Mannings v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, 58-3554-CIV-T-17A.

• Decision Date: 30 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 58-3554-CIV-T-17A.,58-3554-CIV-T-17A.
• Citation: 796 F. Supp. 1491
• Parties: Andrew L. MANNINGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA (formerly Board of Public Instruction of Hillsborough County, Florida), et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida

796 F. Supp. 1491

Andrew L. MANNINGS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, FLORIDA (formerly Board of Public Instruction of Hillsborough County, Florida), et al., Defendants.

No. 58-3554-CIV-T-17A.

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Tampa Division.

June 30, 1992.

Francisco Rodriguz, term 01/21/92, Warren H. Dawson, Tampa, Fla., for plaintiffs.

Thomas M. Gonzalez, Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez, Walter Crosby Few, Few & Ayala, John William MacKay, John W. MacKay, P.A., Tampa, Fla., for defendants.

ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

KOVACHEVICH, District Judge.

This cause came to be heard before the Honorable Charles R. Wilson, United States Magistrate Judge, upon the Defendant's Amended Motion for Injunctive Relief. Judge Wilson had the authority to hear this motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1), and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. After considering the motion, the memoranda, and argument of counsel at a hearing conducted on January 15, 1992, and being otherwise fully advised on the premises, Judge Wilson recommended that the motion be granted as follows:

1. Permanently enjoin the parties and their counsel in the case captioned Robert John Burr, et al. v. School Board of Hillsborough County, Florida, Case No. 91-8747-C, in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, and all other persons acting with them, from interfering with the jurisdiction of this Court and from proceeding with the prosecution of said suit, or any other suit which encroaches upon the orders of this court in this case;

2. Permanently enjoin the parties and their counsel in the administrative proceedings captioned Norman Edwin Armstrong, Jr. et al. v. The School Board of Hillsborough County, Florida, Case No. 91-5333R, with the State of Florida Department of Administration, Division of Administrative Hearings, and all other persons acting with them, from interfering with the jurisdiction of this Court and from proceedings with the prosecution of said administrative proceedings, or any other administrative proceedings which encroach upon the orders of this Court in this case;

3. Permanently enjoin the Judges of the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County, Florida from proceeding further in Case No. 91-8747-C, except for purposes of dismissing the action with prejudice, and from otherwise interfering with the jurisdiction of this Court in the case of Andrew L. Mannings v. School Board of Hillsborough County, Florida, 58-3554-CIV-T-17A;

4. Permanently enjoin any representative of the Department of Administration, Division of Administrative Hearings, from proceedings further in Case No. 91-5333R, except for purposes of dismissing the proceedings with prejudice, and from otherwise interfering with the jurisdiction of this Court in the case of Andrew L. Mannings v. School Board of Hillsborough County, Florida, 58-3554-CIV-T-17A.

This Court has reviewed the findings of fact set out in the Report and Recommendation and incorporates them by reference (A copy of the report and recommendation is attached hereto). However, this Court must make a de novo determination with respect to this dispositive motion to which the intervenors have filed an objection. 28 U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); United Steelworkers of America v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 828 F.2d 1001, 1005 (3d Cir.1987; Hanntz v. Shiley, Inc., 766 F.Supp. 258, 262 (D.N.J.1991).

On February 21, 1992, intervenors filed a Written Objection to Proposed Findings and Recommendations in Magistrate's Report. They requested that this Court reject the Report and Recommendation; and that the Court receive further evidence and oral argument in this matter. The intervenors summarized their specific objections as follows:

Intervenors object to the analysis of Blalock and election set forth in footnote 5, the finding that the intervenors cannot seek relief through intervention in this action, and the recommendations set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the `Conclusion' section of that report. Intervenors simply contend that the current plan was not adopted in accordance with state law, and that the plan itself violates state constitutional guarantees.

Nonetheless, the intervenors failed to bring to the attention of this court the decision in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970), where the Supreme Court clarifies the proper application of the Anti-Injunction Act.

In Atlantic, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (BLE) had been picketing a switching yard owned by Atlantic Coastline Railroad (ACL). Atlantic, 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739. ACL requested an injunction which was eventually granted by a Florida court. As a result, BLE moved in state court to have the injunction dissolved but was unsuccessful. Id. Thereafter, BLE returned to the Federal District Court where its request for an injunction was granted. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. It reasoned that the federal injunction was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 2283, commonly known as the Anti-Injunction Act, exceptions either "to protect or effectuate" or as "necessary in aid of the courts jurisdiction." Id. The Supreme Court held that the federal injunction was not justified under the exceptions listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2283 and was therefore improperly issued. Id.

The Anti-Injunction Act, Section 2283, originated as an Anti-Injunction Statute that was passed by congress in 1793. Atlantic, at 285-87, 90 S.Ct. at 1742-43 (general discussion of the background and policy which led Congress to pass the predecessor of Section 2283, the anti-injunction statute of 1793). This statute followed the passage of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, which gave the lower federal courts their powers "not including the power to review directly cases from state courts." The Federal Judiciary Act made it clear that this country has two separate and distinct legal systems which proceed independently of each other with ultimate review in the Supreme Court. Id. at 286, 90 S.Ct. at 1742-43. Therefore, to make this dual system function, Congress passed the Anti-Injunction Statute of 1793 to establish clear lines of demarcation between the Federal and State court systems. Id., citing, Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Gas Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9, 60 S.Ct. 215, 218, 84 L.Ed. 537 (1940).

The present Anti-Injunction Act provides that "a court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The present act should be read as "an absolute prohibition against enjoining state court proceedings, unless the injunction falls within one of three specifically defined exceptions." Id. Furthermore, "since the statutory prohibition against such injunctions in part rests on the fundamental constitutional independence of the States and their courts, the exceptions should not be enlarged by loose statutory construction." Id. at 287, 90 S.Ct. at 1743. Therefore, whenever a court is faced with a question as to the propriety of a federal injunction against state court proceedings, "any doubts ... should be resolved in favor of permitting the state court to proceed in an orderly fashion to finally determine the controversy." Id. at 297, 90 S.Ct. at 1748.

Although the state court proceedings will likely interfere with federal rights and constitutional guarantees which this Court must protect, such does not give this Court the power to enjoin the state court proceedings. See, Id. at 294, 90 S.Ct. at 1746. Moreover, even though this court has jurisdiction, and the requested injunction is related to our jurisdiction, the exception only applies where the requested injunction is absolutely necessary "in aid of" that jurisdiction. See, Id. at 295, 90 S.Ct. at 1747. Thus, since this Court has some doubt as to whether it has the power, based on an exception to Section 2283, to grant the injunction, we decline to do so.

The Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 109 S.Ct. 2180, 104 L.Ed.2d 835 (1989) raises additional doubts as to whether the decision to grant the requested injunction would be proper. Martin reminds us that it is "part of our `deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court'." Id. at 762, 109 S.Ct. at 2184, citing, 18 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4449, p. 417 (1981). "A judgement or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings." Id.

Our decision in this case, to uphold the consent order, may resolve the issues presented as between the parties to the consent order. However, parties who were not involved, and who were not in privity with those involved, can not be denied their day in court. Thus, since issuing the requested injunction would in effect deny the intervenors the opportunity to have their case decided in a court of law, granting the injunction would be improper. Instead, the state court proceedings should be allowed to continue. The state court has the power to resolve the controversy based on applicable federal law with the ultimate review of its determination in the Supreme Court of the United States. Accordingly it is

ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation be REJECTED by this Court and the Motion for Injunctive Relief be DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

CHARLES R. WILSON, United States Magistrate Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Defendant's Amended Motion for Injunctive Relief (doc. 439).¹ The Court has considered the motion, the memoranda, and the argument of counsel at the hearing conducted on January 15, 1992, and is otherwise fully advised on the premises. Based on the...