Mann v. Minnesota Electric Light & Power Co.

• Decision Date: 06 August 1930
• Docket Number: No. 172.,172.
• Citation: 43 F.2d 36
• Parties: MANN v. MINNESOTA ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER CO.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

43 F.2d 36 (1930)

MANN v. MINNESOTA ELECTRIC LIGHT & POWER CO.

No. 172.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

August 6, 1930.

Walter Mathews, of Cushing, Okl., for appellant.

John F. Webster, of Oklahoma City, Okl. (F. A. Rittenhouse, Frank E. Lee, and Breck Moss, all of Oklahoma City, Okl., on the brief), for appellee.

Before LEWIS, PHILLIPS, and McDERMOTT, Circuit Judges.

McDERMOTT, Circuit Judge.

Lulu Bluejacket recovered a judgment in the state court for $20,000 against the appellee on account of the death of her husband, Ed Bluejacket. The judgment inured to the exclusive benefit of herself and children, as provided by the Oklahoma statute. While an appeal from the judgment was pending, she settled the judgment for $5,000. Her children then brought this suit for their distributive share of the $20,000, or $13,333.33, and deny the power of their mother to effect such compromise. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, and this appeal follows.

The wrongful death statute of Oklahoma confers a right of action upon the personal representative of the deceased, and provides that —

"The damages must inure to the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and children, if any, or next of kin; to be distributed in the same manner as personal property of the deceased." Section 824, C. O. S. 1921, as amended by Laws Okl. 1925, c. 125.

The succeeding section provides that, if no personal representative has been appointed, "the action provided in the said section may be brought by the widow, or where there is no widow, by the next of kin of such deceased."

The action in the state court was brought by the widow pursuant to this statute. Her children were not parties. When the case was called for trial, the defendant failed to appear, and the judgment was taken by default. The state court found that plaintiff was the widow of the intestate deceased, and that she brought this action on behalf of herself and her minor children, and that the death resulted from the negligence of the defendant. Whereupon it was adjudged that she recover $20,000 "for the use and benefit of herself and minor children"; that such sum be distributed as provided by the statutes of descents and distributions. This order is in accordance with the wrongful death statute quoted.

Counsel for the defendant were shortly advised of the default judgment, and on the same day filed a motion to vacate such judgment and to afford the defendant a trial. This motion was overruled and the defendant appealed. Pending the appeal, the case was settled for the sum of $5,000, and the plaintiff executed and acknowledged the following instrument:

"Satisfaction of Judgment

"Now comes the plaintiff, Lulu Bluejacket, and acknowledges full and complete settlement and satisfaction of the judgment rendered in the above entitled cause, as the same appears on the dockets of the District Court of Payne County, Oklahoma, and hereby enters said satisfaction of record.

"The court clerk of Payne County, Oklahoma, is hereby authorized to enter said satisfaction of record on the dockets of said court.

"Lulu Bluejacket."

The following notation was entered on the judgment docket:

"Judgment satisfied in full this 6th day of June, 1925, and said judgment released of record."

The defendant then dismissed its appeal to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Seven months later, a guardian was appointed for the minors and this action was brought on the judgment rendered in the state court; the prayer was to recover $13,333.33, the portion to which the minors were beneficially entitled under the Oklahoma statutes of descents and distributions. Section 11301, C. O. S. 1921. No claim of fraud or inadequacy of consideration is made. The plaintiff's claim is that Lulu Bluejacket intended to settle only that portion of the judgment to which she herself was entitled, and, furthermore, challenged the power of the widow to bind the children by the settlement. In answer thereto the defendant set up that the judgment had been discharged. The trial court declined to hear evidence in contradiction of the written satisfaction of judgment and directed a verdict for the defendant.

I. The trial court was right, in this action at law, in excluding evidence in contradiction of the written satisfaction of judgment. That instrument "acknowledges full and complete settlement and satisfaction of the judgment rendered." Manifestly, any testimony to the effect that the satisfaction was not full and complete, but was partial, contradicts the plain and unambiguous language of the writing, and, under familiar rules, was inadmissible.

II. Did the plaintiff in the state court action have the power to make a fair compromise of the judgment, without securing the appointment of a guardian for her minor children, and securing his consent thereto?

The wrongful death statutes of the various states differ somewhat in their provisions, although generally their purpose is to give to the widow and children the beneficial interest in the recovery for the loss, immune from the claim of creditors. The whole proceeding is statutory, and the statutes, and decisions of the state courts construing them, are binding on the United States courts. The statutes of some states create causes of action in the widow and the children; most of them, like Oklahoma, create but one cause of action and vest it in an administrator, or, if there is none, in the widow or next of kin. Such statutes, while creating but one cause of action vested in a single person, give others a beneficial interest in the recovery which is an enforceable obligation against the one in whom the cause is vested. The Oklahoma decisions fully support the theory on which Lulu Bluejacket brought her original suit; that is, that the cause of action was vested in her alone. In Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Owens, 78 Okl. 114, 189 P. 171, a widow brought an action for the death of her husband. They had two children. The defendant demurred to the petition on the ground that she had no right to sue in her own name, when her children were beneficially interested. The court held that she did have that right. See, also, Cowan v. A., T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 66 Okl. 273, 168 P. 1015, L. R. A. 1918B, 1141, where it was held that an action for wrongful death could only be brought in the name of the person upon whom the statute conferred the right to bring it. See also, Big Jack Mining Co. v. Parkinson, 41 Okl. 125, 137 P. 678.

Under statutes similar to the Oklahoma one, which authorize the administrator to bring an action for wrongful death, the damages to inure to the exclusive benefit of the widow and children, it is uniformly held that the administrator has the power to compromise claims or judgments without the consent of the beneficiaries or the approval of the court, and that those beneficially interested cannot, by compromise or settlement, bar an action by the administrator. This is the law as to administrators generally. In Jeffries v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 110 U. S. 305, 4 S. Ct. 8, 11, 28 L. Ed. 156, the attorney for an administrator compromised a judgment pending appeal. This compromise was immediately attacked, but the Supreme Court sustained it, saying in part:

"The authority given to him by statute (1 Wag. St. p. 87, § 26), to commence and prosecute actions fairly includes the power to make such reasonable contracts in regard to compensation and the compromising of actions on doubtful claims as the circumstances of particular cases may justify."

Missouri, like Oklahoma, had a statute giving the administrator power to compromise a claim with the approval of the county judge. But the Supreme Court held that such approval was not necessary, saying:

"And, even when statutes exist providing for compromises with debtors with the approval of a probate court, it is held that the right to compromise which before existed is not taken away, but may be exercised subject to the burden of showing that the compromise was beneficial to the estate."

There are many cases sustaining the power of an administrator to compromise a claim or judgment for wrongful death. See Yelton v. Evansville & Indiana Ry. Co., 134 Ind. 414, 33 N. E. 629, 21 L. R. A. 158; Dowell v....