Mannheim Sch. Dist. No. 83 v. Teachers' Ret. Sys. of Ill.

• Decision Date: 08 April 2015
• Docket Number: No. 4–14–0531.,4–14–0531.
• Citation: 29 N.E.3d 1224
• Parties: MANNHEIM SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 83, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

29 N.E.3d 1224

MANNHEIM SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 83, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.TEACHERS' RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ILLINOIS, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 4–14–0531.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

April 8, 2015.

Allen Wall (argued), Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Ltd., Chicago, for Appellant.

Ralph H. Loewenstein (argued), Loewenstein, Hagen & Smith, P.C., Springfield, for Appellee.

OPINION

Justice APPLETON

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Mannheim School District No. 83 (Mannheim), appeals the circuit court's order dismissing with prejudice its complaint for administrative review filed against defendant, Teachers' Retirement System of Illinois (TRS). The court dismissed the complaint because plaintiff failed to sue and serve the correct defendant in compliance with the applicable section of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–107(a)

(West 2012)). We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On September 13, 2013, plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review, seeking the circuit court's review of the August 15, 2013, decision of the Board of Trustees of the Teachers' Retirement Systems (Board). Although the substantive content of the administrative decision is not at issue, suffice it to say the Board found plaintiff was required to contribute to two of its administrators' retirement pay due to employment contract addendums.

¶ 4 Plaintiff served defendant by forwarding the complaint and summons via certified mail to the executive director of the TRS. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2–619 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(735 ILCS 5/2–619 (West 2012) ), claiming the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff (1) was not the proper party to bring the lawsuit, (2) sued the wrong defendant, and (3) did not issue a summons within 35 days of the administrative decision as required by section 3–103 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–103 (West 2012) ).

¶ 5 In the motion to dismiss and accompanying memorandum in support, defendant first claimed the Board is the proper party to be named as defendant, as it was the Board, not the TRS itself, that made the underlying administrative decision. Second, defendant claimed plaintiff was “incorrectly named” as well, as the complaint should have been brought by the Board of Education of Mannheim School District 83, not the district itself. Finally, defendant claimed plaintiff failed to have the summons issued within 35 days after the administrative decision was mailed on August 16, 2013. The summons was not issued until September 30, 2013, 45 days after mailing.

¶ 6 In response to the motion to dismiss, plaintiff claimed the issue of naming the incorrect parties was addressed in a 2008 amendment to section 3–107 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3–107 (West 2012)

) in response to the supreme court's decision in Ultsch v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 226 Ill.2d 169, 191, 314 Ill.Dec. 91, 874 N.E.2d 1 (2007) (administrative review case dismissed for failure to name the proper defendant). In 2008, Public Act 95–831 (eff. Aug. 14, 2008) was enacted and amended section 3–111(a)(4) of the Administrative Review Law to authorize the circuit court to correct misnomers or join agencies or parties. 735 ILCS 5/3–111(a)(4) (West 2012). Plaintiff claimed if the amendment itself did not save the lawsuit from dismissal, public policy should govern and allow plaintiff the opportunity to amend. Further, plaintiff argued the delay in issuing the summons did not lie with plaintiff.

¶ 7 On February 25, 2014, after a hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, the circuit court entered a memorandum of opinion, granting defendant's motion with prejudice. The court found “the amendments made * * * do not cover the specific circumstances in this case, and the language of the amended statute does not qualify the plaintiff to add or join necessary parties.” Noting the precise language of the amendment did not save plaintiff's complaint, the court stated:

“Specifically, section 3–107(a)

still requires the plaintiff to name, as defendants, either the administrative agency that made the final decision at issue in the case, or the director or agency head, in his or her official capacity. If a plaintiff names just the administrative agency, but fails to name all persons who were parties of record to the decision, then the amended language of the statute would allow for the plaintiff to name and serve the additional necessary parties within a renewed 35 day time limit. Conversely, if plaintiff names just the director or agency head, in his or her official capacity, as defendants in a complaint for administrative review, and fails to name the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, then the plaintiff would again have the right to name the administrative agency as an additional defendant and provide for service within the 35 day limit. This is how the court reads 735 ILCS 5/3–107(a) [ (West 2012) ].

In the instant case, plaintiff did not name any defendant in its complaint that would have allowed for naming additional parties under the strict language of section 3–107(a)

. In this case, the plaintiff named the Teachers' Retirement System, Illinois as the only defendant. The Illinois Teachers' Retirement System is simply the name of the pension system at issue in the underlying administrative decision. Clearly, the Illinois Teachers Retirement System is not the administrative agency responsible for the final decision, nor does this court consider it to be a board, committee, or government entity, such that by naming it as a defendant, plaintiff should be granted 35 additional days to name additional parties, such as employees, agents, or members, in their official capacities, and have them properly served. Equally as clearly, the Illinois Teachers' Retirement System is not a director or agency head, such that, by naming it as defendant, plaintiff should be given 35 additional days to name the Board of Trustees of the Teachers' Retirement System as an additional defendant in this case. Therefore, based upon the unambiguous language of 735 ILCS 5/3–107 [ (West 2012) ], and the specific facts of this case as they relate to the named defendant in plaintiff's complaint for administrative review, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the complaint and respondent's motion to dismiss shall be granted with prejudice.

This decision necessarily requires the court to reject plaintiff's additional contention that Illinois public policy indicates that adding parties in the instant case should be allowed. This court finds that position to be without sufficient merit to justify plaintiff's request. The case of Ultsch [ ] is controlling in this case, and based upon the previously stated position of the court, the facts of this case do not trigger the legislature's reaction to the supreme court's decision in the Ultsch case as seen by the legislature's amendments to relevant statutes in the Administrative Review Act. Time limits for bringing these type of actions are set forth in 735 ILCS 5/3–103

[ (West 2012) ], and such limits would be circumvented, if not eliminated, by allowing for the adding of parties and serving of summons outside of the exceptions addressed earlier in this opinion as contained in the amended language of 735 ILCS 5/3–107(a) [ (West 2012) ].” (Emphasis in original.)

The court found plaintiff's request of the circuit clerk to issue a summons at the time it filed its complaint was sufficient to constitute a good-faith effort to comply with the statutory requirements regarding service of summons. The court denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider.

¶ 8 This appeal followed.

¶ 9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 A. Standard of Review

¶ 11 Plaintiff appeals from an order granting defendant's motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to section 2–619 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(735 ILCS 5/2–619 (West 2012) ). This court conducts a de novo review of a section 2–619 dismissal order. Illinois Ass'n of Realtors v. Stermer , 2014 IL App (4th) 130079, ¶ 16, 378 Ill.Dec. 887, 5 N.E.3d 267. Further, resolving this particular issue requires us to construe a section of the Administrative Review Law, and issues of statutory construction are likewise reviewed de novo.

Bettis v. Marsaglia, 2014 IL 117050, ¶ 12, 387 Ill.Dec. 659, 23 N.E.3d 351.

“When construing a statute, this court's primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. [Citation.] The best indication of legislative intent is the language used in the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citation.]

It is improper for a court to depart from the plain statutory language by reading into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. [Citation.] Words and phrases should not be viewed in isolation, but should be considered in light of other relevant provisions of the statute. [Citation.] Further, each word, clause and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable construction, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. [Citation.] This court presumes that the legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. [Citation.] Where statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect without resort to other aids of construction. [Citation.] However, where the meaning of an enactment is unclear from the statutory language itself, the court may look beyond the language employed and consider the purpose behind the law and the evils the law was designed to remedy. [Citation.]” Bettis, 2014 IL 117050, ¶ 13, 387 Ill.Dec. 659, 23 N.E.3d 351

.

¶ 12 As mentioned, the statute we must interpret is part of the Administrative Review Law, which consists of sections 3–101

to 3–113 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/3–101 to 3–113 (West 2012)). Circuit courts may exercise jurisdiction over administrative review cases only as...