Manning v. Atchison
Decision Date | 23 May 1938 |
Docket Number | No. 4330.,4330. |
Citation | 79 P.2d 922,42 N.M. 381 |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
Parties | MANNINGv.ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Bernalillo County; Thomas J. Mabry, Judge.
Action by Madah Manning against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Company to recover damages for wrongful ejection from defendant's passenger train. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
A passenger, whether right or wrong in dispute with conductor, is under no duty to remain on train until conductor resorts to force for execution of his commands, and is regarded as having been ejected, if he obeys conductor's command to leave train, so as to give rise to cause of action against carrier for damages, if such ejection was wrongful.
W. C. Reid and E. C. Iden, both of Albuquerque, for appellant.
George S. Klock, of Albuquerque, for appellee.
The plaintiff recovered damages from the defendant in the sum of $350.00 for wrongful ejection from the latter's train at Belen, New Mexico, upon which she was traveling as a paid passenger from Albuquerque, New Mexico, to El Paso, Texas.
A man complained to the Albuquerque police that two negro women had stolen $50.00 from his pocket. It was later learned that two negro women had boarded a train at Albuquerque with tickets for El Paso, Texas. A Jane Doe warrant was issued and the night captain of police communicated with the agent or special officer of the defendant at Belen, New Mexico. He gave a description of the women and requested that the pickpockets, if found on the train, be detained. Instead of the pickpockets the plaintiff, a resident of Albuquerque for fourteen years, and lately graduated from the high school, and her sister, respectable colored women of good reputation, in no way connected with the alleged offense, were taken off the train at Belen. The testimony is in sharp conflict. Appellee claims that the conductor ejected her and her sister from the train without giving them any reason for so doing or telling them that they were charged with a crime. The conductor, on the other hand, testified as follows:
If the conductor had known that the special officer was a deputy sheriff, and was acting as such, his conduct, if as delineated, would have been exemplary. Brunswick & W. R. Co. v. Ponder, 117 Ga. 63, 43 S.E. 430, 60 L.R.A. 713, 97 Am.St.Rep. 152; Owens v. Wilmington, Etc., R. R. Co., 126 N.C. 139, 35 S.E. 259, 78 Am.St.Rep. 642; Beasley v. Hines, 143 Ark. 54, 219 S.W. 757, 15 A.L.R. 864 and anno. 885; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Byrley, 152 Ky. 35, 153 S.W. 36, Ann.Cas. 1915B, 240 and note; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Pack, 192 Ky. 74, 232 S.W. 36; note 15 A.L.R. 886; Thompkins v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 211 F. 391, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 791; Clark v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 84 W.Va. 526, 100 S.E. 480, 7 A.L.R. 117; Gassenheimer v. W. Ry. of Ala., 175 Ala. 319, 57 So. 718, 40 L.R.A., N.S., 998 and notes; Mayfield v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 97 Ark. 24, 133 S.W. 168, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 525; 10 Am.Jur. 272; 4 R.C.L. 1181. At page 1193 of 4 R.C.L., § 617, it is stated:
Whether a railway company is responsible for the trespass of its special officer, wearing the garb of a railway employee, who removes an innocent passenger from a train without disclosing the purpose, and later, in the capacity of deputy sheriff, arrests the passenger, we are not called upon to decide, since the court found that the conductor was alone responsible for the removal of plaintiff.
The findings are that, without making inquiry or investigation as to the identity of the parties, the conductor requested the plaintiff and her sister to leave the train at Belen; that they asked why they were being put off, but were not informed, and that they were removed from the train against their respective wills. The court also found:
“That when said plaintiff and her sister left said defendant's train pursuant to the request of defendant's conductor, the said conductor placed the said plaintiff and her sister in the custody of H. L. Rickard who was an agent and employee of said defendant.
“That said defendant by its agent wrongfully and unlawfully ejected and imprisoned said plaintiff and her sister when no criminal charge whatever had been made against the said plaintiff and her sister.
“That the failure of the defendant's conductor of the defendant's train and the special officer of the defendant who had the plaintiff and her sister in charge after their said removal from defendant's train to interrogate the plaintiff and her sister as to who they were, their names and their places of residence, was an act of gross injustice on the part of the defendant's conductor and on the part of defendant's officer, H. L. Rickard, and exhibits gross negligence on the part of the said defendant's conductor and said defendant's officer and agent.
“That the descriptions which were given by officer, Russell C. Charlton, to the defendant's ticket agent at Belen, New Mexico, was not observed by the defendant's ticket agent at Belen, New Mexico, as the plaintiff and her sister who were unlawfully restrained at Belen, New Mexico, did not fulfill the descriptions that officer, Russell C. Charlton, communicated to the defendant's agent at Belen, New Mexico, and that there was not even a faint resemblance to the plaintiff and her said sister.”
The Jane Doe warrant (the validity of which may well be questioned, 6 C.J.S., Arrest, p. 578 § 4; 5 C.J., p. 394; 4 Am. Jur., p. 9) was issued in another county and was not in the hands of the deputy sheriff at Belen. His only authority was a message from the police department of Albuquerque containing the description of the two negro women pickpockets for whom the warrant was issued. Appellant cites 2 R.C.L., p. 450, par. 6, which states:
***”
The court found that there was no investigation made and there evidently was no care or discrimination exercised, since the Albuquerque police officer reported to his superior as follows:
***”
[1] It is the duty of an officer before making an arrest without a warrant not only to make a careful investigation as to the identity of the accused, but to give the party notice. 6 C.J.S., Arrest, p. 602, § 6, states the rule as follows:
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