Manley v. Felty
| Decision Date | 06 November 1896 |
| Docket Number | 17,924 |
| Citation | 45 N.E. 74,146 Ind. 194 |
| Parties | Manley v. Felty |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Jay Circuit Court.
Affirmed.
Headington & LaFollette, and P. B. Manley, for appellant.
LaFollette & Adair, and France & Merryman, for appellee.
Suit by the appellant upon a note by the appellee for $ 1,000.00 with a credit of $ 522.00, and to foreclose a realty mortgage securing the same. Answer in four paragraphs: 1. No consideration. 2. That all of the balance sued for, excepting $ 100.00 principal and $ 10.00 attorney's fees, was promised without consideration. 3. Answering as to all but $ 110.00, alleges that one Felty died intestate in Adams county, the owner of a large amount of real and personal property; that appellee was his only heir at law and entitled, by descent, to all of said property; that a Mrs Beerbower claimed to be the lawful widow of the decedent, and had procured herself to be appointed administratrix of the estate; that she claimed the whole of said estate and denied that the appellee was an heir of the decedent; that the appellant, a practicing attorney in Adams county, was aware of the condition of said estate and the contention about the heirship and ownership thereof; that the appellee was a farmer, uneducated in business affairs generally, and unable to read or write, and had had no experience in business or in legal controversies and no knowledge of the extent or value of attorney's services, all of which was known to the appellant when he went to the appellee and told him that he was the rightful owner of all of said property; that it would require a law suit to obtain it from Mrs. Beerbower, whose sons were shrewd and experienced business men and were assisting her to maintain her claim to the property, and had employed all the lawyers in Decatur to represent her; that it would take a great deal of work and expense to fight the case and recover the property from her that he could and would recover for appellee all of said property; that the attorney's fees therefor would be reasonably $ 1,000.00, and that no lawyer could be employed for less. It was alleged that all of the statements by the appellant were false and were made fraudulently and for the wrongful purpose of inducing the appellee to execute a note and mortgage for $ 1,000.00. It was further alleged that the appellant had falsely and fraudulently represented the value of said real estate to be $ 4,000.00, when it was worth but $ 2,000.00; that the appellee was unacquainted with the value of real estate in the locality of that in question, and fully relied upon the appellant's statement; that he relied upon and believed all of the appellant's statements, and in reliance thereon did execute the note and mortgage in suit; that no litigation was had, but instead the case was compromised by the appellant, Mrs. Beerbower receiving half the real estate and all of the personal, and executing her note for a difference of $ 500.00, and the appellee receiving real estate of the value of $ 1,000.00; that the appellant obtained and appropriated from said note $ 350.00, and that the services rendered were worth but $ 50.00, to which should be added $ 5.00 as an attorney's fee on said amount. The fourth answer was that appellee had "fully paid said plaintiff all the notes and items charged and mentioned in the * complaint long before * suit."
The appellee filed also a cross-complaint alleging the same facts alleged in the third answer, and seeking a cancellation of the note and mortgage and the quieting of his title against the appellant.
Demurrers were overruled as to each answer and as to the cross-complaint. Issue was joined and a trial resulted in a finding and decree in favor of the appellant for $ 141.24, and the foreclosure of the mortgage. A motion for a new trial was overruled, exceptions were reserved, and the several rulings mentioned are here assigned as error.
The sufficiency of the first answer is not questioned; that of the second is expressly conceded; that of the third involves the same questions presented as against the cross-complaint, and the fourth is objected to as not broad enough to cover the entire cause of action sued upon. The allegation: "All the notes and items charged and mentioned in the complaint" was sufficient, in our opinion, to cover the obligations of both the note and the mortgage as pleaded in the complaint and was not objectionable upon demurrer.
The sufficiency of the third answer and of the cross-complaint is attacked by counsel for the appellant as not alleging positive fraud, since, as claimed, the allegations consist in mere opinions and predictions as to the extent of service necessary, the value of lands, and the extent of resistance by Mrs. Beerbower, and since no allegation was made as to diligence on the part of the appellee to learn and act upon the truth in any of the matters in which he alleges he was deceived by the appellant. Their sufficiency is attacked also as not alleging facts constituting constructive fraud. Counsel for the appellee do not seek to uphold the ruling of the lower court upon the first proposition, that as to positive fraud. It is neither claimed that an allegation of diligence was made, nor that it was unnecessary, but it is urged that the relation of attorney and client existed and required from the appellant the utmost good faith, and permitted the appellee, without investigation, to rely upon the statements and representations of the appellant, and that the burden rested upon the appellant to prove the truth and good faith of his statements and representations. In other words, the contention of counsel for the appellee is, that each of the pleadings in question alleges constructive fraud in procuring the note and mortgage for an excessive sum.
Though counsel should not give the correct reason supporting the ruling of the trial court, if it is apparent that the ruling was correct, this court will not reverse the ruling. Otherwise the value of a decision as authority would depend, not upon the allegations of the pleading upheld or condemned, nor upon the reasoning of the court in its decision, but upon the strength of the reasons given by counsel for or against the pleading.
Upon the question of diligence, it has been settled that a contracting party may rely on the express statement of an existing fact, the truth of which is unknown to him, but which is asserted by the other contracting party, as a basis for mutual agreement. Kramer v. Williamson, 135 Ind. 655, ...
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