Mann v. Lynaugh

• Citation: 688 F. Supp. 1121
• Decision Date: 20 October 1987
• Docket Number: No. CA 3-87-1548-R.,CA 3-87-1548-R.
• Parties: Fletcher Thomas MANN, Plaintiff, v. James A. LYNAUGH, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

688 F. Supp. 1121

Fletcher Thomas MANN, Plaintiff, v. James A. LYNAUGH, Director, Texas Department of Corrections, Defendant.

No. CA 3-87-1548-R.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

October 20, 1987.

Melvyn Carson Bruder, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiff.

Jim Mattox, M.F. Keller, F.S. McCown, W.C. Zapalac, Austin, Tex., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BUCHMEYER, District Judge.

This is a death penalty case.

The petitioner, Fletcher Thomas Mann, raises four issues by his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The first is that "several jurors" were excluded in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed. 2d 776 (1968). The remaining three contentions involve the confession which was given by Mann to two police officers and which was introduced at the state court trial over Mann's objections.

All the petitioner's claims are baseless. Accordingly, for the following reasons, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

1. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On Thursday, September 11, 1980, the petitioner Mann and Martin David Verbrugge (i) raped Barbara Hoppe and then strangled and stabbed her to death; (ii) shot and killed Christopher Bates; and (iii) attempted to murder Robert Matzig by shooting him in the neck and leaving him for dead. Since the "gruesome facts" concerning these crimes are recited in Mann v. State, 718 S.W.2d 741 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), they need not be repeated here.

2. THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 8, 1981, over one year after the commission of these crimes, the petitioner Mann was indicted for the murder of Christopher Bates. He was tried in January of 1982. The district judge, the Honorable Ron Chapman, conducted a pretrial hearing on Mann's motion to suppress his confession (S.F. 35-320) — and denied this motion because "the confession was freely and voluntarily given"; because it "was not tainted in any way by any conduct of any law enforcement officer" and because it was obtained from Mann when "he was voluntarily willing to talk and was not requesting an attorney" (S.F. 320-21).¹

On February 4, 1982, the jury found Mann guilty of capital murder. On the following day, the jury gave affirmative answers to the three special punishment issues submitted to them under Art. 37.071, Tex.Code Crim.Proc. (Vernon Supp.1987). And, on February 5, 1982, Judge Chapman ordered that Mann be executed by lethal injection (S.F. 130-34).

Mann appealed. On October 22, 1986 — six years after the murders, 4 years and 9 months after the trial — the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the sentence. Mann v. State, 718 S.W. 2d 741 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). Mann's petition for writ of certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court on April 6, 1987. (___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1633, 95 L.Ed.2d 206 (1987)).

Mann's execution was scheduled for June 25, 1987. On June 16, 1987, he filed an application for stay and application for writ of habeas corpus in the state court. On June 17, 1987, Judge Chapman denied the request for stay and recommended that the petition for habeas corpus be denied.² The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals accepted this recommendation, and denied mann's application on June 23, 1987.

On the same day, June 23, 1987, Mann filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this Court. The State of Texas did not oppose Mann's request for a stay of execution, and this was granted on June 23, 1987. Several weeks later, this Court received the voluminous state court record. On July 28, 1987, the state filed its answer to the petition and its motion for summary judgment. No response was filed to this motion for summary judgment within 20 days, Local Rule 5.1(e), so the matter became ready for dispositon on August 17, 1987.

3. THE ISSUES

By his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Mann raises the following issues:

(a) That prospective jurors were improperly excluded from the jury based on their beliefs about the propriety of the death penalty, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(b) That his confession should have been suppressed because:

(i) it was obtained as a result of an unlawful arrest, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments;

(ii) it was obtained by use of coercion on the part of interrogating police officers, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments;

(iii) it was obtained in violation of his "rights to silence and to counsel" guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Mann raised the first three of these issues in his petition for writ of habeas corpus in state court, and the fourth issue was presented in the direct appeal of his conviction. Mann, 718 S.W.2d 741. Thus, he has exhausted his state remedies on all four claims, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b).

4. THE APPLICABLE LAW

In all habeas corpus proceedings instituted by state prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the federal district and appellate courts are bound by the provisions of § 2254(d) — which provide, in substance, that the findings of the state court "shall be presumed to be correct," and that the petitioner has the burden of establishing that the factual determinations of the state court are "clearly erroneous." Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed. 2d 722 (1981); Asper v. Estelle, 709 F.2d 356 (5th Cir.1983).

The "factual determinations" covered by § 2254(d) are "basic, primary or historical facts: facts in the sense of a recital of external events and the credibility of their narrators." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963), quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 506, 73 S.Ct. 397, 446, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953) (opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter); Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d 717, 721-23 (5th Cir. 1976). Thus, if a state court has made specific findings of fact or crediblity determinations, these are binding upon a federal court in a subsequent habeas proceeding unless the federal court concludes — not with a "boilerplate" dismissal, but with "some reasoned written references to § 2254(d) and the state court findings" — that the findings or credibility determinations are clearly erroneous. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. at 549-52, 101 S.Ct. at 770-72; Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 218, 102 S.Ct. 940, 946, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982).

Of course, no "presumption of correctness" is due under § 2254(d) if the state court does not make any specific fact findings or credibility determinations — of if the record is incomplete because the material facts were not fully and adequately developed at the state court hearing. Mason v. Balcom, 531 F.2d at 721-23; White v. Finkbeiner, 570 F.2d 194, 201 (7th Cir. 1978). Nor is any deference due to conclusions of law by a state court. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1714-15, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). And, where the resolution of the habeas corpus issue presents a "mixed question of fact and law," the presumption of correctness under § 2254(d) does apply to findings of "specific historical facts" and to specific credibility determinations made by a state court — but it does not apply to the conclusions of law reached by the trial court on the mixed question of fact and law. Town-send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 309 n. 6, 83 S.Ct. 745, 755 n. 6, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963); Lee v. Hopper, 499 F.2d 456, 462 (5th Cir. 1974).

5. EXCLUSION OF JURORS: THE WITHERSPOON CHALLENGE

Mann's first contention is that the trial court improperly excluded "several jurors" because of their views about the death penalty. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). However, Mann does not identify the persons he claims were wrongly excluded. Presumably he means the four veniremembers discussed in his direct appeal and his petition for certiorari: Janie Mathus, Diana Velasquez, Elmer Holmes, and Martha Tingle.³ See Mann, 718 S.W.2d 746-50.

In essence, Mann complains about the "emotional/intellectual dilemna" caused by some "unnecessarily convoluted" voir dire questions used by the prosecutor. Mann, 718 S.W.2d at 747, 749. However, the record relects that the trial judge carefully observed the voir dire proceedings. Indeed, Judge Chapman asked many question of his own during voir dire — including some to three of the jurors involved here — so he would be sure what their answers meant (Mathus — S.F. 664-65; Holmes — S. F. 2678-81; Tingle — S.F. 3108-11). And, the record supports his determination that the prospective jurors were not qualified because their views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with their instructions and oath. As stated in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-26, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852-53, 83 L.Ed. 2d 841 (1985):

"... What common sense should have realized experience has proven; many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made `unmistakably clear'; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.... This is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the jurors." (Emphasis added.)

Judge Chapman saw and heard each of the four jurors in question. In each instance, he found that the person was not qualified to serve because of his or her feelings about capital punishment (Mathus — S.F. 665; Holmes — S.F. 2681-82; Tingle — S.F. 3111). These findings are presumed to be correct; they are subject to § 2254(d); and they are fairly supported by the record.⁴ Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. at 429, 435, 105 S.Ct. at 854,...