Manni v. City of San Diego

• Decision Date: 25 November 2013
• Docket Number: CASE NO: 11-CV-0435W (DHB)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
• Parties: NORA MANNI, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants.

NORA MANNI, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO: 11-CV-0435W (DHB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DATE: November 25, 2013

ORDER GRANTING IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY-

JUDGMENT MOTION [DOC. 46]

Pending before the Court is Defendants City of San Diego and Officer Salvador Hurtado's summary-judgment or, in the alternative, summary-adjudication motion [Doc. 46]. Plaintiff Nora Manni opposes.

The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted and without oral argument under Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion [Doc. 46].

I. BACKGROUND

On June 6, 2010, Plaintiff Nora Manni was in San Diego attending the wedding of her best friend, Peggy Kulato, as the maid of honor. After the wedding, Ms. Manni,the newlyweds, and a group of friends went to a local Pacific Beach bar called "Moondoggies."

The bride's brother, Fourat Kulato, was not allowed to enter Moondoggies because of an issue with his identification. At some point, Ms. Manni alleges that one of the bar's bouncers pushed him. When the groom attempted to intervene, three or four bouncers tackled the groom, handcuffed him, and one of the bouncers punched him in the face. A member of the wedding party then called 911.

At approximately 10:58p.m., Defendant Police Officer Salvador Hurtado and his partner, Officer Mike Sylvester, were dispatched to Moondoggies. (See Galipo Dec. [Doc. 49-1], Ex. 7 (the Dispatch printout) [Doc. 49-8], p.1.) Dispatch reported that one of the bouncers may have assaulted a male. (Hurtado Dep., 15:25-16:8.¹)

Upon arriving, the officers noticed a group of people outside Moondoggies yelling at the bar staff. (Hurtado Dep., 23:1-2; Sylvester Dep., 9:4-11.²) One of the bouncers was holding the groom face down on the ground with his hands handcuffed behind his back. (Hurtado Dep., 23:7-22.) Officer Sylvester approached, helped the groom to his feet, and began walking him toward the patrol car to find out what happened. (Sylvester Dep., 13:3-20, 14:1-7.) Officer Hurtado stayed back about 6 or 8 feet observing the crowd. (Hurtado Dep., 25:2-10.)

When Ms. Kulato, the bride, saw Officer Sylvester walking with her husband, she thought he was being arrested so ran toward them and began trying to talk to Officer Sylvester. (P. Kulato Dep., 61:19-23.³) The officer told Ms. Kulato several times that shecould not come with them. (Id., 61:24-62:1.) However, Ms. Kulato ignored Officer Sylvester and continued to follow. (Id., 62:3-8.) Ms. Kulato also testified that as she followed them, she kept "grabbing my husband's arm so that I could go with both of them." (Id., 83:20-22.)

Officer Hurtado believed Ms. Kulato was attempting to interfere with Officer Sylvester, and intervened. (Hurtado Dep., 28:11-16.) He stepped in front of Ms. Kulato, put his arms on her shoulders, and said "really firmly you cannot go there[.]" (P. Kulato Dep., 62:14-18.) Ms. Kulato, who was crying, pleaded with Officer Hurtado to let her follow Officer Sylvester and her husband, but Officer Hurtado again told her "no, you can't go there." (Id., 62:22-25.) Ms. Kulato ignored him and "proceeded to go there." (Id., 62:25-63:4.) Officer Hurtado then "pulled [her] away," put one of his arms on the "mid range" of her body (i.e., by her stomach), and pushed her back. (Id.)

As Officer Hurtado was focused on Ms. Kulato—and members of the wedding party and bouncers exchanged verbal hostilities—Ms. Manni ran toward Officer Hurtado and, while putting her hand on his shoulder, loudly told him not to push the bride because she was pregnant. (P. Kulato Dep., 64:14-65:1; Manni Dep., 74:14-75:25.⁴) According to Ms. Manni, she had to speak loudly to Officer Hurtado because of the chaos. (Manni Dep., 74:20, 75:3-4.) Officer Hurtado immediately told Ms. Manni she was under arrest, took hold of her left wrist, and he began pushing her towards the nearby patrol car. (Id., 76:23-77:10.) As he moved Ms. Manni toward the car, Officer Sylvester observed men approaching and called for more officers. (Sylvester Dep., 26:16-23.⁵) Officer Hurtado also called for additional officers. (Hurtado Dep., 56:4-6.)

When Officer Hurtado and Ms. Manni reached the car, Officer Hurtado pushed Ms. Manni up against the car, put her left arm behind her back and handcuffed her left wrist. (Manni Dep. 77:25-78:5.) While handcuffing her, Ms. Manni testified that Officer Hurtado "was pushing my face pretty much against the trunk [of the patrol car and], I was saying ouch or something like that." (Id., 79:24-80:1.) After her right wrist was handcuffed, Officer Hurtado placed Ms. Manni in the backseat of the car. (Id., 83:4-11.)

While Officer Hurtado was handcuffing Ms. Manni, he felt a pop in her upper arm and suspected that he may have broken it. (Hurtado Dep., 84:3-9, 86:6-8, 97:1-11.) Once Ms. Manni was placed in the back of the patrol car, she realized her arm was broken because she was in pain. (Manni Dep., 85:25-86:6.) However, while in the back of the car, she did not try to say anything or alert anyone to the fact that she was injured or in pain. (Id., 86:9-16.)

After placing Ms. Manni in the back of the car, Officer Hurtado contacted his supervisor because he believed Ms. Manni was injured. (Hurtado Dep., 97:1-11.) He then called for paramedics and asked a female officer who had arrived on scene, Officer Vanessa Holland, to check Ms. Manni's arm. (Id., 97:16-22.)

Approximately 5 to 10 minutes after Ms. Manni was put in the car, Officer Holland arrived to talk to her. (Manni Dep., 87:1-8.) Ms. Manni told Officer Holland that her "arm is killing me" and an ambulance arrived approximately three to five minutes later. (Id., 87:15-88:2.) The ambulance transported Ms. Manni to the hospital, where she was diagnosed with a broken arm.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Rule 56(c) where the moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). A fact is material when, under the governing substantive law, it could affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can satisfy this burden in two ways: (1) by presenting evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's case; or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. "Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment." T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987).

"The district court may limit its review to the documents submitted for the purpose of summary judgment and those parts of the record specifically referenced therein." Carmen v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, the court is not obligated "to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact." Keenan v. Allen, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Richards v. Combined Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1995)).

If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment merely by demonstrating "that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252) ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's position is not sufficient."). Rather, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by 'the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

When making this determination, the court must view all inferences drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he [or she] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. DISCUSSION

A. The undisputed facts establish that Officer Hurtado had probable cause to arrest Ms. Manni.

"Probable cause exists when, under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers (or within the knowledge of the other officers at the scene), a prudent person would believe the suspect had committed a crime." Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 471 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2001)). Probable cause to arrest is based on an objective standard. U.S. v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, "[p]robable cause exists when, at the time of arrest, the agents know reasonable trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the accused had committed or was committing an offense." Allen v. City of Portland, 73 F.3d 232, 237 (9th Cir. 1995); Aguilera v. Baca, 394 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1214 (C.D. Cal. 2005) ("Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge are sufficient to warrant...