Manjares v. Newton

• Decision Date: 18 March 1966
• Citation: 49 Cal.Rptr. 805,64 Cal.2d 365,411 P.2d 901
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 411 P.2d 901 Robert MANJARES et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Dr. Robert E. NEWTON et al., Defendants and Appellants. S. F. 21826.

Page 805

49 Cal.Rptr. 805

64 Cal.2d 365, 411 P.2d 901

Robert MANJARES et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Dr. Robert E. NEWTON et al., Defendants and Appellants.

S. F. 21826.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

March 18, 1966.

William H. Stoffers, County Counsel, Allan W. Nicholson, Deputy County Counsel, and Richard H. Perry, San Francisco, for defendants and appellants.

Heisler & Stewart, Francis Heisler and Charles A. Stewart, Carmel, for plaintiffs and respondents.

MOSK, Justice.

Defendants, members of the Board of Education of the Carmel Unified School District (hereinafter called the board), appeal from a judgment of the trial court ordering them to provide transportation to eight of the ten minor plaintiffs from their homes to their respective schools. ¹ Robert and Carol Manjares, parents of seven of the children, and Marion and May Wallace, parents of the other three, represent the minor plaintiffs in this action. The issues for determination are whether a school board's decision, made without a hearing, that school buses which serve the district will not furnish transportation to certain areas in the district, is subject to judicial review and, if so, whether the trial court was correct in holding that the board abused its discretion and acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner in refusing to provide transportation to the minor plaintiffs. As hereinafter discussed, both of these questions require an affirmative answer.

Section 16801 of the Education Code provides in part: 'The governing board of any school district may provide, with the written approval of the county superintendent of schools, for the transportation of pupils to and from school whenever in the judgment of the board such transportation is advisable and good reasons exist therefor.'

Plaintiffs live just off a county road in the Paloma Creek area of Monterey County. This is in the southeast corner of the school district, about 30 miles from the junior high school and about half that distance from the elementary school to which the children were assigned. For many years the district has provided bus transportation to students along certain county roads. The closest stop to plaintiff's homes is at the Hastings Reservation, 6.2 miles away. The controversy between the parties involves the question whether the board is required to authorize transportation for this approximate six-mile distance. ²

Each year the board reviews existing routes and decides whether to curtail, maintain, or extend them. In the three years prior to 1963, when plaintiffs moved into the area, there was a trend toward curtailing the routes for reasons of economy. The board's policy regarding transportation is contained in section 16B of its rules and regulations, which provides that, while it is the responsibility of students and their parents to arrange the daily travel between home and school, the board may assist in transporting pupils who live beyond two miles from a bus stop if road conditions, pupil density, or hazardous walking conditions make it advantageous, but that some areas will not be served by buses for reasons of safety. The section also provides that, if the distance from a regular bus stop to a student's home exceeds two miles, payments of six cents per additional mile may be authorized in lieu of transportation.

In the summer of 1963 a family named Dudley, with five children, moved into the Paloma Creek area and requested the district superintendent of schools to provide bus service for their children. The superintendent, who himself was a new resident in the area, agreed to do so, not realizing that section 16801 requires the board to authorize student transportation. The Manjares family moved into the area from San Jose after they learned that bus service had been authorized. Mrs. Manjares enrolled her children in the high school and the elementary school, and from September 23 until November 4, 1963, a station wagon owned by the district took the Dudley and Manjares children to the bus stop at Hastings Reservation or to their respective schools. Subsequently, it was discovered that the Dudleys did not live within the school district, and they moved to Monterey.

The Wallace family bought a ranch in the Paloma Creek section in the fall of 1963. Mr. Wallace had seen the station wagon taking the children to school on the road near their new home, and he assumed that his children would be provided with transportation. However, the service was stopped shortly after the Wallaces moved into the area, and the Wallace children never received transportation.

When the board met in September, the superintendent informed it of his action and recommended that service to plaintiffs' homes be continued. The board was 'dismayed' by his action because it was apprehensive that if it extended transportation to plaintiffs, the door would be opened to demands for transportation by others who lived in parts of the county to which bus service had not previously been afforded. However, it voted to continue the matter until its next meeting. Before that date, the superintendent investigated the various bus routes in the district and, when the board met again, he recommended that the Paloma Creek route as well as three others be discontinued. The board voted to discontinue two of these routes, including Paloma Creek, but did not accept his recommendations as to the other two. It also offered to make payments of six cents a mile in lieu of transportation to the adult plaintiffs or to another person who could drive the children to the bus stop. ³ The adult plaintiffs protested the discontinuance of bus service but were informed that financial considerations compelled the board's action.

Plaintiffs were unable to arrange to transport their children to the bus stop or to employ anyone else to do so, although various plans to accomplish this purpose were considered. Mr. Wallace volunteered to drive the children to school on his way to work and to bring them back on his way home if the district would provide him with a suitable vehicle (he had only an open truck), insurance, and expenses. The board rejected this offer because it was a deviation from policy, because it was too costly, and because Mr. Wallace's working hours were such that the children would be required to be at school about two hours each day without any adult supervision.

As a result of plaintiff's inability to provide transportation, the children did not attend school for the remainder of the 1963-64 school year. The district superintendent recommended to the county superintendent of schools that they be excused from compulsory school attendance under section 12153 of the Education Code, which provides that students residing more than two miles from school shall be exempted from compulsory attendance on the written approval of the county superintendent.

In their complaint plaintiffs, after alleging their inability to secure transportation and the details of the Wallace proposal, asserted that the board's action resulted in excluding the minor plaintiffs from the public schools and in depriving them of their constitutional rights of due process of law and equal protection. They prayed for a restraining order compelling the board to furnish them with transportation to and from school.

The board demurred to the complaint, the demurrer was coverruled, and it thereafter filed an answer denying the allegations of the complaint, with the exception of certain jurisdictional matters, and asserting that the board had no duty to provide the minor plaintiffs with free transportation.

The trial court treated the complaint as one sounding in mandate and, after a trial at which testimony was received from three of the adult plaintiffs, the district superintendent, and the assistant superintendent, it issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the board to provide transportation to eight of the minor plaintiffs to and from their respective schools, beginning with the $1964-65 school year. The court found that, although plaintiffs were offered payments in lieu of transportation, the amount offered was not sufficient for this purpose, that plaintiffs had 'neither the means of transportation nor the means with which to purchase it,' that the board main tains bus service to an area farther from th schools than Paloma Creek, that, although the road to the Paloma Creek area is narrow and requires careful driving at certain points it is no more dangerous than other roads over which the board affords transportation, that defendants are financially 'well able' to provide plaintiffs with bus service, and that their failure to do so prevents eight children from attending school and will do so in the future.

The court concluded that the board's action in refusing transportation was arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, and unreasonable and deprived plaintiffs of free schooling and of due process of law and equal protection of the laws. It also found that the board's refusal to act favorably on Mr. Wallace's offer was capricious and discriminatory.

The board first contends on this appeal that the trial court erred in overruling its demurrer to the complaint. It claims that, since section 16801 of the Education Code clearly gives it discretion to determine whether or not transportation should be provided, its determination is conclusive and is not subject to review by the courts. It is pointed out that under section 1085 of the Code of Civil Procedure a writ of mandate may issue only when a petitioner has a right to the performance of an act and a respondent has a duty to perform that act, and the board asserts the plaintiffs have no right to free transportation and the board has no duty to furnish it. Two district court cases are cited in which children were injured on their way home from school and it was held that the district could not be held liable for negligence since it was under no duty...