Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist.

• Decision Date: 02 June 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-00068
• Citation: 189 F.Supp.3d 467
• Parties: Kenneth and Rose Mann as parents and co plenary guardians of the estate of Sheldon Mann, an incapacitated person, Plaintiffs, v. Palmerton Area School District et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

189 F.Supp.3d 467

Kenneth and Rose Mann as parents and co plenary guardians of the estate of Sheldon Mann, an incapacitated person, Plaintiffs,

v.Palmerton Area School District et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:14-CV-00068

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed June 2, 2016

Adam J. Pantano, Larry Bendesky, Robert J. Mongeluzzi, Robert W. Zimmerman, Saltz, Mongeluzzi, Barrett & Bendesky, Philadelphia, PA, Joseph T. Healey, O'Malley, Harris, Durkin & Perry, Scranton, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Mark Joseph Kozlowski, Robin B. Snyder, Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin, Scranton, PA, William J. McPartland, Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, Moosic, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

A. Richard Caputo, United States District Judge

Presently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 56) filed by Defendants Palmerton Area School District and Christopher Walkowiak ("Defendants").¹ Plaintiffs assert a state-created danger claim arising out of injuries sustained by their son during a high school football practice. Because Defendant Walkowiak is entitled to qualified immunity and because there is insufficient evidence to establish municipal liability against the School District, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.

I. Background

The facts presented in the summary judgment record, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, are as follows:

Sheldon Mann ("Sheldon") was a student at Palmerton Area High School and participated in the school's football program beginning in July, 2008. His parents, Kenneth and Rose Mann ("Plaintiffs"), were appointed co-plenary guardians of his estate on January 13, 2014. Beginning in 2006, Defendant Christopher Walkowiak ("Coach Walkowiak") was the Assistant Coach of the school's football team and in 2011, he was the Head Football Coach. (Doc. 57, Defendants' Statement of Facts ("DSF"), ¶¶ 30-31.) In 2011, in preparation for his Head Football Coach position, Coach Walkowiak received concussion safety training from DeSales University. (Id. ¶ 32.) Based on this training, he was aware of the signs and symptoms of a concussion prior to the 2011 football season. (Id. ¶ 34.)

On November 1, 2011, Sheldon was participating in football practice at Palmerton Area High School. At some point during the practice, Sheldon sustained a hit, after which he ceased practicing. Sheldon suffered traumatic brain injury, including second impact syndrome. There is some evidence that Sheldon sustained two (2) hits at this practice, and that after the first hit, was told to continue practicing by Coach Walkowiak. Some players testified that after this first hit, Sheldon appeared dazed, confused, and disoriented.

At the time of Sheldon's incident in November 2011, the Palmerton Area School District (the "School District") was using a series of policies and procedures outlined in its 2011-2012 Athletic Handbook (the "Handbook") to inform the coaches and parents about the School District's policies, procedures, rules and regulations, and general guidelines relating to its athletic program. (See Doc. 57-1, Def. Ex. A.) The Handbook outlines several policies requiring, inter alia , the exclusion of any player from play who has suffered injury or illness until that player is pronounced physically fit by a physician. (Doc. 57, DSF, ¶ 3; see also Doc. 57-1, Def. Ex. A, at 6.) The Handbook also details the duties and responsibilities of various employees in the athletic program, including the head coach, who is required to inform the athletic trainer of any injuries that occur during practices or games. (Doc. 57, DSF, ¶ 8; see also Doc. 57-1, Def. Ex. A, at 9.) Additionally, the Handbook contains a separate section dedicated to the proper handling of injured players. (Doc. 57-1, Def. Ex. A, at 20.) The procedures outlined in this section prohibit injured athletes from returning to practice or competition without first being cleared by the athletic trainer. (Id. at 20-21.) The Handbook does not include any policies or guidelines that specifically address concussions or other head injuries. The School District also adopted OAA Orthopaedic Specialists' concussion policies, though deposition testimony shows that it is unclear if these policies were written out at the time of Sheldon's incident. It is undisputed that one year after Sheldon's incident, however, the School District had a written concussion policy in place.

Plaintiffs assert due process claims against the School District and Coach Walkowiak for violating Sheldon's constitutional rights and causing his traumatic brain injuries. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Sheldon's rights were violated as a result of Coach Walkowiak's exercise of authority in telling Sheldon to continue participating in football practice after sustaining a hit and exhibiting signs of a concussion. Plaintiffs also claim that Sheldon's rights were violated as a result of the School District's practice of failing to medically clear student athletes, failing to enforce and enact proper concussion policies, and failing to train the coaches on a safety protocol for head injuries. The parties engaged in discovery and on February 1, 2016, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish a state-created danger claim against Coach Walkowiak and a municipal liability claim against the School District. (Doc. 56.) Defendants also argue that even if there were sufficient evidence to establish a state-created danger claim, Coach Walkowiak is entitled to qualified immunity. This motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for disposition.

II. Discussion

A. Legal Standard

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Wright v. Corning , 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir.2012) (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police , 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir.1995) ). A fact is material if proof of its existence or nonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving party need only establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Edelman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. , 83 F.3d 68, 70 (3d Cir.1996). Where, however, there is a disputed issue of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute is not a genuine one. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue of material fact is genuine if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Where there is a material fact in dispute, the moving party has the initial burden of proving that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc. , 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir.2010). The moving party may present its own evidence or, where the non-moving party has the burden of proof, simply point out to the court that "the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

When considering whether there are genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to "examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wishkin v. Potter , 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir.2007). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to either present affirmative evidence supporting its version of the material facts or to refute the moving party's contention that the facts entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 256–57, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n , 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990).

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show "specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in that party's favor, thereby establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial." Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm'n , 490 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir.2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ). Although the non-moving party's evidence may be either direct or circumstantial, and "need not be as great as a preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla." Id. (quoting Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA , 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir.2005) ). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

B. State-Created Danger

Plaintiffs assert a claim for due process violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" Section 1983") under the Fourteenth Amendment against the School District and Coach Walkowiak. In order to state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States. Par r att v. Taylor , 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds , Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). Although the general rule is that the state...