Manley v. Lycoming Motors Corp.

• Decision Date: 21 April 1924
• Docket Number: 27-1924
• Citation: Manley v. Lycoming Motors Corp., 83 Pa. Super. 173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1924)
• Parties: Manley v. Lycoming Motors Corporation, Etc., Appellants
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

83 Pa.Super. 173

Manley v. Lycoming Motors Corporation, Etc., Appellants

No. 27-1924

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

April 21, 1924

Argued March 11, 1924

Appeal by defendants, from judgment of C.P. LackawannaCo.-1922, No 220, affirming the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board in the case of Thomas Manley v. Lycoming Motors Corporation, Defendant, and Globe Indemnity Company Insurance Carrier.

Appeal from the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board.Before Whitehead, P. J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Superior Court.

The court affirmed the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Board.Defendant appealed.

Error assigned was, among others, the judgment of the court.

Affirmed.

C Edmund Gilmore, for appellant.-- The Workmen's Compensation Board had no authority to grant a rehearing: Carlin v. Coxe Bros. & Co.,274 Pa. 38;Workmen's Compensation Acts, a Corpus Juris Treatise, page 104, paragraph 101;Morris v. Yough Coal and Supply Co.,266 Pa. 216, 218;Kalucki v. American Car & Foundry Co.(Mich.),166 N.W. 1011.

W. E. Ritter, for appellee, cited: Carlin v. Coxe Bros.,274 Pa. 38, Mackey's Decisions 4, 554;Lees v. Commercial MiningCo., 4 Mackey's Reports, 278;4 Conway v. Sugar Run Coal MiningCo., 4 Mackey's Reports, 420;Hughes v. Am. International Shipbuilding Corp.,270 Pa. 27;Chase v. Emery Mfg. Co.,271 Pa. 265.

Before Orlady, P. J., Porter, Henderson, Trexler, Keller, Linn and Gawthrop, JJ.

OPINION

KELLER, J.

The only question involved in this appeal is whether the Workmen's Compensation Board, upon cause shown, may grant a claimant who has been disallowed compensation, but failed to appeal from such decision, a rehearing of his petition after the ten days allowed for taking an appeal have expired.If it may, the judgment of the lower court must be affirmed.

In disposing of the question it must be borne in mind that the Workmen's Compensation Board is not a court and a proceeding under the act creating it is not " litigation" to which established rules and principles of common law practice are applicable: Gairt v. Curry Coal Mining Co.,272 Pa. 494, 498.If the necessary authority has been conferred upon the board, it is not restricted in its action by terms or return days, but may grant a rehearing when the interests of justice require it, within such general limitation as may be imposed by the act.And it is the duty of courts to construe the act liberally, as respects the claimant's right to compensation, having in mind the benevolent and humanitarian purposes of its enactment: Gairt v. Curry Coal Mining Co.,supra, p. 498;Blake v. Wilson,268 Pa. 469, 474;Callihan v. Montgomery,272 Pa. 56, 59;Clark v. Clearfield Opera House Co.,275 Pa. 244, 246.

Keeping this purpose in mind we are of opinion that express authority to grant a rehearing in such case is given the board in section 426 of the act as amended by the Act of June 26, 1919, P. L. 642, p. 665, which provides: " The board, upon petition of any party and upon cause shown, at any time before the court of common pleas of any county of this Commonwealth to whom an appeal has been taken under the provisions of section 427 of this article shall have taken final action thereon, may grant a rehearing of any petition upon which the board has made an award or disallowance of compensation or other order or ruling, or has sustained or reversed any action of a referee.If the board shall grant a rehearing of any petition from the board's action on which an appeal has been taken to and is pending in, the court of common pleas of any county of this Commonwealth under the provisions of section 427 of this article, the board shall file in such court a certified copy of its order granting such rehearing and it shall thereupon be the duty of such court to cause the record of the case to be remitted to the board."

The appellants contend that this section limits the board, in its grant of a rehearing, to cases which have been appealed to the court of common pleas, but we place no such narrow construction upon it.It does not read, " Whenever an appeal has been taken to the court of common pleas, of any county, and is still pending, the board may, upon petition of any party, upon cause shown, grant a rehearing," etc.The clause relating to an appeal has no such restrictive meaning.It means rather, as it says, that such rehearing may be granted by the board, upon petition and cause shown, at any time, except that if an appeal has been taken to the court of common pleas under section 427, the rehearing must be granted before final action has been taken by such court thereon.This construction is strengthened by the last sentence of the section above quoted.If the whole section is limited in its scope to cases in which appeals have been taken to and are pending in the courts of common pleas, there would be no necessity for inserting the conditional clause, but the duty of the board to file in such court a certified copy of its order granting a rehearing and of the court thereupon to remit the record would apply in all cases.The fact that it was thought necessary to make the distinction is persuasive evidence that the right to grant a rehearing, for cause shown, applies to cases not appealed as well as to those where an appeal is pending.

A fair reading of the section, having in mind its evident purpose, is to authorize a rehearing, at any time, upon petition and cause shown -- that is, when justice requires, -- of any petition upon which the board has made an award or disallowance of compensation, with this qualification, that if an appeal has been taken to the common pleas, the rehearing must be granted before final action by that court, and in that event, the board shall file in such court a certified copy of its order granting a rehearing and thereupon the court must cause the record to be remitted to the board.The action, thus authorized, was taken by the board in Carlin v. Coxe Bros. & Co.,274 Pa. 38, where, at first, it disallowed compensation to the claimant because the causal connection between the accident and the employee's death had not been sufficiently established.Subsequently, on petition and over the protest of the employer, the board ordered a rehearing and allowed compensation and the Supreme Court approved this action.The cases from Illinois and Texas cited by appellants are of no weight because the compensation acts of those states do not confer the authority on the board given by our amendment of 1919.

But appellants assert that where a claimant has not appealed from the award or disallowance of the referee, the board has made no award or disallowance, and hence section 426 does not apply; but this is sticking in the bark.The referee is simply the agent of the board; his findings and awards or disallowances are not made direct to the parties but are filed with the Workmen's Compensation Bureau (sec. 404) in accordance with the rules and regulations of the board and copy thereof served by it upon the parties in interest; and the referee's report and award, unappealed from, is considered the action of the board, just as the entry of judgment by the prothonotary for want of an affidavit of defense is on behalf of the court, or the report of an auditor to which no exceptions have been filed is considered as the action of the court.This is clearly the case, for by section 414(amendment of 1919) it is provided that the board may either refer claim petitions to a referee or hear them itself, except that hearings where the parties agree on the facts, but fail to agree on the compensation payable thereunder (section 411) and on petitions for commutation, (section 412) must...