Manley v. Foundations Plus, Ltd.
| Decision Date | 19 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:15-cv-1786,Case No. 2:15-cv-2978 |
| Parties | CHARLES JAMES MANLEY, Plaintiff, v. FOUNDATIONS PLUS, LTD., et. al, Defendants LIGHTNING ROD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. FOUNDATIONS PLUS, LTD., et. al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on various motions in two related cases. The cases are not consolidated.1 In Case No. 2:15-cv-1786, Manley v. Foundations Plus, LLC, et al., the parties have filed motions and cross-motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss directed at the fifteen claims filed in the amended complaint. Likewise, in Case No. 2:15-cv-2978, Lightning Rod Mutual Insurance Company v. Foundations Plus, et al., Plaintiff Lighting Rod Mutual Insurance Company ("Lightning Rod") has moved for summary judgment on its amended complaint for declaratory judgment (ECF No. 3), and Defendant Charles James Manley ("Mr. Manley" or "Manley") has moved to dismiss Lightning Rod's amended complaint. (ECFNo. 4.) The Court GRANTS the Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Defendants Ohio Ready Mixed Concrete Association and James E. Barnhart (Case No. 2:15-cv-1786, ECF No. 41) and Defendants Buckeye Ready Mix, LLC and Greg Starling (Case No. 2:15-cv-1786, ECF No. 42), and hereby DISMISSES Case No. 2:15-cv-1786, without prejudice. The Court REMANDS the declaratory judgment case, Case No. 2:15-cv-2978, to the Licking County Court of Common Pleas.
These cases are before the Court on diversity jurisdiction. Manley is the plaintiff in the first captioned case and one of the defendants in the second.2 The declaratory judgment action was filed in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, and was removed to this Court by Mr. Manley.
In the first captioned case, Manley has sued a number of parties whom he claims were responsible for not completing a barn restoration project in accordance with his directions. Manley asserts that he was responsible for the oversight of the construction necessary to convert an historic barn, located in Newark, Ohio, into a residence. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 16, at pp. 7-8, ¶ 38.) The barn and the real property on which it is situated are owned by Manley's parents, Charles Roger Manley and Marilyn M. Manley. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 16, at p. 38, ¶ 37.)
On or about May 16, 2011, Manley entered into a contract with Malon Eash, Jr. ("Mr. Eash" or ") of SR661-ELM, Ltd. dba Foundations Plus to pour a new concrete foundation for the barn. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 16, at p. 9, ¶ 50.) Foundations Plus was paid an initial payment of $7,000, with the remainder due after the "work was accepted by Plaintiff as fully performed and completed." (Am. Compl., ECF No. 16, at p. 42, ¶ 296.) The work was completed on June 7,2011. Manley was dissatisfied with the work, and declined to pay for it. On August 1, 2011, Eash filed a mechanics' lien on the real property, alleging that Charles and Marilyn Manley (Manley's parents) owed Foundations Plus the amount of $14,038.20. (ECF No. 16, Exh. G., Page ID# 341.)
On May 8, 2015, Manley filed this suit, naming as defendants the limited partnership SR661-ELM Ltd. dba Foundations Plus, members of the Eash family, and John Doe defendants. On August 11, 2015, Manley filed an Amended Complaint, adding as defendants Buckeye Ready Mix, LLC, Greg Starling, Head of Sales for Buckeye Ready Mix, LLC, Ohio Concrete and/or Ohio Ready Mixed Concrete Association, and James E. Bamhart, P.E., Senior Engineer for the Ohio Ready Mixed Concrete Association. (ECF 16.) The amended complaint presents fifteen claims, including fraud, breach of contract, breach of warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, intentional misrepresentation, breach of express warranty, negligence, failure to perform in a workmanlike manner, breach of a second contract, unjust enrichment, detrimental reliance, failure to mitigate damages, civil conspiracy, tortious interference with contracts, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 16.)
Manley has moved for summary judgment on his amended complaint. (ECF No. 17.) Motions to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction have been filed by the Ohio Ready Mixed Concrete Association and James E. Bamhart, P.E (ECF No. 41), and Buckeye Ready Mix, LLC and Greg Starling. (ECF No. 42.) Manley also filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment directed toward these four defendants. (ECF No. 55.)
The second captioned case involves a claim by Lightning Rod Mutual Insurance Company ("Lightning Rod") for a declaratory judgment that it is not liable under an insurance policy that itissued to Foundations Plus, a defendant in the first case, for the claims Manley has asserted against Foundations Plus. Lightning Rod filed its declaratory judgment complaint in the Licking County Court of Common Pleas, and Manley, a defendant in that action, removed the case to this Court. Lightning Rod has moved for summary judgment on its claim for declaratory judgment (ECF No. 3), and Manley has moved to dismiss Lightning Rod's amended complaint for declaratory judgment. (ECF No. 4.)
On January 9, 2016, Mr. Manley asked the Court for a 90-day stay of this litigation to permit him to obtain medical treatment. (ECF No. 70.) The Court granted a stay through April 15, 2016. (ECF No. 73.) The various motions for summary judgment and motions to dismiss are ripe for decision.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) allows dismissal for "lack of subject matter jurisdiction" over claims asserted in the Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Generally, Rule 12(b)(1) motions fall into two general categories: facial attacks and factual attacks. A facial attack is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading itself. On such a motion, the court must take the material allegations of the petition as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 235-37, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686-87, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). In contrast, a factual attack is not a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleading's allegations, but a challenge to the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction. On such a motion, no presumptive truthfulness applies to the factual allegations, see Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir.1990), and the court is free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case. See United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir. 1994). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court mayconsider written instruments that are exhibits to a pleading, as those are considered part of the pleading for all purposes. Campbell v. Nationstar Mortg., No. 14-1751, 611 Fed. App'x 288, 291-92, 2015 WL 2084023, at *3 (6th Cir. May 6, 2015) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c)). A court may also consider "documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Id. (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007)).
Additionally, it is "familiar law that a federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction." Charvat v. GVN Michigan, Inc., 561 F.3d 623, 627-28 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628, 122 S.Ct. 2450 (2002)). "Not only may a court raise subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, it must." CMS North America, Inc. v. DeLorenzo Marble & Tile, Inc., 521 F.Supp.2d 619, 632 (W.D. Mich. 2007) (citing Clarke v. Mindis Metals, Inc., No. 95-5517, 99 F.3d 1138, 1996 WL 616677, *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 24, 1996) () (emphasis in original). This responsibility rests in part on the fact that Federal Courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction. "[T]he intent of Congress drastically to restrict federal jurisdiction in controversies of diverse citizens has always been rigorously enforced by the courts." St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938).
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction over claims involving either a federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or arising among citizens of different states pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Federal Courts have "original 'diversity' jurisdiction where the suit is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of costs and interest." Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 871 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing 28U.S.C. § 1332(a)). In diversity actions, the governing substantive law is state law. See Erie R.R. Co. v Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817 (1938).
In the first captioned case, defendants Ohio Ready Mixed Concrete Association, James E. Barnhart, Buckeye Ready Mix, LLC, and Greg Starling challenge the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) as against all parties. These defendants contend that "[t]o maintain complete diversity and allege damages closer to the amount-in-controversy requirement, Mr. Manley attempts to substitute himself into his parents' position and bring claims on their behalf" (ECF No. 41, at p. 7), and "any alleged damages to the barn it [defective concrete] could have caused inure to Plaintiff's parent's benefit, not Plaintiff." (ECF No. 42, at p. 2.) This raises the question of whether Plaintiff's parents are real parties in interest who should be joined to this suit. Although this issue is not briefed in detail, the Court finds it necessary to determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction over these actions.
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