Manor v. Keeton
| Citation | 2019 Ohio 3260 |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 18CA15 |
| Parties | KINGSTON MOUND MANOR I, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CAROLYN KEETON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Ohio) |
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Sara L. Rose and Mark M. McCarthy, Sara L. Rose, LLC, Pickerington, Ohio and Gary D. Kenworthy, Kenworthy Law Office, Circleville, Ohio, for Appellee.
Kristen Finzel Lewis and Baylee Butler, Southeastern Ohio Legal Services, Chillicothe, Ohio, for Appellant.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry dismissing Appellant's counterclaim for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Appellant, Carolyn Keeton, contends the trial court erred when it dismissed her counterclaims for violation of the Fair Housing Act, codified in 42 U.S.C. 3601, et seq., and the Ohio Civil Rights Act, codified in R.C. 4112, et seq. Upon review, we find no merit to Appellant's arguments. Accordingly, we overrule her sole assignment of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} The underlying matter began with the January 18, 2018, filing of a complaint in forcible entry and detainer by Appellee, Kingston Mound Manor I, against Appellant, Carolyn Keeton, in the Circleville Municipal Court, after Appellant stopped paying rent. The eviction action contained claims for possession and money damages. Appellee filed her answer and counterclaims on February 26, 2018, alleging sex-based housing discrimination in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. and the Ohio Civil Rights Act, R.C. 4112 et seq. Upon Appellee's request, the case was certified to the Pickaway County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶3}Appellee's counterclaim for sex-based housing discrimination stemmed from an allegation that Chad Workman, allegedly a maintenance employee of Appellee, groped Appellant, made sexually explicit remarks to her, forced her to perform sexual acts, and then threatened her by telling her that if word got out about the incident, it would not be good for her. The counterclaim alleged these acts occurred as part of a single incident that took place while Mr. Workman was in Appellant's apartment installing window blinds, approximately eight months before the eviction action was filed. Appellant further noted in her counterclaim that Mr. Workman had a master key to all apartments, including hers. Appellee filed an answer admitting Mr. Workman possessed a master key and that he was an employee.1 The parties dispute on appeal whether the counterclaims alleged claims based upon direct or vicarious liability, or both.
{¶4} Thereafter, Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaims for failure to state a claim, in accordance with Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Appellant filed a lengthy memorandum contra the motion to dismiss. Over the objection of Appellant, the trial court dismissed her claims for failure to state a claim in accordance with Civ.R. 12(B)(6) on June 18, 2018. In dismissing Appellant's counterclaims, the trial court construed the claims as being ones for vicarious liability only, based upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. The trial court found, in part, that "there [was] no way to characterize the alleged assault that would bring it within the scope of employment." The trial court further found that the incident could not be "described as calculated to facilitate or promote the business for which the maintenance worker was employed."
{¶5} Appellee subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of damages, which the trial court granted in part. The trial court reserved, however, the right to hear evidence and arguments regarding the cleaning costs and trash removal. Then, on October 10, 2018, Appellee appeared before the trial court and orally withdrew its remaining claims. The trial court filed a judgment entry the same day dismissing the remaining claims. It is from that final order that Appellant brings her timely appeal, setting forth a single assignment of error for our review.
{¶6} Appellant contends the trial court erred when it dismissed her counterclaims for violation of the Fair Housing Act and Ohio Civil Rights Act. Appellant raises two arguments under her sole assignment of error. First, Appellant contends that reviewed under an aided-by-agency standard for vicarious liability in sexual harassment claims, she stated a claim against Appellee for violation of the Fair Housing Act. Second, Appellant contends she stated a claim against Appellee for violation of the Fair Housing Act and Ohio Civil Rights Act based on a negligence theory of liability. Appellee contends that because Appellant failed to demonstrate the maintenance worker at issue had any supervisory or managerial authority, or that any tangible housing action was taken against her, she has failed to demonstrate any violation of the Fair Housing Act. Appellee also argues the trial court correctly dismissed Appellant's vicarious liability claims because the actions of Mr. Workman were outside the scope of his employment. Further Appellee argues that Appellant's counterclaim failed to allege a negligence claim in the form of a direct liability claim for negligent hiring and/or supervision of the maintenance worker. While Appellee disputes that Mr. Workman was its employee on appeal, it concedes that, for purposes of considering the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, it is appropriate to accept the truth of Appellant's claim that Mr. Workman was Appellee's employee. We begin with a look at our standard of review, as well as a general overview of the Fair Housing Act and Ohio Civil Rights Act, as they relate to sexual harassment claims as a discriminatory housing practice in the context of fair housing.
{¶7} A review of the record indicates the trial court dismissed Appellant's complaint for failure to state a claim in accordance with Civ.R. 12(B)(6), upon the motion of Appellee. Because it presents a question of law, we review a trial court's decision regarding a motion to dismiss independently and without deference to the trial court's determination. See Roll v. Edwards, 156 Ohio App.3d 227, 2004-Ohio-767, 805 N.E.2d 162, ¶ 15 (4th Dist.); Noe v. Smith, 143 Ohio App.3d 215, 218, 757 N.E.2d 1164 (4th Dist. 2000).2 "A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint." State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992). A trial court may not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted unless it appears "beyond doubt from the complaint that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to recovery." O'Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 327 N.E.2d 753 (1975), syllabus; see also Taylor v. London, 88 Ohio St.3d 137, 139, 723 N.E.2d 1089 (2000).
{¶8} Furthermore, when considering a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial court must review only the complaint, accepting all factual allegations as true and making every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmoving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988); Estate of Sherman v. Millhon, 104 Ohio App.3d 614,617, 662 N.E.2d 1098 (10th Dist.1995); see also JNS Ents., Inc. v. Sturgell, 4th Dist. Ross No. 05CA2814, 2005-Ohio-3200, ¶ 8. The court, however, need not presume the truth of legal conclusions that are unsupported by factual allegations. McGlone v. Grimshaw, 86 Ohio App.3d 279, 285, 620 N.E.2d 935 (4th Dist.1993); citing Mitchell at 193.
{¶9} We further note that under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief." Civ.R. 8(A)(1). Civ.R. 8(E) further directs that averments contained in a pleading be simple, concise, and direct. Accordingly, "Ohio law does not ordinarily require a plaintiff to plead operative facts with particularity." Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 95 Ohio St.3d 416, 2002-Ohio-2480, 768 N.E.2d 1136, ¶ 29. We observe, however, that " '[i]n a few carefully circumscribed cases,' " a plaintiff must " 'plead operative facts with particularity.' " State ex rel. Edwards v. Toledo City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 72 Ohio St.3d 106, 109, 647 N.E.2d 799 (1995); quoting York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991); citing Mitchell, supra () and Byrd v. Faber, 57 Ohio St.3d 56, 565 N.E.2d 584 (1991) (); see also S.Ct.Prac.R. 12.02(B)(1) (); Civ.R. 9(B) ().
{¶10} Moreover, a plaintiff is not required to plead the legal theory of the case at the pleading stage and need only give reasonable notice of the claim. State ex rel. Harris v. Toledo, 74 Ohio St.3d 36, 656 N.E.2d 334 (1995); see York, supra, at 145 (). Thus, "a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage." York at 145; accord State ex rel. Leneghan v. Husted, 154 Ohio St.3d 60, 2018-Ohio-3361, 110 N.E.3d 1275, ¶ 16 ().
{¶11} The Fair Housing Act was originally enacted in 1968 as part of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. It ...
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