Mansell v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs.
| Decision Date | 23 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 8:18-cv-1307-KKM-SPF |
| Parties | LWANE A. MANSELL, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Lwane A. Mansell, a Florida prisoner, filed a timely[1] pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his conviction. (Doc. 1.) Having considered the petition (id.), Respondent's response in opposition (Doc. 10), and Mansell's reply (Doc. 17), the Court orders that the petition is denied. Furthermore, a certificate of appealability is not warranted.
A Florida jury convicted Mansell of one count of luring or enticing a child and two counts of lewd or lascivious conduct. (Doc. 12-2, Ex. 1, pp. 68-69.) The state trial court sentenced Mansell to a total term of 30 years in prison, followed by five years on probation. (Id., pp. 80-98.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the convictions and sentences. (Doc. 12-3, Ex. 5.) The state postconviction court denied Mansell's motion for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. (Docs. 12-3 through 12-6, Ex. 10.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the denial. (Doc. 12-6, Ex. 14.)
The victim, 11-year-old J.G., moved to Florida with her mother, brother, and aunt. (Doc. 12-2, Ex. 1b, pp. 291-94.) J.G. first met Mansell when he drove up to her family's home sometime after December 18, 2006, saying that he was picking up kids to go to Sunday school and then to see horses. (Id., pp. 294-96.) With her mother's permission, J.G. went with Mansell. (Id., pp. 301-02.) Mansell drove her to his house, and, once there, J.G. saw children's toys in the yard and a doll in the back of Mansell's Jeep. (Id., pp. 302, 349-50.) Mansell went to the closet to get feed for the horses. (Id., pp. 306-07.) J.G. petted, fed, and rode a horse. (Id., pp. 309-11.) Mansell kept giving J.G. a “kind of creepy” grin. (Id., p. 312.) J.G. later asked Mansell to take her home, and he did so. (Id., p. 316.) On the drive back, Mansell continued to grin at J.G. (Id.)
The next day, Mansell returned to J.G.'s home. (Id., pp. 317-18.) After J.G.'s mother talked to Mansell, she asked J.G. if J.G. wanted to go play with the horses. (Id., p. 318.) J.G. went with Mansell to his house and played with a horse; then, they went to another location where there were several horses. (Id., pp. 319-24.) Mansell drove J.G. home. (Id., pp. 326-27.) On December 25, 2006, Mansell had Christmas dinner with J.G. and her family at their home. (Id., p. 327.)
On December 27, 2006, Mansell again came to J.G.'s home and said that they were going to see the horses. (Id., pp. 328-29.) Mansell drove J.G. to his house and told J.G. to follow him inside. (Id.) After J.G. obeyed, Mansell told J.G. to go into his bedroom, and she did so. (Id.) J.G. sat on the bed and Mansell gave her a toy (Id., p. 330.) While J.G. played with the toy, Mansell sat down on the bed close to her. (Id., pp. 330-32.)
J.G. started to move away from Mansell, but he put his arm around her and on her shoulder. (Id., p. 332.) Mansell put his other hand on J.G.'s thigh and started to inch his hand closer to her “private area.” (Id., p. 333.) Mansell touched the “crotch area” of J.G.'s pants; J.G. felt very uncomfortable and started to move away. (Id., p. 334.) Mansell moved his hand toward J.G.'s “breast area” and touched J.G.'s breast. (Id., pp. 335, 365, 369, 380.) J.G. jumped up and said, “No.” (Id., p. 338.)
On the way back to J.G.'s home, Mansell said that he would pay J.G. $50 for helping with the horses, and $10 “if [J.G.] would let him touch” her. (Id., p. 340.) J.G. looked away and did not respond, and Mansell “said not to tell anyone else.” (Id., pp. 340-41.) After Mansell dropped J.G. off at home, J.G. told her mother what happened. (Id., p. 344.)
The next day, December 28, 2006, Mansell came back to J.G.'s house and her mother talked to him. (Id., pp. 344-45.) After he left, J.G.'s mother called the police. (Id., p. 345.) J.G. gave a statement to Deputy Kathleen Pettit. (Id., p. 347.) Mansell also gave a statement to Deputy Pettit. He said that he would tell her some things, but not everything. (Doc. 12-2, Ex. 1c, p. 417.) Mansell stated that he hugged J.G. but did not fondle her. (Id., p. 418.)
Evidence at trial addressed certain omissions or inconsistencies in J.G.'s statements. J.G. testified at trial that Mansell did in fact touch her breast. (Doc. 12-2, Ex. 1b, pp. 369, 380.) J.G.'s written statement to police said that Mansell tried to touch her in that area. (Id., p. 365.) J.G. told Deputy Pettit that J.G. tried to touch her breast, while at trial she testified that what she meant by that was that Mansell did not touch her nipple. (Id., pp. 368-69.) At her deposition (which is permitted in Florida criminal proceedings), when J.G. was asked if Mansell ever touched her breast, she answered that he did not because she took his hand off her shoulder; however, she also stated that she was sure Mansell did touch the upper portion of her breast. (Id., pp. 370, 378-79.) When Deputy Pettit was interviewing J.G., she motioned to her breast in describing where Mansell touched her. (Doc. 12-2, Ex. 1c, p. 423.)
J.G. testified at trial and at her deposition that Mansell touched her leg and was moving towards her “private area.” (Doc. 12-2, Ex. 1b, pp. 333, 376-77.) She did not mention this to Deputy Pettit or in her written statement. (Id., pp. 374-75.) In addition, J.G. testified at trial that Mansell offered her money to touch her, and she also verbally told Deputy Pettit about the offer of money. (Id., pp. 34; Ex. 1c, pp. 412-13.) J.G.'s written statement did not mention the offer of money. (Id., p. 365.) J.G. did not state before the day of trial that Mansell told her not to tell anyone. (Id., pp. 231-38.)
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs this proceeding. Carroll v. Sec'y, DOC, 574 F.3d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir. 2009). Habeas relief under the AEDPA can be granted only if a petitioner is in custody “in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d) provides that federal habeas relief cannot be granted on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the state court's adjudication:
For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), a decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Wi liams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000). The phrase “clearly established Federal law” encompasses the holdings only of the United States Supreme Court “as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Id. at 412. A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of clearly established federal law “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Id.
For purposes of § 2254(d)(2), a state court's findings of fact are presumed correct. See Roling v. Crosby, 438 F.3d 1296, 1301 (11th Cir. 2006) (). A petitioner can rebut the presumption of correctness afforded to a state court's factual findings only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The AEDPA was meant “to prevent federal habeas ‘retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002). Accordingly, “[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, and . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one.” Id. at 694. As a result, to obtain relief under the AEDPA, “a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003) ().
When the last state court to decide a federal claim explains its decision in a reasoned opinion, a federal habeas court reviews the specific reasons as stated in the opinion and defers to those reasons if they are reasonable. Wilson v Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018). When the relevant state-court decision is not accompanied with reasons for the decision-such as a summary affirmance without discussion-the federal court “should ‘look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale [and] presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Id. The state may contest “the presumption by showing that the unexplained...
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