Manning v. Leighton
| Decision Date | 13 December 1892 |
| Citation | 26 A. 258,65 Vt. 84 |
| Parties | JEROME F. MANNING v. BENJAMIN F. LEIGHTON |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
FEBRUARY TERM, 1891
General assumpsit. Heard at the December term, 1890, START J., presiding, upon the report of a referee. Judgment pro forma for the plaintiff. The defendant excepts. The opinion states the case.
Judgment reversed, and judgment for defendant.
Stewart & Wilds for the defendant.
Before ROSS, Ch. J., TAFT, MUNSON AND THOMPSON, JJ.
The tribunal of arbitration which met at Geneva, in Switzerland, under the provisions of the treaty of Washington, for the adjustment of the claims of the United States against Great Britain, known as the Alabama claims awarded to the United States a certain sum in gross in satisfaction of its demands. In 1874, the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims was established by act of Congress to effect a distribution of the sum so awarded; but after the satisfaction of all claims which the court was authorized to allow, a portion of the award remained undistributed, and was covered into the treasury of the United States. In 1882, this court was reestablished for the allowance of claims directly resulting from damage done on the high seas by Confederate cruisers, and claims for the payment of premiums charged for war risks after the sailing of any Confederate cruiser; and provision was made for the payment of the claims so allowed by the secretary of the treasury out of the balance of the Geneva award not appropriated to claims allowed under the previous act. This suit is to recover for services rendered in the prosecution of claims of the second class above named before the Court of Commissioners as thus reestablished.
Soon after the passage of the act of 1882, the plaintiff undertook to prosecute the demands of certain complainants, under contracts by which he was to have one-half of the amount recovered and collected, and was to make no charge unless recovery was had. These demands were based upon payments made by the complainants as agents of certain beneficiaries, who had afterwards reimbursed such complainants for the sums advanced. While these claims were pending, the court promulgated a construction of the statute under which they were presented, to the effect that when payment of premiums had been made by one party in his own name for the benefit of others, and the amount of such payment had been refunded to him by the persons for whose benefit the payment was made, the petition should be made out and sworn to in the name of the party who paid the premiums, on behalf of the persons for whose benefit such payment was made, and should state the names and residences of the parties beneficially interested, and the amount of their respective interests; and that separate judgments should be entered in favor of such beneficiaries. After this was promulgated, the petitions in the cases in which the plaintiff rendered the services sued for were amended accordingly. The plaintiff subsequently continued the prosecution of the claims under such circumstances regarding employment by the beneficiaries as will be hereafter stated. Previous to the 15th day of July, 1885, the proofs were completed, and the claims ready for judgment as the petitions then stood. On that day the court announced a further decision, to the effect that where the claimant's administrator received his appointment without the United States, ancillary administration must be taken out in the District of Columbia, and that the ancillary administrator only could maintain the claim of the decedent and take judgment thereon. It was also held that a judgment could not be rendered in favor of a guardian.
On the 29th day of July, 1885, and before any further action had been taken by the plaintiff upon the claims in question in view of these decisions, the plaintiff was prohibited from appearing in the Court of Commissioners, and from exercising in any way the functions of an attorney and counsellor of that court; and the clerk was authorized to substitute for the plaintiff's name the name of any other attorney, upon the receipt of a written request to that effect from the claimant or his legal representative. The plaintiff did not appear in court after this, and rendered no further services in connection with the claims; but he entered into an arrangement with one Edward E. Holman, who was then a clerk in his office, by which it was agreed that Holman should procure an appointment in the Orphans' Court of the district as ancillary administrator of the several beneficiaries, and appear in the several cases in the interest of the plaintiff and take judgment upon the several claims, and receive from the plaintiff for these services a certain share of the amounts collected. Before anything had been done under this agreement, Holman abandoned his employment as the plaintiff's clerk and commenced practice for himself; and he thereupon procured the defendant to take out the administration made necessary by the above decision. After duly qualifying under his appointments as administrator, the defendant employed Holman to appear in the several cases and obtain judgment. Holman was regularly substituted in place of the plaintiff as attorney, and prosecuted the claims in behalf of the defendant. But no further proofs were furnished, except the depositions of the defendant, in which he referred to the proofs already on file, and expressed his willingness to accept as correct the amounts therein named. Judgments were obtained in due course, of which the defendant received part satisfaction.
The beneficiaries whose claims were thus preferred for allowance by the plaintiff, and of whose estates the defendant was thus appointed administrator, with the exception of Henry W. Slicer, died in foreign countries, and left estates which were there administered. In some of the cases the entire service of the plaintiff is shown to have been rendered after the death of the beneficiary, and this is apparently true of all the cases, except that in the case of Raynsford the initiatory proceedings were before his death. In some of the cases the plaintiff was directly employed or clearly recognized by the personal representative of the beneficiary in the country of principal administration, as attorney for the further prosecution of the claim; but no adoption of the contract made with the complainant is shown in any case. Slicer died in Baltimore, Md., leaving minor children, of whom Laura G. Cooper was the duly appointed guardian. The amendment and subsequent prosecution of the petition by the plaintiff was done as her attorney. Raynsford died at Rio Janeiro, in Brazil, leaving a widow, who was there duly appointed his administratrix. She furnished such further proofs as the plaintiff called for. Grossman died in the kingdom of Prussia, leaving a widow who was appointed his executrix, and who continued the plaintiff as her attorney. Miguel Bou died in Barcelona, in Spain, and the petition in his case was further prosecuted in the name of his son as executor, who recognized the plaintiff as attorney for the complainant, and appointed an agent to protect the beneficiary's interest. Zangroniz was a member of the firm of Y. M. Zangroniz & Co., the other partners being Baron Kessel and Sebastian de Lassa, residents of Cuba. One Kerlegand, of Havana, was appointed executor, etc., of the estate of Zangroniz, and recognized the plaintiff as his attorney in the prosecution of the decedent's claim. But no judgment was rendered in favor of the Zangroniz estate; the judgment upon this claim being awarded to Kessel and De Lassa as surviving partners, but without any such judgment being asked by them or by any representative or attorney in their behalf. Cosme de la Torriente died in Cuba, and one Rionda was duly appointed administrator of his estate, and as such agreed that the plaintiff should receive for his services fifty per cent of any judgment obtained, and should have a lien upon any draft which might be issued in payment of such judgment, and be the lawful custodian of such draft until the amount due him should be paid. The defendant has settled his several administration accounts, and, with the exception of the amounts received on the Zangroniz claim and in the Slicer estate, has paid over the sums received, less the expenses allowed, to the personal representatives of the several decedents in the foreign countries named.
The plaintiff sought to establish before the referee an express promise by the defendant to pay for these services. The referee having failed to find that any promise was made, the plaintiff now claims that the circumstances were such that the law will imply one. This claim must rest upon one of two grounds; either that the defendant has received and disposed of a fund upon which the plaintiff had a lien, and out of which it was the duty of the defendant to see that the plaintiff was paid; or that the defendant has received the benefit of the plaintiff's services under such circumstances that the law casts upon him the burden of compensation.
But the defendant suggests that the plaintiff's only remedy upon a claim of this nature was in the court where the defendant accounted for the estates. The case shows that to establish a claim against a deceased person's estate in the District of Columbia the claim must be filed with the register of wills within thirteen months after the issue of letters of administration, and that the notice required by law to be given to creditors in such cases was duly given by the defendant, but that the plaintiff did not, within the period named, file any claims against these estates. Ordinarily the persons referred to as creditors of an estate are those who had claims against...
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