Manning v. Noa

• Decision Date: 02 April 1956
• Docket Number: Nos. 69,70,s. 69
• Citation: 76 N.W.2d 75,345 Mich. 130,77 A.L.R.2d 955
• Parties: , 77 A.L.R.2d 955 Lucille A. MANNING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bishop Thomas L. NOA, Catholic Bishop of Marquette, Individually and as Trustee of St. Peter's Cathedral, Marquette, Michigan, Defendant-Appellant. Malcolm A. MANNING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bishop Thomas L. NOA, Catholic Bishop of Marquette, Individually and as Trustee of St. Peter's Cathedral, Marquette, Michigan, Defendant-Appellant. *
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 75

76 N.W.2d 75

345 Mich. 130, 77 A.L.R.2d 955

Lucille A. MANNING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bishop Thomas L. NOA, Catholic Bishop of Marquette,

Individually and as Trustee of St. Peter's

Cathedral, Marquette, Michigan,

Defendant-Appellant.

Malcolm A. MANNING, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Bishop Thomas L. NOA, Catholic Bishop of Marquette,

Individually and as Trustee of St. Peter's

Cathedral, Marquette, Michigan,

Defendant-Appellant.

^*

Nos. 69, 70.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 2, 1956.

Eldredge & McDonald, Marquette, for defendant-appellant.

Baldwin & Kendricks, Marquette, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before the Entire Bench.

SMITH, Justice.

This is not an easy case. The difficulty arises from the fact that the plaintiff, though grievously injured, is said to be a law violator, whose turpitude bars her from recovery. She had, in truth, been playing bingo at Cathedral Hall, St. Peter's Cathedral, in Marquette. She was injured while leaving the church property, and was awarded damages. Her case is analogized to that of a woman aborted who sought to recover damages from the doctor, Nash v. Meyer, 54 Idaho 283, 31 P.2d 273, to that of a participant in a fist-fight suing his adversary, Galbraith v. Fleming, 60 Mich. 403, 27 N.W. 581, and to that involving the consort of a strumpet, who, having lost his wallet, sued the hotel, alleging that he came within the statutory definition of a 'guest,' Curtis v. Murphy, 63 Wis. 4, 22 N.W. 825. We have meditated long on the case. A rogue does not appeal to our conscience. Yet even a rogue may have a cause of action and so, a fortiori, may Mrs. Manning, who is no rogue.

In more detail, this was the situation: On Tuesday, May 23, 1950, Mrs. Manning, a resident of the city of Marquette, at about 7:15 p. m., went to St. Peter's Cathedral to attend a bingo game regularly sponsored by the church. It is estimated that approximately 400 persons were in attendance at the game on this particular evening. The game was open to the public and the cards necessary for playing were available for the price of $1.00 each. About 10:15 p. m. the game was concluded and plaintiff, along with the rest of the crowd, left the hall. (The exit consisted of double doors, illuminated on the outside by an ornamental light fixture above and to the right of the doors as one leaves the building.) Plaintiff came out of the left side of the righthand door and walked toward the left on the private walk in preparation to turning left where it joins the public sidewalk. The night was dark and plaintiff was in the middle of a crowd. As she walked along in this company and in the darkness, she 'stepped into this hole' and fell to the ground, sustaining serious injuries.

Action was brought against Bishop Thomas L. Noa, of Marquette, individually and as trustee of St. Peter's Cathedral. Upon motion granted below, the Bishop in his individual capacity was dismissed as a party defendant and he appears here as Bishop of the Diocese, holding title to the premises as trustee for St. Peter's Cathedral Parish and, as conceded, the person who 'individually or through his agents, employees and assigns, operated St. Peter's Cathedral.' The action so brought was in tort, and was based upon the negligence of defendant in failing to maintain 'the walk-ways and means of egress from the premises in a reasonably safe condition.' In the one case (No. 46674) plaintiff Lucille A. Manning claims damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of her fall and in the other (No. 46675) her husband sues for damages for medical expenses, loss of services and consortium. (Since the husband's action is controlled by decision in his wife's case we shall hereafter refer only to Lucille A. Manning as plaintiff.)

Defendant has taken a general appeal from a judgment for plaintiff, entered upon the jury's verdict and from the trial court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict made at the conclusion of plaintiff's case. Execution was stayed upon the filing of a certified copy of the insurance policy. Since this appeal is directed only to the trial court's failure to direct a verdict at the close of plaintiff's proofs, our decision will be based on the status of the proofs and pleadings at the time the motion was made. Hilliker v. Jewel Oil & Gas Co., 277 Mich. 615, 270 N.W. 158 (rehearing), and all legitimate inferences from plaintiff's testimony will be construed as strongly as possible in plaintiff's favor. Turnbull v. Roseland Park Cemetery Association, 341 Mich. 677, 68 N.W.2d 753; Bennett v. Hill, 342 Mich. 754, 71 N.W.2d 220.

Our doors are open to both the virtuous and the villainous. We do not, however, lend our aid to the furtherance of an unlawful project, nor do we decide, as between two scoundrels, who cheated whom the more. Rarely, indeed, are such cases brought before us, possibly from the result of the highwayman's case, reported in 2 Evans' Pothier on Obligations, p. 2 (3d Amer.ed.):

'There is a tradition that a suit was instituted by a highwayman against his companion to account for his share of the plunder, and a copy of the proceedings has been published as found amongst the papers of a deceased attorney. It was a bill in the Exchequer, which avoided stating in direct terms the criminality of the engagement, and is founded upon a supposed dealing as co-partners in rings, watches, et cetera, but the mode of dealing may be manifestly inferred. The tradition receives some degree of authenticity, by the order of the court being such as would in all probability ensue from such an attempt. The order was, that the bill should be dismissed with costs for impertinence, and the solicitor fined 50L. The printed account is accompanied by a memorandum which states the particular times and places where the plaintiff and defendant were afterwards executed. Europ.Mag.1787, vol. ii p. 360. (a)'

Whether or not the case is suppositious it well illustrates a general principle. For more modern discussion see Piechowiak v. Bissell, 305 Mich. 486, 9 N.W.2d 685, involving a charge of malicious prosecution by one of the parties to a criminal conspiracy against the other.

Inasmuch as the bearing of asserted illegality of plaintiff's actions upon a recovery for tort is involved, a problem involving complex considerations of individual and public morality, we deem it prudent to point out that our opinion is narrowly circumscribed. We have not a case of 'splitting up the loot,' i. e., and action for the conversion of property obtained under an illegal contract. Nor do we have the case where the defendant was acting in concert with plaintiff, for here defendant is charged only with negligence. We are not, moreover, faced with the case in which plaintiff was injured during her participation in an unlawful act, such as rioters injuring one another in the general turmoil. In all such cases the plaintiff must prove the illegal transaction in order to make out his case. But in the case at bar the game is over. The evening has come to a close and the day's pursuits, wicked or pure, are over. The plaintiff is proceeding by normal means of egress, and, it is asserted, in the exercise of due care, towards her domicile, when she is hurt while still on the church premises. Will the action lie? Or is it to be barred by the evil range of the evening's activities? That is to say, is this properly a case where recovery cannot be had because of the unlawful act of the plaintiff, which was a contributing cause of the damage suffered?

Assuming, but not deciding, that, as Mrs. Manning abandoned her evening's diversions and started for home, she still wore a halo of illegality, or, as defendant puts it, still 'was tarred with the illegal transaction,' is she outside the law, precluded from recovery? We find no warrant for the position. It goes too far. In order to have such effect an unlawful act must be one which the law recognizes as having a causal connection with the injury complained of. If the unlawful act was merely collateral to the cause of action sued upon, and did not proximately contribute to the injury, recovery is not barred. 52 Am.Jur., Torts, § 92. A moment's reflection will confirm the justice of the rule. A passenger on a railroad train should be able to recover for the negligence of his carrier, resulting in the train's derailment and his injury therefrom, even though he was swearing like a trooper at the time he was hurt, in direct violation of C.L.1948, § 466.10, Stat.Ann. § 22.269, which forbids the...