Manning v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 17 June 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-2258,96-2258 |
| Citation | 146 F.3d 808 |
| Parties | 28 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,431, 98 CJ C.A.R. 3084 Richard MANNING, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Peter V. Domenici, Jr., Dolan & Domenici, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
John W. Zavitz, Assistant United States Attorney (John J. Kelly, United States Attorney), United States Attorney's Office, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before ANDERSON, LOGAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Richard Manning appeals from the district court's grant of declaratory and injunctive relief to the United States. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
Manning owns an ore-processing plant located on an unpatented millsite within the boundaries of the Gila National Forest. Manning has operated this facility since 1978. On October 5, 1993, two employees of the United States Forest Service inspected Manning's millsite after entering the site through the locked fence surrounding the ore-processing facility.
Manning filed this action in January 1995 as a civil rights complaint, seeking declaratory and monetary relief against the two Forest Service employees as well as one New Mexico state employee based on their allegedly unauthorized inspection of the millsite. Manning subsequently voluntarily dismissed the claim for monetary relief against the individual federal employees and dismissed all his claims against the state employee, leaving only claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against the federal employees in their official capacities. In his complaint, Manning requested the court to "declare that Defendants must honor and observe the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution in gaining access to and searching Plaintiff's mill site and buildings, and must do so by first obtaining a warrant based upon probable cause or by complying with the guidelines for administrative and regulatory searches...."
The United States answered as the real party in interest and was substituted as the named Defendant. The United States also asserted a counterclaim for declaratory and injunctive relief against Manning, requesting that Manning be required to provide the Forest Service with a key to the millsite and requesting that Manning be enjoined from any further operations at the site until the Forest Service had approved a new plan of operations, or a plan for reclamation if operations had ceased, and until Manning had provided the necessary bond. In the counterclaim, the United States asserted that although the Forest Service originally approved Manning's operating plan in 1978, Manning had substantially modified operations at the millsite since that time. The United States claimed that the "modified operations ha[d] not been approved by the Forest Service and are not in compliance with the previous approved plan of operations."
In response, Manning claimed he had modified and updated the original operating plan "without objection from the Forest Service." Manning further requested that the court "declare that his operating plan was updated, modified and supplemented in 1985 and remains valid and in full force and effect through the year 2000."
The district court granted Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment insofar as it required Manning to provide the Forest Service with a key allowing access to the area surrounding the mill, although the court stated that Manning could separately lock the mill buildings and was not required to provide the Forest Service with unrestricted access to the mill. Following the trial, the court awarded declaratory judgment in favor of Defendant, holding that no valid plan of operations was in effect and that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
On appeal, Manning asserts (1) the district court erred in striking Manning's jury demand for his claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act; (2) the district court erred in refusing to grant Manning's motion to amend his counterclaim to add damage claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680; (3) a number of the district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous; (4) a number of the district court's legal conclusions are contrary to law; (5) the district court erred in determining that the Multiple Use Mining Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. § 601, et seq., applies to unpatented millsite claims.
Manning first asserts the district court erred in denying his demand for a jury trial for his claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act. This court reviews de novo the trial court's determination that Manning was not entitled to a jury trial. See Bowdry v. United Airlines, Inc., 58 F.3d 1483, 1489 (10th Cir.1995).
Manning notes that the Declaratory Judgment Act "preserves the right to jury trial for both parties" and asserts the district court therefore erred in refusing to grant a jury trial for the factual issues raised by his claims under this Act. In so arguing, Manning is apparently suggesting that the Declaratory Judgment Act provides a right to a jury trial whenever a party is seeking declaratory relief and there are factual issues to be determined. 1
Manning is correct in asserting that the Declaratory Judgment Act preserves the right to a jury trial. See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959); see also Northgate Homes, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 126 F.3d 1095, 1098-99 (8th Cir.1997) (); Hargrove v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 125 F.2d 225, 228 (10th Cir.1942) (). Nevertheless, "[s]eeking declaratory relief does not entitle one to a jury trial where the right to a jury trial does not otherwise exist." Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 662 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 49, 136 L.Ed.2d 13 (1996).
Whether Manning is entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment depends on whether his action is equitable or legal in nature. See Bowdry, 58 F.3d at 1489. Actions at law entitle the parties to a jury, but equitable cases do not. See id. "Declaratory relief may be legal or equitable depending on the basic nature of the underlying issues." United States v. New Mexico, 642 F.2d 397, 400 (10th Cir.1981); see also Northgate Homes, Inc., 126 F.3d at 1099. In this case, Manning's action was equitable in nature. Manning was not requesting monetary damages, but was seeking only equitable relief in the form of a declaratory judgment and injunction. The fact that he requested a declaratory judgment, in connection with the injunctive relief, did not alter the basic equitable nature of his action. See Robinson v. Brown, 320 F.2d 503, 505 (6th Cir.1963) (); see also Northgate Homes, Inc., 126 F.3d at 1099. The district court therefore did not err in striking Manning's jury demand as to his claims under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Manning next asserts the district court erred in denying his motion to amend his reply counterclaim to add damage claims under the FTCA. This court reviews the district court's decision to deny Manning's motion to amend for abuse of discretion. See Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co. v. Ellis, 28 F.3d 1033, 1041 (10th Cir.1994).
Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party may amend the pleadings after the time for amending as a matter of course "only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party," but that "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). The Supreme Court has stated that "[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason--such as ... repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.--the leave sought should, as the rules require, be 'freely given.' " Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S.Ct. 227, 230, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962).
The district court articulated a number of reasons for denying Manning's motion to amend. The district court noted that the case had been pending for over a year, that "the pleadings ha[d] been amended repeatedly, including two previous 'reply counterclaims' by Plaintiff," and that the motion to amend was made shortly before the close of discovery and less than four months prior to the scheduled trial.
The district court also stated that there were jurisdictional flaws with the proposed reply counterclaim. In asserting the FTCA claim, Manning did not specify the tort or the basis of his tort claim other than incorporating federal constitutional violations previously alleged. In the district court, Manning argued that those constitutional torts could be asserted under the FTCA. 2 As the district court noted, however, constitutional torts are not actionable under the FTCA. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend on the above grounds.
Manning next challenges eight of the district court's factual findings, claiming they are incomplete, misinterpret testimony, contain improper implications, and rely on noncredible testimony while disregarding contrary credible testimony.
This court must accept the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. See Exxon Corp. v. Gann, 21 F.3d 1002, 1005 (10th Cir.1994). "A finding of fact is 'clearly...
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