Mann v. Clark
| Docket Number | 4:21-CV-04158-RAL |
| Decision Date | 28 July 2022 |
| Parties | DANIEL RAY MANN, Plaintiff, v. DOUG CLARK, WARDEN, SDSP; AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
Petitioner Daniel Mann was convicted of one count of first-degree rape in violation of SDCL § 22-22-1(1). He filed a petition of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 contending that he was denied a fair trial by testimony from a police officer that vouched for the child victim, questions asked and statements made by the prosecution that improperly shifted the burden of proof, and ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. For the reasons set forth below, Mann's § 2254 petition is denied and Defendants motion to dismiss is granted.
In September 2016, Mann was charged with four counts of first-degree rape in violation of SDCL § 22-22-1(1). Criminal Trial Record (“CTR”) 1. He was accused of sexually assaulting a minor child, J.G., his wife Nikki Mann's niece. Habeas Appeal Record (“HAR”) 6. J.G. had come into the couple's care along with one of her brothers[1] after they were removed[2] from their biological parents due to severe neglect. HAR 6. Eventually, because of Nikki's declining mental health, the children were again removed to another relative's care in North Dakota. HAR 8. There, J.G. told a therapist that she had been sexually abused by Mann while under his care. HAR 8. J.G.'s therapist reported this disclosure to law enforcement triggering an investigation that led to Mann's indictment. HAR 11.
A jury trial was conducted in August 2017, and Mann was convicted of one count of first-degree rape but found not guilty on the other three counts. CTR 541. Mann received a thirty-five-year prison sentence with ten years suspended, and the court imposed various costs. CTR 541-42.
On direct appeal, Mann raised three issues:
Doc. 27 at 3. The Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed Mann's conviction, but noted its order expressed “no opinion on the issue of whether Mann was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.” CTR 1336; HAR 142.
In December 2019, Mann filed a state habeas corpus action contending that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated during his criminal jury trial. Doc. 27 at 4; HAR 1-3. Mann contended his trial counsel was ineffective in three ways:
Doc. 27 at 4. A state judge denied Mann's habeas petition in July 2020. HAR 162. Mann then' obtained a certificate of probable cause and appealed denial of his ineffective assistance claims to the Supreme Court of South Dakota which affirmed the lower court ruling in March of 2021. HAR 199, 202, 297, 299.
Mann filed a federal pro se § 2254 petition with this Court in September 2021, which he subsequently amended. Docs. 1,25,27,28. In his amended petition, Maim raised the following grounds as basis for relief:
Docs. 27,28. Mann petitioned the Court to “reverse conviction, and/or remand for re-trial, and/or remand for further review.” Doc. 27 at 16. The state defendants moved to dismiss, Doc. 11-2, to which Mann responded, Docs. 23, 24. The government then replied. Doc. 26. This Court now denies Mann's amended petition for writ of habeas corpus and grants the state defendant's motion to dismiss for the reasons outlined below.
As amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 sets limitations “on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). Id. (quoting § 2254).
“If an application includes a claim that has been ‘adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings,'” additional restrictions apply. IT (quoting § 2254(d)). Section 2254(d) provides that an application shall not be granted unless adjudication of such a claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Supreme Court of the United States has described the § 2254(d) standard as “highly deferential standard,” “difficult to meet” and demanding “that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181 (). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). The petitioner bears the burden of proof. Cullen, 563 U.S. at 181, However, because § 2254(d)'s demanding standard of review only applies if the claim was adjudicated on the merits, when the state court did not resolve the claim on the merits, federal courts review the petitioner's claim de novo. See Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 495 (8th Cir. 2011). This Court will now analyze each ground Mann raises under § 2254.[3]
On direct appeal, Mann argued that Lt. Powers improperly vouched for the credibility of another witness, the alleged victim J.G. South Dakota Supreme Court Direct Appeal Record (“DAR”) Doc. 12. The Supreme Court of South Dakota held that Mann's appeal was “without merit.” CTR 1336. Mann reiterated this vouching argument in his habeas action contending the failure to object to Powers's vouching for the child witness was ineffective assistance of counsel. HAR 43.
To properly exhaust his standalone vouching claim, Mann needed to “fairly present” his federal claims in state court. Turnage v. Fabian, 606 F.3d 933, 936 (8th Cir. 2010). To fairly present his vouching claim, Mann “must have referred to a specific federal constitutional right, a particular constitutional provision a federal constitutional case, or a state case raising a pertinent federal constitutional issue in a claim before the state courts.” Id. “A claim is considered exhausted when the petitioner has afforded the highest state court a fair opportunity to rule on the factual and theoretical substance of his claim.” Ashker v. Leapley, 5 F.3d 1178, 1179 (8th Cir. 1993). After reviewing the record, see DAR Docs. 12, 15, Mann has not “fairly presented” his standalone vouching claim to the state court, and therefore, has not satisfied the exhaustion requirement for his claim to be considered by this Court under § 2254.[4] Mann's brief on direct appeal presented this issue as a challenge under SDCL § 19-19-702 and its federal corollary Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. But a violation of a state law rule of evidence is “not cognizable in a federal habeas action because it only concerns an alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law.” Hurtado v. Long, No. CV 14-8068 MWF (KS), 2017 WL 11647753, at *16 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26,2017); see also Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (“federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law” (cleaned up and citation omitted)). Moreover, the “Federal Rules of Evidence are not Taws' or ‘rights' that apply in state court criminal proceedings, and those rules are not binding on a state court, and to the extent that a state court may have ‘violated' a Federal Rule of Evidence during a state court criminal trial, such a violation is not a constitutional or federal-law violation that a federal habeas corpus action is empowered to remedy.” Hurtado, 2017 WL 11647753, at *16; see also Ward v. Beard, No. CV 11-8025 GAF SS, 2013 WL 5913816, at *13 n.17 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013) (...
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