Mann v. Russey

• Decision Date: 20 December 1898
• Citation: 49 S.W. 835
• Parties: MANN et al. v. RUSSEY.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

49 S.W. 835

MANN et al. v. RUSSEY.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

December 20, 1898.

Appeal from chancery court, Franklin county; T. M. McConnell, Chancellor.

Bill by one Mann and others against one Russey. From a decree in favor of complainants, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

C. B. Russey and W. H. Brannon, for appellant. J. M. Littleton, for appellees.

BEARD, J.

The bill in this cause was filed by the widow in her own right and as administratrix of a deceased vendee, as well as next friend of his infant heirs, against the defendant, as vendor, for the purpose of having set aside a parol sale of land, and compelling the defendant to account for so much of the purchase money as he had received, and also for permanent improvements placed upon the property by this vendee, while in possession, in so far as they had enhanced its value. No controversy is made that this sale rested in parol, and of the right of the heirs of the vendee to disaffirm, or of the administratrix to recover the purchase money paid (the statute of limitation alone out of the way), with interest, less rents accrued during occupancy by the vendee. The real objection made by the defendant is to so much of the claim of complainant as covers the enhanced value of the property from the permanent improvements made by the vendee. This objection rests on the fact that while defendant is urging a consummation of the contract of sale and purchase, and is pressing a payment of the balance of the purchase money and acceptance of a deed by the complainants, they are repudiating the contract. For this contention the defendant relies on the rule announced in Rainer v. Huddleston, 4 Heisk. 223, which is that a vendee in a parol sale of land, who comes into a court of equity, claiming compensation for improvements made by him, will be repelled unless at the time of making them he intended in good faith to carry out his contract of purchase, and fails to do so, because of a default or wrong of the vendor. This rule is a sound one, and it has been repeatedly recognized in subsequent cases. If it were true that the defendant was, as his contention assumes, free from fault, and the failure to carry out the contract was attributable to the vendee or his privies in estate, then he could invoke the protection of the rule in question. But the record discloses that the defendant sold to the ancestor of the complainants this property at a grossly exaggerated price, for a consideration at least six times in...