Manix v. State, 2002-KA-01694-SCT.

Citation895 So.2d 167
Decision Date17 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. 2002-KA-01694-SCT.,2002-KA-01694-SCT.
PartiesMichael Shane MANIX v. STATE of Mississippi.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

Ross Parker Simons, H. Bernard Gautier, attorneys for appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, attorneys for appellee.

Before COBB, P.J., EASLEY and GRAVES, JJ.

GRAVES, Justice, for the Court.

¶ 1. Michael Shane Manix appeals from his conviction of capital murder by the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Mississippi, and his sentence to a term of life imprisonment without parole in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Manix raises four assignments of error in the trial below: (1) whether his right to a speed trial was violated; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographs of the victim's body; (3) whether the jury was properly sworn; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying Manix's motion to suppress his pretrial statements. Finding no merit in these issues, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2. On the night of May 16, 1998, Michael Manix, Elia Check and Michael Janes set out with the intent to engage in criminal activity. Manix, who was twenty-eight years old at the time, needed money to pay his car note and to make rent for the trailer he lived in with his girlfriend. Along with Check and Janes, both eighteen, Manix set out across the Mississippi Gulf Coast in search of a person to rob. Around one o'clock on the morning on May 18th, the three stopped at the new Super 8 Motel in Ocean Springs. The men sat in the parking lot and considered their options. Deciding to enter the motel, they approached the office and encountered Heather Hampton, the twenty-seven-year-old night clerk, who had walked outside for a quick cigarette break. They asked her if any rooms were open, but she told them the hotel was full. Then she graciously offered to find them rooms elsewhere. Manix then grabbed Heather and dragged her behind the counter of the Super 8, demanding that she give them money. Despite the fact that Heather did not struggle and begged him not to hurt her, Manix stabbed her thirteen times with a knife. The men cleaned out the cash drawer of the hotel, leaving behind only $1 bills and coin change. Manix, Check and Janes returned to their vehicle and made their escape with $456. Despite the efforts of the police officers and emergency medical technicians who were summoned to the scene, Heather lost so much blood that even after she regained a pulse it could not be sustained, and she died.

¶ 3. After their capture, the three men were jointly indicted for capital murder by a Jackson County Grand Jury. They were tried separately, and on August 15, 2002, Manix was convicted of capital murder. The jury could not unanimously find that he deserved the death penalty, and so the trial judge entered a sentence of life without parole in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections.

ANALYSIS

I. Whether Manix was denied a speedy trial?

¶ 4. Manix argues that he was deprived his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial because almost four years (precisely, 1,430 days) elapsed between his arraignment on the charge of capital murder and his trial. The following events and dates are key to understanding if Manix's rights were violated. Date Event 7/7/98 Indictment 9/11/98 Arraignment (Trial Date (T.D.) 11/23/1998) 9/21-22/98 Orders entered for body search of defendant 11/23/98 First Date set for Trial 12/22/98 Notice of Trial (T.D. 2/22/99) 1/25/99 Motion to Continuance (defendant) 1/26/99 Order of Continuance 4/19/99 Notice of Trial (T.D. 5/24/99) 6/9/99 Scheduling Order (T.D. 8/30/99) (the court was involved with the trial of C Douglas Gulley on the 5/24/99 trial date) 7/8 & 13/99 Motion to Continue (State) 7/14/99 Notice of Trial (T.D. 8/30/99) 8/31/99 Order of Continuance (requested by the State, although the court was involved in another trial at this time and was not available) 9/3/99 Scheduling Order (T.D. 12/6/99) 10/1/99 Order Appointing Special Prosecutor (Anthony N. Lawrence, III.) 11/5/99 Motion to Continue (defendant) 11/12/99 Order of Continuance (T.D. 7/17/00) 2/24/00 Order of Continuance (T.D. 7/17/00) 5/12/00 Order Appointing Special Prosecutor (Albert Necaise) 6/30/00 Motion to Continue (State) 7/10/00 Order of Continuance (T.D. 10/2/00) 8/16/00 Motion to Continue (defendant Ore Tenus) 9/15/00 Order of Continuance (T.D. 2/12/01) 2/5/01 Motion to Continue (defendant) 2/12/01 Order of Continuance (T.D. 4/9/01) 4/3/01 Motion to Continue (defendant) 4/9/01 Order of Continuance (T.D. July 2001 Term) 9/17/01 Notice of Trial (T.D. 11/5/01) 10/18/01 Motion to Continue (defendant) 10/23/01 Order of Continuance (T.D. 3/4/02) 4/10/02 Notice of Trial (T.D. 5/28/02) 5/1/02 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Grant a Speedy Trial 5/10/02 Order of Continuance Sua Sponte (T.D. 8/12/02) 8/02/02 Order Denying Motion to Dismiss 08/09/02 Second Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Grant a Speedy Trial 08/13/02 Trial Commenced

¶ 5. A defendant in a criminal case in Mississippi has a guaranteed right to a speedy trial embodied in the bedrock of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution (applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment) and in Article 3, § 26 of the Mississippi Constitution. In addition, our Legislature has seen fit to engrave particulars upon the abstract stone of the two constitutional rights; Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Rev.2000) creates a right to a speedy trial within 270 days after arraignment.

¶ 6. Manix filed two motions to dismiss for failure to grant a speedy trial which were both denied by the trial court. The trial court acknowledged that the massive delay was unusual, but found that sufficient cause existed for the delays. Manix disagrees and asserts that the trial court committed error by denying the motions.

¶ 7. Speedy trial claims necessarily entail questions of fact regarding "whether the trial delay rose from good cause." DeLoach v. State, 722 So.2d 512, 516 (Miss.1998). We will uphold the trial court's findings on the issue of a speedy trial where supported by "substantial, credible evidence; [but] if no probative evidence supports the trial courts's finding ... [we] will ordinarily reverse." Ross v. State, 605 So.2d 17, 21 (Miss.1992). As in other cases in which the trial court must make factual determinations, we review those findings with a deferential standard that asks if the trial court made a "clearly erroneous" decision. Stokes v. State, 548 So.2d 118, 122 (Miss.1989). While the constitutional and statutory rights are factually intertwined, we will separate them to address the underlying legal issues.

The Statutory Right

¶ 8. Our Legislature has mandated that:

Unless good cause be shown, and a continuance duly granted by the court, all offenses for which indictments are presented to the court shall be tried no later than two hundred seventy (270) days after the accused has been arraigned.

Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-1 (Rev.2000). "The statutory right to a speedy trial attaches and time begins running after the accused has been arraigned." Adams v. State, 583 So.2d 165, 167 (Miss.1991). The 270-day rule analysis is very fact specific and hinges upon whether the prosecution or the defense caused the delay. Sharp v. State, 786 So.2d 372, 378 (Miss.2001). The statute also allows for continuances based upon a showing of good cause, making the reason for the delay just as important as the determination of which side is the delaying party. Id. at 377. For "[m]otions made and granted on behalf of the defense are charged against them." Poole v. State, 826 So.2d 1222, 1228 (Miss.2002). In addition, "delay can be attributed to the complexity of the crime, the number of defendants involved[,] and a congested docket, all of which is viewed as good cause if a continuance is actually granted for those reasons." Id. at 1228.

¶ 9. The first step to determine if there is compliance with the 270-day rule is to calculate the total number of days between arraignment and the actual trial. In the calculation, the date of arraignment is not counted, but the date of trial is; weekends are counted unless the 270th day is a Sunday. See Adams, 583 So.2d at 167

. Manix was tried 1,430 days after arraignment, well after the 270 days provided for in the statute. The delay is not as long as it appears, for the second step in calculating compliance with the 270-rule is to consider each delay separately, because only those delays attributable to the State count toward the 270 days. Baine v. State, 604 So.2d 258, 264 (Miss.1992). Any delay as a result of action by the State that is not supported by good cause will cause that time to be counted against the State. Wiley v. State, 582 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Miss.1991). Yet a delay caused by the actions of the defendant, such as a continuance, will toll the running of the time period for that length of time, and correspondingly this time is subtracted from the total amount of the delay. Id. at 1011.

¶ 10. The first block of time to be considered is from arraignment on 9/11/98 to the first date set for trial — 11/23/98.1 "The necessary time for the accused and his counsel to prepare his trial must necessarily be left largely to the sound discretion of the trial judge, bearing in mind the facts and circumstances of the particular case." Id. at 1012; Gilmore v. State, 225 Miss. 173, 189, 82 So.2d 838, 846 (1955). Two months is not an excessive amount of time for preparation for such a complicated creature as a capital murder trial; therefore the time does not count against either the State or Manix.

¶ 11. The record then reflects that on 9/21 and 9/22/98 orders for body searches were entered by the court, which necessitated moving the trial date to 2/22/99. The trial court held that the date was moved until the evidence could be obtained and examined. Manix argues that this was far...

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