovereign immunity from suit.” Pascale v. United States, 998 F.2d 186, 187 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950)).
The FTCA is a limited waiver of immunity and thus “is strictly construed in favor of the sovereign.” Lightfoot v. United...
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